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§ 12-541 requires a claim to be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues “[u]pon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture.” A cause of action accrues “when the plaintiff knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the defendants’ conduct.”

5 App. 248, 251, quoting Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins.

§ 12-542); , (discovery rule developed to address ambiguity of term “accrues”).

Thus, Arizona law recognizes that “one of the fundamental reasons underlying the philosophy of these statutes — the presumed invalidity of a claim allowed to become stale — is not present in the case where the injured plaintiff has no knowledge that such a claim exists.” -52 , -01 (1971).

ctions be “commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrue[d], and not afterward.” Under the common law “discovery rule,” a cause of action accrues “when the plaintiff knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the defendants’ conduct and therefore the statute of limitations does not begin to run until that time.”

Co., -89 , -67 (1995); , 76 n. 6, , 968 n. 6 (1984); Kowske v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc.

Under the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues “when the plaintiff knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the defendants’ conduct and therefore the statute of limitations does not begin to run until that time.”

Our court of appeals expressly adopted the discovery rule in its current form in another medical malpractice case, , (“[A] cause of action in a malpractice case accrues when the plaintiff knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the defendant’s conduct.”).

§ 12-542 bars a medical malpractice action which is not “commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues____” Although the word “accrues” is not statutorily defined, it has been judicially defined as that date “when the plaintiff knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the defendants’ con-duct____”

Arizona has long recognized the “discovery rule.”

accrues when the plaintiff knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the defendants’ conduct and therefore the statute of limitations does not begin to run until that time.”

§ 12-564 [would] remain in effect except that the courts of this state shall follow the discovery rule 5 , ” Kenyon, 142 Ariz. at 87, 88 , 688 P.2d at 979, 980 .

Under the “discovery rule” , which, as stated, was expressly revived by all four justices participating in Kenyon , the date of injury is deemed to occur for purposes of accrual of the cause of action at the time when the injured plaintiff knew or should have known of the defendant’s negligence.

that period is subject to the “discovery rule”

§ 12-564(A) , where the court of appeals held that a medical malpractice action accrued, and the statute began to run, on the date that the victim discovered or reasonably should have discovered that he or she had been injured by the negligence of the treating physician.

division one of this court adopted the “discovery rule,” i.e., the statute of limitations does not begin to run in a malpractice case until the plaintiff knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the defendant’s conduct.

12-542; , Thus, under Arizona law, the question of when appellants knew or should have known of appellees’ negligence is critical to determining whether the statute of limitations has run.

This court, for example, , that the period of limitation under the predecessor to A.R.S.