Searles v. Haldiman
Cited by
- Sanders v. Cobble 744 P.2d 1 Ariz. 1987
- Sullivan & Brugnatelli Advertising Co. v. Century Capital Corp. 734 P.2d 1034 Ariz. Ct. App. 1986
- Matter of Estate of Kerr 667 P.2d 1351 Ariz. Ct. App. 1983
- Valley National Bank v. Dykstra 667 P.2d 1351 Ariz. Ct. App. 1983
- State v. Wimberg 514 P.2d 1258 Ariz. Ct. App. 1973
- Shenfield v. City Court of City of Tucson, Pima County 443 P.2d 443 Ariz. Ct. App. 1968
- Boies v. Anderson 435 P.2d 70 Ariz. Ct. App. 1967
- Cordoba v. Wiswall 425 P.2d 576 Ariz. Ct. App. 1967
- Connolly v. Great Basin Insurance Company 423 P.2d 732 Ariz. Ct. App. 1967
- J. H. Welsh & Son Contracting Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission 420 P.2d 970 Ariz. Ct. App. 1967
- State v. Nixon 420 P.2d 979 Ariz. Ct. App. 1966
- Howard P. Foley Company v. Harris 419 P.2d 735 Ariz. Ct. App. 1966
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Rueda v. Galvez 382 P.2d 239
- Stevens v. Mehagian's Home Furnishings, Inc. 365 P.2d 208
- Ginn v. Superior Court, in and for County of Pima 404 P.2d 721
- Bloch v. Bentfield 403 P.2d 559
- Christian v. Cotten 403 P.2d 825
- State v. Mileham 399 P.2d 688
Opinion text
CAMERON, Judge. This is an appeal from an order granting defendant’s motion to set aside a default. Plaintiff filed a complaint in libel on 13 August, 1964. Copies of the summons and complaint were personally served upon the defendant, Joseph C. Haldiman, Jr., individually and as President of the Acme Real Estate and Development, Inc., on the same day. Affidavit on default and entry of default was filed 22 September, 1964, and motion to set aside default was filed by the defendants 15 October, 1964. The minute entry of 6 November, 1964, reads as follows: “This matter having been submitted for ruling without argument, and the court being fully advised in the premises, “IT IS ORDERED granting defendant’s motion to set aside default.” Although the parties have not questioned our jurisdiction, we must, nevertheless, pass upon our jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Stevens v. Mehagian’s Home Furnishings, Inc., 90 Ariz. 42 , 365 P.2d 208 (1961), Bloch v. Bentfield, 1 Ariz.App. 412 , 403 P.2d 559 (1965), Christian v. Cotten, 1 Ariz.App. 421 , 403 P.2d 825 (1965), Ginn v. Superior Court, 1 Ariz.App. 455 , 404 P.2d 721 (1965). Generally, the power of this Court to review actions of the Superior Court is limited by 12-2101 A.R.S., and 12-120.21 A.R.S. State v. Mileham, 1 Ariz.App. 67 , 399 P.2d 688 (1965). In the instant case, neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to set aside an entry of default. Our Supreme Court has stated: “After a motion to set aside entry of default had been denied it remains for the trial court to conduct hearings, when appropriate, to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment, and to enter judgment upon the default. Ariz.R.Civ.Proc. 55(b), 16 A.R.S. An order denying a motion to set aside default entered by the clerk of the superior court is in no sense a final judgment. Nor does such order determine the action so as to prevent entry of judgment upon the default. Therefore, the order is not appealable.” Rueda v. *295 Galvez, 94 Ariz. 131, 132, 133 , 382 P.2d 239, 240 (1963). And: “If the question of whether the order setting aside the entry of default had been raised in the original opinion, this court would have decided it. If it is not an appealable order, the inadvertent acceptance of this appeal does not bar the court from refusing subsequent appeals in other cases involving this situation.” Overson v. Martin, 90 Ariz. 151, 153 , 367 P.2d 203, 205 (1961). The appeal is dismissed. STEVENS, C. J., and DONOFRIO, J., concur.