Cited by

1 Father filed no answering brief, but we decline to find a confession of error because there is no debatable issue, ¶ 9 (App. 2014), and a child’s future hangs in the balance, (refusing to treat lack of answering brief as confession of error when children would be adversely affected).

-03 ¶ 18 (2003), (stating that application of implied confession of error should not be mandatory in cases involving minor children).

¶ 18 (2003) (“We have repeatedly stressed that the child’s best interest is paramount in custody determinations.”) (); see also Mayberry v. Stambaugh, 1 CA-CV 23-0289 FC, 2024 WL 1282653, at *1 ¶ 5 (Ariz. App. March 26, 2024) (mem.

(stating that an application of implied confession of error should not be mandatory in cases involving minor children).

2 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO G.T.

-04 ¶¶ 18-23 (2003) (reversing contempt sanctions against mother that impacted best- interests determination); (declining to apply court rule making mother’s refusal to file answering brief a default where doing so impacted best-interests determination).

3 FLYNN v. FLYNN Opinion of the Court of justice dictate

Decision of the Court ¶6 Although this court has discretion to consider Mother’s failure to file an answering brief as conceding error, see ARCAP 15(a)(2); we decline to do so, given that the best interests of the children are involved, ¶ 2 (App. 2002)

Although this court has discretion to consider Chavez’ failure to file an appropriate answering brief as conceding error, see ARCAP 15(a)(2); we decline to do so here, see, ¶ 2 (App. 2002); -85 (1966).

Although this court has discretion to consider Father’s failure to file an appropriate answering brief as conceding error, see ARCAP 15(a)(2); we decline to do so, given that the best interests of the children are at issue, -85 (1966).

tion to consider Mother’s failure to file an answering brief as conceding error, see ARCAP 15(a)(2); 4 we decline to do so, given that the best interests of the children are at issue, -85 (1966).

¶ 2 (App. 2002); (“[T]o reverse the decision of the trial court concerning the custody and well being of two minor children because their mother failed or was unable to file an answering brief would not, we believe, serve the ends of justice .

sion of error, ¶ 6 n.1 (App. 2008), we do not do so here, as we prefer to decide 4 MURRELL v. TAYLOR, et al. Decision of the Court cases on their merits when the interests of justice dictate

(discussing the obsolete but analogous Rule of the Supreme Court 7(a)(2)).

(stating that the child’s best interest is the “primary consideration” and the “pole star” for the court); , (“In a custody case the primary duty of the court is to safeguard the best interests and welfare of the children.” (citing Clifford)); , (refusing to apply the court rule treating as a confession of error a mother’s failure to file an answering brief in a child custody appeal, because doing so would not serve the ends of justice and would have an adverse effect on the children, who were u

55 (1957) (child’s best interest is the “primary consideration” and the “pole star” for the court); (same); (“In a custody case the primary duty of the court is to safeguard the best interests and welfare of the children.”); (refusing to apply a court rule regarding the effect of a mother’s failure to file an answering brief in a child custody appeal, because doing so would have an adverse effect on the children, who were unrepresented but most interested in the proceeding).

dealt with a change in child custody.