Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Roll v. Janca, 527 P.2d 294.

38 citing documents.

Nanini v. Francisco-Baez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
Nanini v. Francisco-Baez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
A party has a duty to take legal steps to protect his own interests.” (citing Ackerman v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950)).
Anderson v. Winston Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
Anderson v. Winston Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
Rule 60(b)(6), therefore, is a “catch-all” provision, that offers relief only where “extraordinary circumstances” are present
Muscarella v. Muscarella Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
Muscarella v. Muscarella Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
A party has a duty to take legal steps to protect h[er] own interests.” (citing Ackerman v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950)).
Evans v. Evans Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
Evans v. Evans Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
Gonzalez, 243 Ariz. at 535 ¶ 16
Tailwind v. Wells Fargo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Tailwind v. Wells Fargo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
1994) (noting that “passage of time alone is not dispositive” and finding three- month delay reasonable considering prejudice to moving party and no prejudice to nonmoving party)); (finding amount in controversy of $25,000 gave rise to a strong presumption of trial on the merits).
Dominguez v. National Shotcrete Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Dominguez v. National Shotcrete Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
A court must consider the “‘totality of facts and circumstances’ to determine whether Rule 60(c)(6) relief is appropriate.” Amanti Elec., Inc. v. Engineered Structures, Inc., ¶ 7 (App. 2012)
Pablo Gonzalez v. Quoc Nguyen 414 P.3d 1163 Ariz. 2018
Pablo Gonzalez v. Quoc Nguyen 414 P.3d 1163 Ariz. 2018
Janca, the court of appeals ruled that where the defendant moved for Rule 60(c)(6) relief expeditiously after a default judgment, and “where a large judgment of $25,000 has been entered on default on a trip and fall case where the injury sustained was allegedly merely a twisted knee and torn ligaments, serious consideration must be given to the presumption of resolution of cases on their merits.” accord Daou, 139 Ariz. at 361 (“[I]t is not the size of the damage award alone that is conclusive, b
Amanti Electric, Inc. v. Engineered Structures, Inc., Western Surety Company Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
Amanti Electric, Inc. v. Engineered Structures, Inc., Western Surety Company Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
Relief nevertheless has been granted “‘with[] a more liberal dispensation than a literal reading of the rule would allow’” in “‘cases of extreme hardship or injustice.’” quoting 11 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2864, at 219-20 (1973); see also Webb, 134 Ariz. at 187, 655 P.2d at 11 (purpose of clause (6) to grant equitable relief “whenever the circumstances are extraordinary and justice requires”), citing Rol
Hilgeman v. American Mortgage Securities, Inc. 994 P.2d 1030 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
Hilgeman v. American Mortgage Securities, Inc. 994 P.2d 1030 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
656 (N.D.Cal.1994) (three month delay between judgment and filing of motion under federal Rule 60(b) reasonable considering lack of prejudice to non-moving party among other factors); , (defendants “acted expeditiously” when they moved to set aside default judgment one month after first learning of it); compare Richas, 133 Ariz. at 515 , 652 P.2d at 1038 (“[s]inee delay is not explained [at all], there is no basis” for the court to find delay reasonable).
FLOOD CONTROL DIST. OF MARICOPA CTY. v. Conlin 712 P.2d 979 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
FLOOD CONTROL DIST. OF MARICOPA CTY. v. Conlin 712 P.2d 979 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
P.2d 294 (1974) (court analyzed and decided appeal under rule 60(c)(6) after acknowledging that rule 60(c)(4) was also applicable).
Daou v. Harris 678 P.2d 934 Ariz. 1984
Daou v. Harris 678 P.2d 934 Ariz. 1984
Park v. Strick 669 P.2d 78 Ariz. 1983
Park v. Strick 669 P.2d 78 Ariz. 1983
Wright & Miller, supra, at 214.
Webb v. Erickson 655 P.2d 6 Ariz. 1982
Webb v. Erickson 655 P.2d 6 Ariz. 1982
Webb v. Erickson 655 P.2d 15 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
Webb v. Erickson 655 P.2d 15 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
A judgment may be void because of invalid service of process, , or lack of notice to a non-party with standing.
Gendron v. Skyline Bel Air Estates 590 P.2d 483 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1979
Gendron v. Skyline Bel Air Estates 590 P.2d 483 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1979
Homecraft Corp. v. Fimbres 580 P.2d 760 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
Homecraft Corp. v. Fimbres 580 P.2d 760 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
allowed relief from a default judgment under subparagraph 6 in a case where no summons and complaint had been actually received by appellant.
Wright v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 569 P.2d 821 Ariz. 1977
Wright v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 569 P.2d 821 Ariz. 1977
Our Court of Appeals discussed the meaning which has been attached to rule 60(c)(6) at 337 , at 296 (1974): “Federal cases reveal that relief is given under Clause 6 in those cases in which the judgment was obtained by the improper conduct of the party in whose favor it was rendered or the judgment resulted from the excusable default of the party against whom it was directed under circum
INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF MACH. & AERO. WKRS v. Petty 529 P.2d 251 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
Sloan v. Florida-Vanderbilt Development Corp. 529 P.2d 726 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF MACH. & AERO. WKRS v. Petty 529 P.2d 251 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
of E.W., No. 480, 460 F.2d 105 (5th Cir.1972)
Sloan v. Florida-Vanderbilt Development Corp. 529 P.2d 726 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974