Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Andreola v. Arizona Bank, 550 P.2d 110.
- Ncr Investments v. Maxfield Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
- Zayas v. Zayas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
- Zayas v. Zayas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
- Cruger v. Blansette Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
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Cruger v. Blansette
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
Accordingly, challenges to the validity of title can neither be raised nor resolved in such a proceeding, though “the fact of title may be proved as a matter incidental to showing right of possession by an owner.” A.R.S.
- Secure Ventures v. Hon. gerlach/johnson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
- Secure Ventures v. Hon. gerlach/johnson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
- Wells Fargo v. Park Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
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Wells Fargo v. Park
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
An FED action offers rightful landowners “a summary and speedy remedy for obtaining possession.”
- Desert Financial v. Doss Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
- Desert Financial v. Doss Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
- Jp Morgan v. Mgm Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
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Jp Morgan v. Mgm
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
(recognizing that a major purpose of the trustee’s sale statutes is “to provide relatively inexpensive and speedy foreclosure proceedings”); cf. Pappas v. E. Sav.
- Glava v. Jpmorgan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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Glava v. Jpmorgan
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
7 see Morgan AZ Fin., 235 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 7, 326 P.3d at 290 (noting trustee’s sales “are meant to operate quickly and efficiently, ‘outside of the judicial process.’”) (quoting Hogan v. Wash.
- Grady v. Barth 312 P.3d 117 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
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Grady v. Barth
312 P.3d 117
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
Evans v. J Four Realty, LLC, 164 N.H. 570, 574 , 62 A3d 869, 874 (2013) (tenant at sufferance is not “in a landlord-tenant relationship”; it is not a “tenancy in fact” because there is no privity between landlord and tenant).
- United Effort Plan Trust v. Holm 101 P.3d 641 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
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United Effort Plan Trust v. Holm
101 P.3d 641
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
§ 12-1171 did not apply even though the parties thought that they had a landlord-tenant relationship.); , (Despite the lack of a landlord-tenant relationship, a former property owner became a tenant at sufferance when he failed to surrender possession upon foreclosure of his interest in the deed of trust.).
- Curtis v. Morris 925 P.2d 259 Ariz. 1996
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Curtis v. Morris
925 P.2d 259
Ariz. 1996
§ 12-1173 was broad enough to authorize a forcible detainer action to obtain possession of property after an occupant’s interest had been terminated pursuant to a nonjudicial sale because “[o]ne who remains in possession of property after termination of his interest under a deed of trust is a tenant at will or sufferance.”
- Kadera v. Superior Court 931 P.2d 1067 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
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Kadera v. Superior Court
931 P.2d 1067
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
5 The forcible entry and detainer proceeding contained in this statute applies to a “holdover by a person to whom lands, tenements, or real property were let.” , in support of its argument that a forcible entry and detainer action is appropriate here because such actions are not limited to the formal lessor-lessee relationship.
- Ledesma v. PIONEER NAT. TITLE INS. CO. 629 P.2d 1007 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
- Ledesma v. PIONEER NAT. TITLE INS. CO. 629 P.2d 1007 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981