Cited by

seller.” Antone, 214 Ariz. at 552-53, ¶ 12 (citation omitted); see, e.g., Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., (trademark licensors); Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane & Plumbing Supplies Co., (used goods dealers); –46 (App. 1978) (pharmaceutical product donors).

see Acri, 242 Ariz. at 241, ¶¶ 20-21 (fighting wildfires); -82 (App. 1979) (use or storage of explosives); Second Restatement § 520A (flying aircrafts).

See, -53 , -46 (App.1978) (exclusion of some expert opinions harmless where substance elicited at other times in trial).

¶ 11 (noting purpose of invited error doctrine is to prevent a party from injecting error in the record and profiting from it on appeal); n.2, n.2 (App. 2002) (refusing to apply invited error doctrine where record did not reflect which party proposed stipulation which was source of error); (finding acceptance of ruling with “uncharacteristic acquiescence and meekness” did not rise to the level of invited error).

(“[E]vidence which is inadmissible for the purpose offered should be rejected, notwithstanding that the evidence could have been received for another purpose or under a different theory.”).

See, (witness must be “competent to give an expert opinion on the precise issue about which he is asked to testify”).

Thus, “[i]t is the scope of the witness’ knowledge and not the artificial classification by title that should govern the threshold question of admissibility.” , (quoting Fitzmaurice v. Flynn, 167 Conn. 609 , 356 A.2d 887, 892 (1975)).

See, (holding res ipsa applies to two defendants in joint control of instrumentality); 588 (citing Jackson for proposition “it is possible to employ the doctrine against multiple defendants in a proper case,” but refusing to apply it to defendant drug companies when insufficient showing of control over injury-causing ins

Sys., Inc., , 178 n. 3, , 415 n. 3 (App.1993) ("`Learned intermediary doctrine' means the manufacturer's duty to warn is ordinarily satisfied if a proper warning is given to the specialized class of people that may prescribe or administer the product."); , ("In the case of prescription drugs .

seller.” Unique Equip., 3 P.3d at 976; see, e.g., Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 163 Ariz. 88, 96, (trademark licensors); Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane & Plumbing Supplies Co., (used goods dealers); -46, -39 (App. 1978) (pharmaceutical product donors).

32, 38 , those involved in used goods, Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane & Plumbing Supplies, Co., , those donating pharmaceutical products, -47 , -40 (App.1978); and trademark licensors.

See, e.g., Torres, 163 Ariz. at 93 , 786 P.2d at 944 (trademark licensor); Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane & Plumbing Supplies Co., , (dealer in used goods); , (donor of pharmaceutical product); Sequoia Mfg.

this court held that it was error to exclude testimony by physicians regarding the toxic effect of a drug simply because those physicians had not personally used the drug in question on their own patients.

Under the “learned intermediary doctrine,” “the manufacturer’s duty to warn is ordinarily satisfied if a proper warning, is given to the specialized class of people that may prescribe or administer the product.” Piper, 180 Ariz. at 178 n. 3, 883 P.2d at 415 n. 3

ree of the manual which says: “The BEAR 2 Ventilator is intended for use only by a qualified practitioner, under the direction of a qualified physician.” Bear argues because Bear 2 could be sold only to physicians and was intended for use only by doctors or qualified practitioners, any duty to warn was satisfied by warning doctors under the “learned intermediary doctrine.” 3

53 n. 21, , 346 n. 21 (App.1978); see also M. Udall & J. Livermore, Law of Evidence § 25, at 44 (1982).

See, e.g., Jordan v. Sunnys-lope Appliance Propane & Plumbing Supplies Co., , (used goods); , (Ct.App.