Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Smith v. Smith, 564 P.2d 1266.
- State v. Alvarez Bojorquez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
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State v. Alvarez Bojorquez
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
“Judicial rulings alone do not support a finding of bias or partiality without a showing of an extrajudicial source of bias or a deep-seated favoritism.” Stagecoach Trails MHC, ¶ 21 (App. 2013); (“[T]he bias and prejudice necessary to disqualify a judge must arise from an extra-judicial source and not from what the judge has done in his [or her] participation in the case.”).
- Alexandra K. v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
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Alexandra K. v. Dcs
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
¶ 14 (App. 2014); Stagecoach Trails HMC, ¶ 21 (App. 2013) ("Judicial rulings alone do not support a finding of bias or partiality without a showing of an extrajudicial source of bias or a deep- seated favoritism.")
- Prescott v. Prescott Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
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Prescott v. Prescott
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Moreover, “[i]t is generally conceded that the bias and prejudice necessary to disqualify a judge must arise from an extra-judicial source and not from what the judge has done in his participation in the case.”
- hertz/coy v. Coy Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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hertz/coy v. Coy
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Importantly, the bias and prejudice required for disqualification “must arise from an extra- judicial source and not from what the judge has done in [the judge’s] participation in the case.”
- In the Matter of Lisa M. Aubuchon 309 P.3d 886 Ariz. 2013
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In the Matter of Lisa M. Aubuchon
309 P.3d 886
Ariz. 2013
See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994) (holding that a judge is not biased or prejudiced if the judge forms opinions as a result of knowledge obtained in earlier proceedings); (deciding that, generally, “the bias and prejudice necessary to disqualify a judge must arise from an extra-judicial source and not from what the judge has done in his participation in the case”).
- Smith v. Mitchell 148 P.3d 1151 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
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Smith v. Mitchell
148 P.3d 1151
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
(“It is generally conceded that the bias and prejudice necessary to disqualify a judge must arise from an extra-judicial source and not from what the judge has done in his participation in the case.”).
- Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court 120 P.3d 1092 Ariz. 2005
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Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court
120 P.3d 1092
Ariz. 2005
As the Ninth Circuit stated: “‘[A] judge is not disqualified merely because a litigant sues or threatens to sue him.’ Such an easy method for obtaining disqualification should not be encouraged or allowed.'” Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d at 70l, quoting United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1977)
- Mervyn's v. Superior Court 879 P.2d 367 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
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Mervyn's v. Superior Court
879 P.2d 367
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
The Respondent Judge based his decision on the concept that the “bias and prejudice necessary to disqualify a judge must arise from an extra-judicial source and not from what the judge has done in his participation in the case” ( , ).
- State v. Greenway 823 P.2d 22 Ariz. 1991
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State v. Greenway
823 P.2d 22
Ariz. 1991
“It is generally conceded that the bias and prejudice necessary to disqualify a judge must arise from an extra-judicial source and not from what the judge has done in his participation in the case.” , (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 , 86 S.Ct.
- State v. Carver 771 P.2d 1382 Ariz. 1989
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State v. Carver
771 P.2d 1382
Ariz. 1989
(recusal not required in criminal case where trial judge has heard unfavorable remarks about defendant during prior trial of codefendant); , (party’s law *174 suit pending against trial judge for his actions during the course of proceedings insufficient to require recusal for bias).
- State v. Emanuel 768 P.2d 196 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
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State v. Emanuel
768 P.2d 196
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
Although involving different facts, , “It is generally conceded that the bias and prejudice necessary to disqualify a judge must arise from an extra-judicial source and not from what the judge has done in his participation in the case.” We agree that the rule that a trial judge must be impartial, “does not mean that
- State v. Thompson 724 P.2d 1223 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
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State v. Thompson
724 P.2d 1223
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Although involving different facts, , “It is generally conceded that the bias and prejudice necessary to disqualify a judge must arise from an extra-judicial source and not from what the judge has done in his participation in the case.” We agree that the rule that a trial judge must be impartial, “does not mean that
- Matter of Ronwin 680 P.2d 107 Ariz. 1983
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Matter of Ronwin
680 P.2d 107
Ariz. 1983
Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d at 701, quoting United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 933 (10th Cir.1977)
- State v. Jeffers 661 P.2d 1105 Ariz. 1983
- State v. Jeffers 661 P.2d 1105 Ariz. 1983
- Clark v. Clark 603 P.2d 506 Ariz. 1979
- Clark v. Clark 603 P.2d 506 Ariz. 1979
- Marce v. Bailey 636 P.2d 1225 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1979
- Marce v. Bailey 636 P.2d 1225 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1979