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Opinions in Arizona that cite Flowers v. K-Mart Corp., 616 P.2d 955.

44 citing documents.

Doe v. Iglesia Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
Doe v. Iglesia Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
Rather, [the non-moving party] must show that competent evidence is available which will justify a trial on the issue.” (citations omitted).
Troxel v. Timberline Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
Troxel v. Timberline Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
Santos v. Trolley Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Santos v. Trolley Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
(plaintiff’s testimony that a crosswalk would have prevented the accident at issue insufficient because he was “not qualified to render such an opinion.”).
Goshkarian v. McGovern Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Goshkarian v. McGovern Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Rather, they must show that competent evidence is available which will justify a trial on the issue.” 4 GOSHKARIAN, et al. v. MCGOVERN, et al. Decision of the Court (App. 1980) ( and Hensley v. A. J. Bayless Stores, Inc., ).
Perez v. Palace Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Perez v. Palace Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Valdez asked Eretza to see if Unit 1 had an operable compressor that 4 Nor has Babylon shown how the analysis in Flowers v. K-Mart Corp., where the layout of a K-Mart “parking lot and the traffic therein” was an open and obvious danger, supports summary judgment here.
Ritchie v. Costello 356 P.3d 337 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Ritchie v. Costello 356 P.3d 337 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
-98, -58 (App. 1980); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (1965) (“A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite
McMurtry v. Weatherford Hotel, Inc. 293 P.3d 520 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
Criticized McMurtry v. Weatherford Hotel, Inc. 293 P.3d 520 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
¶27 In reaching its ultimate conclusion that the window was an open and obvious danger relieving the Hotel of liability, the trial court relied primarily on Goodman v. Staples Office Store, LLC, 2009 WL 4827204 (D.Ariz.2009), , and Wellhausen v. University of Kansas, 40 Kan.
Tilley v. Delci 204 P.3d 1082 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Tilley v. Delci 204 P.3d 1082 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
II 8 To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show “the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty and an injury proximately caused by that breach.”
Hamblin v. State 143 P.3d 388 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Hamblin v. State 143 P.3d 388 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Badia v. City of Casa Grande 988 P.2d 134 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
Badia v. City of Casa Grande 988 P.2d 134 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
Shaner v. Tucson Airport Auth., Inc.
Hill v. Safford Unified School District 952 P.2d 754 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
Hill v. Safford Unified School District 952 P.2d 754 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
Rogers, 170 Ariz. at 402 , 825 P.2d at 23 quoting Harper, James & Gray, The Law of Torts § 15.3 at 355 (2d ed. 1986); see also Orme School
Randall v. Alvarado-Wells 928 P.2d 732 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
Randall v. Alvarado-Wells 928 P.2d 732 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz County Fair & Rodeo Ass'n 866 P.2d 1342 Ariz. 1994
Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz County Fair & Rodeo Ass'n 866 P.2d 1342 Ariz. 1994
However, the court may properly decide proximate cause if, after reviewing the facts, there is “no reasonable chance or likelihood that the conclusions of reasonable persons would differ.”
Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc. 825 P.2d 5 Ariz. 1992
Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc. 825 P.2d 5 Ariz. 1992
(question whether duty has been breached ordinarily question for jury), citing Moore v. Maricopa County, 11 Ariz.App.
Ferguson v. Cash, Sullivan & Cross Insurance Agency, Inc. 831 P.2d 380 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Ferguson v. Cash, Sullivan & Cross Insurance Agency, Inc. 831 P.2d 380 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Fedie v. Travelodge International, Inc. 782 P.2d 739 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
Fedie v. Travelodge International, Inc. 782 P.2d 739 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
Proximate cause is “that which, in a material and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces an injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred.”
Molever v. Roush 732 P.2d 1105 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Molever v. Roush 732 P.2d 1105 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Tennen v. Lane 716 P.2d 1031 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
Tennen v. Lane 716 P.2d 1031 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Board 706 P.2d 364 Ariz. 1985
Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Board 706 P.2d 364 Ariz. 1985
Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Board 705 P.2d 937 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Board 705 P.2d 937 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
First Nat. Bank of Arizona v. Dupree 665 P.2d 1018 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
First Nat. Bank of Arizona v. Dupree 665 P.2d 1018 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
Smedberg v. Simons 631 P.2d 530 Ariz. 1981
Smedberg v. Simons 631 P.2d 530 Ariz. 1981
Our courts have reiterated the Cummings language, see, e. g., , , but have applied it only in circumstances wherein plaintiff’s attention has been distracted, see Yuma Furniture Co. v. Rehwinkel, 8 Ariz.App.

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