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Opinions in Arizona that cite Toney v. Bouthillier, 631 P.2d 557.

30 citing documents.

TP Racing, L.L.L.P. v. Simms 307 P.3d 56 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
TP Racing, L.L.L.P. v. Simms 307 P.3d 56 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
Cullen v. Koty-Leavitt Insurance Agency, Inc. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Cullen v. Koty-Leavitt Insurance Agency, Inc. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
ief under any theory of law is whether the complaint, taken in the light most favorable to appellant, is sufficient to constitute a valid claim.”) (emphasis added); (“[O]ur courts have long held that ‘failure to make reference to a statute [in a complaint] is not fatal to a claim.’”)
Mullenaux v. Graham County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
Mullenaux v. Graham County 82 P.3d 362 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
Mullenaux v. Graham County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
1, and our courts have long held that “failure to make reference to a statute [in a complaint] is not fatal to a claim.” see also Logan v. Forever Living Products Int’l, P.3d 760 (2002) (if employee’s claim cognizable under AEPA, it should not be dismissed); (“[P]ublic statutes need not be pleaded or offered into evidence
Mullenaux v. Graham County 82 P.3d 362 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
1, and our courts have long held that “failure to make reference to a statute [in a complaint] is not fatal to a claim.” , see also Logan v. Forever Living Products Int’l, , (if employee’s claim cognizable under AEPA, it should not be dismissed); , (“[P]ublic statutes need not be pleaded or offered into evidence s
Zimmer v. Peters 861 P.2d 1188 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
Zimmer v. Peters 861 P.2d 1188 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
Mulcahy v. Damron 816 P.2d 270 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
Mulcahy v. Damron 816 P.2d 270 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
Schleier for Alter v. Alter 767 P.2d 1187 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
Schleier for Alter v. Alter 767 P.2d 1187 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
See Murdock, 144 Ariz. at 138 , 696 P.2d at 232 ; James, 130 Ariz. at 156-57 , 634 P.2d at 968-69
JOHNSON BY JOHNSON v. Svidergol 757 P.2d 609 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
JOHNSON BY JOHNSON v. Svidergol 757 P.2d 609 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
Massey v. Colaric 725 P.2d 1099 Ariz. 1986
Massey v. Colaric 725 P.2d 1099 Ariz. 1986
§ 24-523; 2 , Murdock v. Baile, supra
Massey v. Colaric 725 P.2d 1123 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
Massey v. Colaric 725 P.2d 1123 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
Murdock v. Balle 696 P.2d 230 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
Murdock v. Balle 696 P.2d 230 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
Brown Wholesale Electric Co. v. Merchants Mutual Bonding Co. 713 P.2d 291 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
Brown Wholesale Electric Co. v. Merchants Mutual Bonding Co. 713 P.2d 291 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
Brown claims that there is no need to resort to the rules of statutory construction in this case, since Brown did indeed supply materials “used in the direct performance of a construction contract.” The flaw in Brown’s argument, however, is that while words used in a statute ought to be accorded their obvious and natural meaning, , words -will not be interpreted in their ordinary sense if it appears from context that a different meaning should control.
State v. Schossow 703 P.2d 496 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
State v. Schossow 703 P.2d 496 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
involved deposition statements by a child victim of a dog bite.
Marriage of Deatherage v. Deatherage 681 P.2d 469 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
Marriage of Deatherage v. Deatherage 681 P.2d 469 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
James v. Cox 634 P.2d 964 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
James v. Cox 634 P.2d 964 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
This court has recently decided a , where we held that the actions of a child of tender years may constitute provocation within the meaning of A.R.S.

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