Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Walker, 621 P.2d 938.

32 citing documents.

  • Parker Law v. Cec 141202761 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • Parker Law v. Cec 141202761 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • Randy Melbye v. Rocio Dennis 556 P.3d 1225 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2024
  • Randy Melbye v. Rocio Dennis 556 P.3d 1225 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2024
    See, e.g., Sears Roebuck & -36 (App. 1980) (rejecting possibility that Byrer establishes “absolute requirement” of post-judgment motion in all cases where party is in default and finding jurisdiction over appeal from default judgment where no motion to vacate or set aside judgment had been filed).
  • Cuen v. Cuen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • Cuen v. Cuen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1)-(2); see also Sears Roebuck & (holding that entering default, and the resulting default judgment, as a sanction are appealable as a final judgment); ("[A]n order setting aside or refusing to vacate default judgment is a special order made after judgment and is therefore appealable.").
  • Best Western v. Oakland Park Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • Best Western v. Oakland Park Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    See Sears Roebuck & -36 (App. 1980).
  • Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, LLC 380 P.3d 659 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Zarco Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, LLC 380 P.3d 659 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    However, because a default judgment may be appealable under certain circumstances, see, e.g., Sears Roebuck & -36 , (exercising appellate jurisdiction for appeal from default judgment entered as a sanction even though no motion to set aside had been filed), and a motion to set aside a judgment is not proper unless it seeks to set aside a final judgment, Ruesga, 215 Ariz. at 593 -94 ¶¶ 8-16, 161 P.
  • State v. Zarco Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    However, because a default judgment may be appealable under certain circumstances, see, e.g., Sears Roebuck & -36 (App. 1980) (exercising appellate jurisdiction for appeal from default judgment entered as a sanction even though no motion to set aside had been filed), and a motion to set aside a judgment is not proper unless it seeks to set aside a final judgment, Ruesga, 215 Ariz. at 593-94 ¶¶ 8-16, the better practice wo
  • Faraji v. Phoenix Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Faraji v. Phoenix Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    Cf. Sears Roebuck & –35, -41 (App. 1980) (stating this court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal from a default judgment if the appellant has not first moved in the trial court to set the judgment aside); Sullivan & Brugnatelli Adver.
  • Delong v. Merrill 310 P.3d 39 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
  • Delong v. Merrill 310 P.3d 39 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
    ¶22 Further, “the striking of pleadings and entry of default judgment are not proper sanctions for the failure to adequately respond to requests for admissions of facts pursuant to Rule 36.” Sears Roebuck & (discussing difference in sanctions available under Rules 36 and 37, Ariz. R. Civ.
  • Stonecreek Bldg. Co., Inc. v. Shure 162 P.3d 675 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
  • Stonecreek Bldg. Co., Inc. v. Shure 162 P.3d 675 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
  • Souza v. Fred Carries Contracts, Inc. 955 P.2d 3 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
  • Souza v. Fred Carries Contracts, Inc. 955 P.2d 3 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
    Co., , Sears Roebuck & , (“[T]he range of discretion for dismissal is narrow.”); , (a trial court’s discretion “as to the ultimate sanc *250 tions of dismissal and/or entry of default judgment^] has been rather severely limited by the deci
  • State v. Webb 717 P.2d 462 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
  • State v. Webb 717 P.2d 462 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
  • In Re the Marriage of Gray 695 P.2d 1127 Ariz. 1985
  • In Re the Marriage of Gray 695 P.2d 1127 Ariz. 1985
    206 P. 1078, 1079 (1922).
  • Poleo v. Grandview Equities, Ltd. 692 P.2d 309 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
  • Poleo v. Grandview Equities, Ltd. 692 P.2d 309 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
    (sanctioning Rule 59 as a means of attacking a Rule 37 default); Sears Roebuck & , (accepting jurisdiction in the absence of any *133 request to rehear or set aside a default entered pursuant to Rule 87).
  • U-Totem Store v. Walker 691 P.2d 315 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
  • U-Totem Store v. Walker 691 P.2d 315 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
  • J-R Construction Co. v. Paddock Pool Construction Co. 625 P.2d 932 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
  • J-R Construction Co. v. Paddock Pool Construction Co. 625 P.2d 932 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
    Sears, Roebuck and Company v. Walker, Ariz.App., , Zakroff v. May, 8 Ariz.App.
  • Soltes v. Jarzynka 621 P.2d 933 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
  • Soltes v. Jarzynka 621 P.2d 933 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
    P.2d 938 filed this date.