Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Groener v. Briehl, 661 P.2d 659.

22 citing documents.

NOVALIS-MARINE v. MONASH Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
The requisite prejudice will be found “if the reviewing court is unable to conclude that the jury would have reached the same verdict” but for the “[e]rror in admitting evidence[.]” (citations omitted).
State v. Velasquez-Cruz Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
¶ 28 (App. 2019) (“The question of whether a lay witness is qualified to testify as to any matter of opinion is a preliminary determination within the sound discretion of the trial court”) (
Bergevin v. Bergevin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
Waterford v. Sanchez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
(explaining an erroneous ruling on the admissibility of opinion testimony “is reversible if the reviewing court is unable to conclude that the jury would have reached the same verdict” absent the error).
Aspen v. Wakefield Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
The decision to admit or exclude lay opinion testimony lies “within the sound discretion of the trial court” and will be upheld absent a showing that the ruling is “clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.”
State v. Norrington Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
¶11 “The question of whether a lay witness is qualified to testify as to any matter of opinion is a preliminary determination within the sound discretion of the trial court whose decision must be upheld unless shown to be clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 28 (App. 2019) ().
Taraska v. Taraska Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Krieger v. Duick Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
“Error in admitting evidence is reversible if the reviewing court is unable to conclude that the jury would have reached the same verdict without the testimony.”
State v. Craft Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Kelley v. Abdo 105 P.3d 167 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
Kelley v. Abdo 105 P.3d 167 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
See Perez; , (“The improper admission of evidence is reversible error if we are unable to conclude that the jury would have reached the same verdict without the evidence.”)
State v. Gatliff 102 P.3d 981 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
we held that fire falls within the statutory definition of “dangerous instrument.” , 198 n. 1, , 1023 n. 1 (1981) , (“The jury also found that these crimes
State v. DePiano 926 P.2d 508 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
State v. DePiano 926 P.2d 508 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp. 893 P.2d 26 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp. 893 P.2d 26 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc. 825 P.2d 5 Ariz. 1992
Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc. 825 P.2d 5 Ariz. 1992
Kott v. City of Phoenix 763 P.2d 235 Ariz. 1988
Kott v. City of Phoenix 763 P.2d 235 Ariz. 1988
Harris v. Thompson, 18 Ariz.App.
Carter-Glogau Laboratories, Inc. v. Construction, Production & Maintenance Laborers' Local 383 736 P.2d 1163 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Carter-Glogau Laboratories, Inc. v. Construction, Production & Maintenance Laborers' Local 383 736 P.2d 1163 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986