Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Book Cellar, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 678 P.2d 517.
- State Ex Rel Brnovich v. City of tucson/dewit 399 P.3d 663 Ariz. 2017
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State Ex Rel Brnovich v. City of tucson/dewit
399 P.3d 663
Ariz. 2017
(b)); accord Book Cellar, , , 521 (App. 1983).
- Falcone Brothers & Associates, Inc. v. City of Tucson 381 P.3d 276 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
- Falcone Brothers & Associates, Inc. v. City of Tucson 381 P.3d 276 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
- Compassionate v. adhs/nelson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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Compassionate v. adhs/nelson
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶21 Citing Book Cellar, P.2d 517 (App. 1983), the superior court concluded that “the Rules of Procedure for Special Actions do not create substantive rights” and, because CCD had no property right in the award of a certificate, the court could not grant special action relief.
- Roosevelt Arthur Williams v. State of Arizona 303 P.3d 532 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
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Roosevelt Arthur Williams v. State of Arizona
303 P.3d 532
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
¶ 14 Like the court in Grell II , our review is limited to whether the respondent judge “clearly err[ed]” in concluding Williams faded to prove an intellectual disability by clear and convincing evidence, and we must defer to the respondent’s determination if “reasonably supported by evidence.” Grell II, , 135 P.3d at 709 ; see also Book Cellar, , , 520 (App.1983) (in review by special action, court does not weigh evidence but determines whether sufficient evidence supported decision and whether
- Jeffery Harris v. City of Bisbee Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
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Jeffery Harris v. City of Bisbee
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
mandamus under § 19-122 because “[t]he very purpose for the creation of special action[s] was to simplify the relief available under the various special writs and to eliminate the necessity of complying with the requirements of complex common law.” We agree with Harris’s statement of the purpose behind the creation of rules governing special actions, see Book Cellar, but, as Rule 1(b) plainly states, “Where a statute expressly authorizes proceedings under .
- Tire Shredders, Inc. v. Pima County 965 P.2d 86 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
- Tire Shredders, Inc. v. Pima County 965 P.2d 86 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
- Circle K Convenience Stores, Inc. v. City of Phoenix 870 P.2d 1198 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
- Circle K Convenience Stores, Inc. v. City of Phoenix 870 P.2d 1198 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
- Neal v. City of Kingman 810 P.2d 572 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
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Neal v. City of Kingman
810 P.2d 572
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
If it has the authority to — and if it does consider such a claim — we believe that under the holding in Book Cellar, , the trial court could review the board’s ruling by special action but would be limited to deciding the question whether the board abused its discretion.
- M & M Auto Storage Pool, Inc. v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. 791 P.2d 665 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
- M & M Auto Storage Pool, Inc. v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. 791 P.2d 665 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
- Arkules v. Board of Adjustment 780 P.2d 431 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
- Arkules v. Board of Adjustment 780 P.2d 431 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
- Blake v. City of Phoenix 754 P.2d 1368 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
- Blake v. City of Phoenix 754 P.2d 1368 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
- Book-Cellar, Inc. v. City of Phoenix 721 P.2d 1169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
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Book-Cellar, Inc. v. City of Phoenix
721 P.2d 1169
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
That issue was appealed and the Court of Appeals held that special action proceedings were appropriate in Book Cellar
- Arkules v. BD. OF ADJUST. OF PARADISE VALLEY 728 P.2d 657 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
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Arkules v. BD. OF ADJUST. OF PARADISE VALLEY
728 P.2d 657
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
the judicial functions of a lower tribunal.” Book Cellar