Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite City of Phoenix v. Schroeder, 405 P.2d 301.

52 citing documents.

Souza v. Fred Carries Contracts, Inc. 955 P.2d 3 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
Souza v. Fred Carries Contracts, Inc. 955 P.2d 3 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
cf. Beil, 15 F.3d at 553 (“Cases are often tried even though a crucial piece of evidence is unavailable.
Tellez v. Saban 933 P.2d 1233 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Tellez v. Saban 933 P.2d 1233 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
and produces a result which would have not otherwise occurred.”
Ontiveros v. Borak 667 P.2d 200 Ariz. 1983
Ontiveros v. Borak 667 P.2d 200 Ariz. 1983
473, 475-76, -60 (1966); -17 , -08 (1965); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 435(2), comments c and d, and 442 (1965).
Jaeger v. Petroni 650 P.2d 476 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
Jaeger v. Petroni 650 P.2d 476 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
Stated differently, in order for an intervening cause to supersede the original negligence, the intervening cause must be so extraordinary that the defendant could not have reasonably anticipated that the cause would intervene.” -517
Griffith v. VALLEY OF SUN RECOVERY, ETC. 613 P.2d 1283 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
Griffith v. VALLEY OF SUN RECOVERY, ETC. 613 P.2d 1283 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
Herzberg v. White, supra.
Parness v. City of Tempe 600 P.2d 764 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1979
Parness v. City of Tempe 600 P.2d 764 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1979
Stated differently, in order for an intervening cause to supersede the original negligence, the intervening cause must be so extraordinary that the defendant could not have reasonably anticipated that the cause would intervene, (citations omitted) -517
Rayner v. Stauffer Chemical Co. 585 P.2d 1240 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
Rayner v. Stauffer Chemical Co. 585 P.2d 1240 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
where the Court held that an expert’s testimony and opinion based on viewing several police photographs taken at the scene of an automobile accident were admissible into evidence.
Central Alarm of Tucson v. Ganem 567 P.2d 1203 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
Central Alarm of Tucson v. Ganem 567 P.2d 1203 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
As Division I -17 , : “An intervening cause (force or act) is an independent cause which steps between the original wrongful act or omission of the defendant and the injury to the plaintiff, alters the natural and normal sequence of events and produces a result which would have not otherwise occurred.
Stroud v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc. 542 P.2d 1102 Ariz. 1976
Stroud v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc. 542 P.2d 1102 Ariz. 1976
It is, of course, a proper defense in a negligence action to show that the injury was the result of the superseding intervening negligence of a third party, , and, of course, evidence to support the claim that the third party’s negligence was the sole cause of the accident is also admissible.
Hemet Dodge v. Gryder 534 P.2d 454 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
Hemet Dodge v. Gryder 534 P.2d 454 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
Stated differently, in order for an intervening cause to supercede the original negligence, the intervening cause must be so extraordinary that the defendant could not have reasonably anticipated that the cause would intervene.” -18 , -8 (1965).
State v. Kevil 527 P.2d 285 Ariz. 1974
State v. Kevil 527 P.2d 285 Ariz. 1974
accurately spelled out Arizona law on thiis issue: “Defendants contend most strenuously that there is enough evidence and sufficient witnesses from which the jury might well have found these facts upon their own, and that to allow the expert to testify concerning these same facts invades the pro
State v. Kelly 526 P.2d 720 Ariz. 1974
State v. Kelly 526 P.2d 720 Ariz. 1974
Carrizoza v. Zahn 515 P.2d 1192 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
Carrizoza v. Zahn 515 P.2d 1192 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
Collins v. County of Maricopa 488 P.2d 991 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1971
Collins v. County of Maricopa 488 P.2d 991 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1971
While the court’s instruction could have been more complete, and also have referred to superseding cause by name, , which states: “For an intervening cause to be a superseding cause it must be a cause which could not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated by the defendant.” That instruction, however, when read with the instruction which followed, “If you find that the defendant Maricopa County
Sulpher Springs Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Verdugo 481 P.2d 511 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1971
Sulpher Springs Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Verdugo 481 P.2d 511 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1971
City of *147 , Harris v. Campbell, 2 Ariz.App.
Santanello v. Cooper 468 P.2d 390 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Santanello v. Cooper 468 P.2d 390 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Zelman v. Stauder 466 P.2d 766 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Zelman v. Stauder 466 P.2d 766 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Herzberg v. White, supra.
E. L. Jones Construction Co. v. Noland 466 P.2d 740 Ariz. 1970
E. L. Jones Construction Co. v. Noland 466 P.2d 740 Ariz. 1970
City of Mesa v. Bradshaw 462 P.2d 864 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
City of Mesa v. Bradshaw 462 P.2d 864 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
We believe that this somewhat difficult field of tort law is adequately discussed, , ; , which quotes from Herzberg; and State v.Watson, 7 Ariz.App.
Worthington v. Funk 442 P.2d 153 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
Worthington v. Funk 442 P.2d 153 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
State v. Watson 436 P.2d 175 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1967
State v. Watson 436 P.2d 175 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1967
Smith v. Goodman 430 P.2d 922 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
Smith v. Goodman 430 P.2d 922 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
180 P. 446 (1919); Inter-State Fidelity Building & Loan Ass’n v. Hollis, , , , Powell v. Industrial Commission, 4 Ariz.App.
Bullard v. Stonebraker 422 P.2d 700 Ariz. 1967
Bullard v. Stonebraker 422 P.2d 700 Ariz. 1967
Hinson v. Phoenix Pie Company 416 P.2d 202 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
Hinson v. Phoenix Pie Company 416 P.2d 202 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
O'Rielly Motor Company v. Rich 411 P.2d 194 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
O'Rielly Motor Company v. Rich 411 P.2d 194 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n v. Cornum