Cited by

Ctr., (“In [ordinary negligence] cases, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to present evidence to establish the standard of care because the jury can rely on its own experience in determining whether the defendant acted with reasonable care under the circumstances.”).

Center, this court reasoned that a jury could not conclude “that [a] hospital’s violation of its [own] protocols constituted evidence of negligence unless it first found that the protocols were not merely evidence of the applicable standard, but were synonymous with it.” But in Peacock v. Samaritan Health Se

Ctr., (citation omitted).

Ctr., , (trial court did not err in refusing to give separate instruction regarding one aspect of the applicable standard of care).

Ctr., , (concluding that the trial court properly rejected a proposed jury instruction that a violation of a hospital's protocol was evidence of negligence on the part of the hospital); Evans v. Bernhard, 23 Ariz.App.

Ctr., , (ordinary standard of care is that of “reasonably prudent person under the circumstances”; higher standard of care for health care providers based on “ ‘usual conduct of other members of the defendant’s profession in similar circumstances’ ”).

Ctr., , see also Rudolph v. Arizona B.A.S.S.

Cf., , 195 n. 1 (App.1988) (expert testimony necessary for medical malpractice unless the negligence is so gross as to be apparent to a lay person).

Center, , (the standard imposed upon one who owes a duty of care is “that of the conduct of a reasonably prudent man under the circumstances”); , (standard is that degree of care that a “reasonable” or “ordinary” person would exercise i

She contends that the instruction tended to single out a particular factual aspect of Ciszek-Olson’s case