DocketDrift

Real-time tracking of state judicial trends.

Outcomes

Public record · Human review · No verdicts asserted

Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Stewart v. Fahey, 481 P.2d 519.

34 citing documents.

  • Linscott v. Heshion Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • Linscott v. Heshion Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
    A lis pendens is essentially a “statutorily authorized republication of pleadings in a judicial proceeding” that provides “constructive notice of all that is claimed in the action.” (citation omitted).
  • McAlister v. Loeb Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • McAlister v. Loeb Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
    Slander of title “is not a true defamation action, being historically an action on the case for special damages arising from a falsehood.” see also Dobbs at § 656 (“Trade libel is not libel and slander of title is not slander.”).
  • Ledvina v. Cerasani Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
  • Ledvina v. Cerasani Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
  • Sobol v. Marsh 130 P.3d 1000 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
  • Sobol v. Marsh 130 P.3d 1000 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
    at 125 , 618 P.2d at 619 ( , ).
  • Hatch Companies Contracting, Inc. v. Arizona Bank 826 P.2d 1179 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
  • Hatch Companies Contracting, Inc. v. Arizona Bank 826 P.2d 1179 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
  • West Pinal Family Health Center, Inc. v. McBryde 785 P.2d 66 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
  • West Pinal Family Health Center, Inc. v. McBryde 785 P.2d 66 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
  • Matter of Bowen 774 P.2d 1348 Ariz. 1989
  • Matter of Bowen 774 P.2d 1348 Ariz. 1989
    He argued that the action was constitutionally protected by *560 the first amendment and by prior Arizona case law that immunized the filing of a lis pendens from liability for slander of title, , or for abuse of process, Gray v. Kohlhase, 18 Ariz.App.
  • Coventry Homes, Inc. v. Scottscom Partnership 745 P.2d 962 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
  • Coventry Homes, Inc. v. Scottscom Partnership 745 P.2d 962 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
  • Franzi v. Koedyker 758 P.2d 1303 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
  • Franzi v. Koedyker 758 P.2d 1303 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
  • Green Acres Trust v. London 688 P.2d 617 Ariz. 1984
  • Green Acres Trust v. London 688 P.2d 617 Ariz. 1984
    mond v. Stahl, supra, (statements contained in motion filed to compel withdrawal of counsel and complaint filed with State Bar of Arizona); Sierra Madre Development, Inc. v. Via Entrada Townhouses Assn., supra (statement contained in complaint filed); , (statements contained in affidavit attached to motion filed for new trial); , (statements contained in filed lis pendens, in context of slander of title action).
  • Richey v. Western Pacific Development Corp. 684 P.2d 169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
  • Richey v. Western Pacific Development Corp. 684 P.2d 169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
    1 The purpose of a , , 108 P. 491 (1910): “ ‘The statute is obviously intended to make the recording of the lis pendens constructive notice of all that is claimed in the action regardless of whether such claims are sufficiently plead, in so far as their na
  • Green Acres Trust v. London 688 P.2d 658 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
  • Green Acres Trust v. London 688 P.2d 658 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
    550 , in a lis pendens filed to give notice of underlying litigation, , or in a complaint to the State Bar alleging unethical conduct on the part of an attorney
  • Drummond v. Stahl 618 P.2d 616 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
  • Drummond v. Stahl 618 P.2d 616 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
  • Kelly v. Perry 531 P.2d 139 Ariz. 1975
  • Kelly v. Perry 531 P.2d 139 Ariz. 1975
  • Sierra Madre Development, Inc. v. via Entrada Townhouses Ass'n 514 P.2d 503 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1973
  • Sierra Madre Development, Inc. v. via Entrada Townhouses Ass'n 514 P.2d 503 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1973
    ons One of this court has held that parties to judicial proceedings in this state are generally granted an absolute privilege to use defamatory language in pleadings because of an “overriding public interest that persons should speak freely and fearlessly in litigation, ‘uninfluenced by the possibility of being brought to account in an action for defamation.’ [Citation omitted]” -151
  • Todd v. Cox 512 P.2d 1234 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
  • Todd v. Cox 512 P.2d 1234 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
    we held that in a libel action a party to judicial proceedings was entitled to assert the defense of absolute privilege under the conditions set forth in § 587, Restatement of Torts, Vol.
  • Melton v. Slonsky 504 P.2d 1288 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
  • Melton v. Slonsky 504 P.2d 1288 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
    That is, giving recognition to the policy “that persons should speak freely and fearlessly in litigation, ‘uninfluenced by the possibility of being brought to account in an action for defamation’,” -151 , -521 (1971), and a policy against extending this rule to administrative bodies where a volunteer informer *68 may “[vent] his malice under the guise of protecting the public.” Meyer v. Parr, supra.