Cited by

3 MAUNEY, et al. v. KHAN, et al. Decision of the Court Chartered, ¶ 8 (App. 2012); (“causation must be shown to be probable and not merely possible, and generally expert medical testimony that a subsequent illness or disease ‘could’ or ‘may’ have been the cause of the injury is insufficient”) (emphasis added).

efendant has held himself out to be trained in a particular trade or profession,” a heightened standard of care may apply that requires the defendant to act with “the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that trade or profession in good standing in similar communities.” Powder Horn Nursery, Inc. v. Soil & Plant Lab’y, Inc., ().

“Such causation must be shown to be [p]robable and not merely [p]ossible, and generally expert medical testimony that a subsequent illness or disease ‘could’ or ‘may’ have been the cause of the injury is insufficient.” accord Robertson, 163 Ariz. at 546 (recognizing that causation cannot be left to jury speculation).

3d at 60 (citations omitted); Harper, 823 P.2d at 1143 (rejecting post-conviction psychiatric diagnosis as newly discovered evidence where petitioner simply “retains a new expert, who reviews the same evidence, and presents a new opinion”); (testimony of a new expert witness is not newly discovered evidence).

Van Allan’s affidavit provides no expert opinion that treating doctors exercising standard of care treatment probably would have “tak[en] action” differently than what took place here had Khan and Hu “not[ed] and report[ed] the presence of damage to an artery.” (“Such causation must be shown to be Probable and not merely Possible, and generally expert medical testimony that a subsequent illness or disease ‘could’ or ‘may’ have been the cause of the injury is insufficient.”).

See, e.g., Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc., (recognizing that plaintiff cannot leave causation to jury's speculation); (noting that “causation must be shown to be [p]robable and not merely [p]ossible”).

5 (“In the absence of evidence establishing the requisite standard of care and that defendant’s conduct failed to meet that standard, there was no basis upon which the jury could have found defendant liable to the plaintiff, and therefore the trial court did not commit error in refusing to submit the matter

However, where the duty arises “because the defendant has held himself out to be trained in a 8 NORTH et al. v. VPS et al. Decision of the Court particular trade or profession,” and the negligence is not “so grossly apparent that a layman would have no difficulty in recognizing it,” Bell, 157 Ariz. at 195 n.1 (), expert testimony is required “as to the care and competence prevalent in the business or profession,” St.

§ 12-563; (in a medical malpractice case, a plaintiff must show the standard of care was breached to defeat a motion for summary judgment).

Health Care Servs., Inc., (citation omitted); (stating that the parties agreed expert medical testimony was necessary to prove whether a customer’s severe ear infection was caused by a hearing aid dealer’s alleged negligence in not properly adjusting the customer’s hearing aids).

See Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc., (recognizing that plaintiff satisfies burden by presenting facts from which causal relationship may be inferred but cannot leave causation to the jury’s speculation); (noting “causation must be shown to be [p]robable and not merely [p]ossible, and generally expert medical testimony that a subsequent illness or disease ‘could’ or ‘may’ have been the cause of the injury is insufficient.”).

See, e.g., Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc., , (recognizing that plaintiff satisfies burden by presenting facts from which causal relationship may be inferred, but cannot leave causation to jury’s speculation); , (noting that “causation must be shown to be Probable and not merely Possible, and generally medical expert testimony that a subsequent illness or disease ‘could’ or ‘may’ have been the cause of the injury is insufficient”) (emphasis added).

Robertson, 163 Ariz. at 546 , 789 P.2d at 1047 (holding plaintiff satisfies burden by presenting facts from which causal relationship may be inferred but cannot leave causation to jury’s speculation); , (concluding mere possibility that act or omission caused injury insufficient); , (noting “causation must be shown to be probable and not merely possible, and generally expert medical testimony that a subsequent illness or disease ‘could’ or ‘ma/ have been the cause of the injury is insufficient”)

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A (1965).

Powder Horn Nursery v. Soil & Plant Laboratory, Inc.

In reaching this conclusion, P.2d 107 (1970), which held, Where, as here, the duty which the law recognizes arises because the defendant has held himself out to be trained in a particular trade or profession, the standard required for the protection of others against unreasonable risks is that the defendant exercise the skill and knowledge n

which the law recognizes arises because the defendant has held himself out to be trained in a *44 particular trade or profession, the standard required for the protection of others against unreasonable risks is that the defendant exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that trade or profession in good standing in similar communities, (emphasis added)

But if there is medical evidence of the possibility of the existence of the causal relationship together with other evidence or circumstances indicating such relationship, the finding that the accident caused the injury will be sustained.” (Italics in original) , and Montague v. Deagle, 11 Ariz.App.

Restatement 2d, Torts, § 299A, , wherein this Court held that the plaintiff failed to establish the professional standard of care allegedly breached by a hearing aid dealer, are authority to the contrary.

where we recognized and relied on 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 299A (1965) for the standard of care required towards one relying on professed expertise