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¶ 19 (App. 2001) (concluding that a defendant’s release status, for sentencing purposes, must be determined by a jury); –42, ¶ 22 (App. 2002) (vacating two-year sentencing enhancement because consideration of defendant’s release status was not decided by the jury).

In arguing the prior conviction should have been submitted to a jury, Togstad relies on State v. Gross arguing he was entitled to a jury trial for any enhancement that would increase his sentence.

Parole status is “not used to determine guilt, but only to enhance” or aggravate a defendant’s sentence upon conviction, -45, ¶¶ 11-15 (App. 2001).

¶ 19, Large, 234 Ariz. at 280 ¶ 16, 321 P.3d at 445 (extending Gross to 4 STATE v. ENRIQUEZ Decision of the Court a defendant’s release status when it will expose him to a higher mandat

¶23 Clifton argues that Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), P.3d 815 (App. 2001), support his position that the Almendarez-Torres and Ring holdings are no longer viable.

¶ 19, (holding that a defendant’s release status must be determined by a jury), Large, 1 CA-CR 13-0115, 2014 WL 1226731, at *4, ¶ 16, (extending Gross to a defendant’s parole or release status when it will expose him to a higher mandatory minimum sentence).

¶ 19 , we addressed whether a defendant’s release status had to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt before receiving an enhanced sentence under AR.S.

14 proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict.”7 Jones, 526 U.S. at 233, 252; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494; ¶¶ 9-10, ¶¶ 12, 14, 819 (App. 2001).

this court held that because a finding that the defendant was on release status when he committed a new felony exposed the defendant to a maximum sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum for the offense, the defendant’s release status had to be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a re

mposed can be reversed on appeal despite the lack of an objection”); , (fundamental error for trial court to make sentence-enhancement determination jury was required to make); , (“[A] Rule 32 proceeding is the appeal for a defendant pleading guilty.”); , (because Apprendi presents new rule of constitutional law, its holding will be applied to cases pending on direct review).

As Division O P.3d 815 (A pp. 2001), Apprendi effectively overruled Hurley, requiring that release status be determined by a jury beyon d a reasonable dou bt.

Apprendi effectively overruled Hurley , requiring that release status be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 9 , this Court addressed whether a jury must make the finding of release status under a similar statute, A.R.S.

2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) ¶ 9 , require that the issue of a defendant’s release status for sentence enhancement purposes be tried to a jury rather than a judge, we vacate the two-year enhancements to the defendant’s sentences and remand the case for a jury trial on the release status issue.

Therefore, we concluded, the requirement in § 13-604(P) that the sentencing judge make that release status determination “unconstitutionally conflicts with the defendant’s right to a jury trial on that issue.” Benenati, , ; , (same).

State v. Gross, 201 Ariz. 41, P.3d 791 (App. 2001).

¶ 13 , applied the prior conviction exception to Apprendi very narrowly and the same reasoning applies here.

2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), , Booker contends he was entitled to a jury trial to determine his release status.

¶ 7 , in which Division One of this court held that, pursuant to Apprendi , a defendant’s release status must be determined by a jury for purposes of enhancement under § 13-604(R).

6 , (Apprendi enhancements “should be tried by the same jury that tried the substantive charge”); , (outlining bifurcated trial procedure formerly used to determine prior convictions pursuant to A.R.S.

§ 13-604(R) is encompassed by the Apprendi rule for cases on direct appeal, , we need not reach that question for former § 13-604.02(A) because we agree with the state’s contention that Apprendi does not apply retroactively to persons such as petitioner whose convictions have become final.