Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Hensley, 31 P.3d 848.

26 citing documents.

Keenan Reed-Kaliher v. State of Arizona 332 P.3d 587 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
Keenan Reed-Kaliher v. State of Arizona 332 P.3d 587 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
Therefore, “[a] condition of probation may not circumvent another statutory scheme.” United States v. Abushaar, 761 F.2d 954, 960 (3d Cir.1985); , (“[A] court’s probation order ‘must conform to the statutory authorization.’ ”)
State of Arizona v. Joel Agustin Lopez 282 P.3d 424 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
State of Arizona v. Joel Agustin Lopez 282 P.3d 424 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
-29 (App. 1989), and it is not clear whether the imposition of probation would constitute a “sentence” as contemplated by § 13-4032(5), compare Pickett v. Boykin, 118 (“Probation is not a sentence but rather a feature of the suspension of imposition of sentence.”) (trial court’s termination of Proposition 200 probation “illegal sentence” permitting appellate court to address issue sua sponte) (“[W]hen used in the context of [the rules governing post-verdict proceedings
State v. Lewis 244 P.3d 561 Ariz. 2011
State v. Lewis 244 P.3d 561 Ariz. 2011
To be sure, such a failure will typically indicate that the defendant is not 2 The State also relied below on State v. Hensley, which stated that “once the court finds that a defendant has violated probation, its only options are to revoke, modify, or continue the terms of probation.” ¶ 21
State v. Hatch 239 P.3d 432 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
State v. Hatch 239 P.3d 432 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
at 284, ¶ 19, 69 P.3d at 1005 ; -72, ¶¶ 6, 8 , -20 (App.2002) (noting that “incarceration [was] not an available option” for Proposition 200 probation violation and that a probation violator could not reject probation) ( ¶ 21 , (finding that courts are limited to revocation, continuation, or modification of probation terms in the event of probation violation absent specific statutory authorization for other actions)).
State v. Lewis 233 P.3d 625 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
State v. Lewis 233 P.3d 625 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Foreman 118 P.3d 1117 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Foreman 118 P.3d 1117 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
In Re Themika M. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
In Re Themika M. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
¶11 In support of her argument to the contrary, P.3d 848 (App. 2001).
State v. Givens 76 P.3d 457 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Raney v. Lindberg 76 P.3d 867 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Givens 76 P.3d 457 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Criticized Raney v. Lindberg 76 P.3d 867 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
1 In answering the first question
State v. Siner 69 P.3d 1022 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Siner 69 P.3d 1022 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Paxson 49 P.3d 310 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
State v. Paxson 49 P.3d 310 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
State v. Hylton 44 P.3d 1005 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
State v. Hylton 44 P.3d 1005 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
¶ 3 Because our “trial court[s] do[ ] not have inherent authority to grant probation,” but rather are granted that authority from our legislature, a court’s probation order “must conform to the statutory authori *326 zation.” ¶ 21
State v. Tousignant 43 P.3d 218 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
State v. Tousignant 43 P.3d 218 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
-80, ¶ 22-23 , -54 (App.2001).