Cited by

¶ 20 (App. 2002); U.S. Const. amend.

¶ 24 (2013); ¶ 21 (App. 2002).

In doing so, courts should consider “the vitality of the evidence to the proponent’s case; the degree to which the evidence or the sanctionable conduct has been prejudicial to the opposing party; whether the sanctionable conduct was willful or motivated by bad faith; and whether a less stringent sanction would suffice.” see Ariz. R. Crim.

See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15 (1995) (identifying “the law enforcement team engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”) (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)); ¶ 21, [3] 12.

We review for an abuse of discretion and “grant considerable deference to the trial court’s perspective and judgment.” ¶ 19

In Alyeska Pipeline, the Supreme Court “affirmed the continuing vitality of the ‘American Rule’ that requires each party to bear the cost of its own attorneys’ fees absent express statutory authority,” but noted the following exceptions in federal courts: “(1) the common fund doctrine applies; (2) a party willfully disobeys a court order; or (3) a party acts in bad faith.” (Hall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 258-59.

also United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 1989) (“Oates has been criticized by both courts and commentators as an unduly broad interpretation of Rule 803(8).”); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1202 (6th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e now join the Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in [refusing to apply] the restriction [in Oates].”).13 ¶40 P.3d 407 (App. 2002), for the proposition that criminalists who do calibration testing should be considered “law enforcement personnel” and, th

763 (Brady violation when one prosecutor did not disclose deal unknown to him between key witness and another prosecutor); , 55 ¶¶ 20-21, (city crime laboratory arm of prosecution for purpose of disclosure); -90 , -50 (App.1993) (law-enforcement agency performing criminal investigation within prosecution’s control).

(“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); , (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); , (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v.

"The State must disclose not only `information in the possession or control of members of the prosecutor's staff,' but also that within the possession or control `of any other persons who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case.'" , quoting Ariz. R.Crim.