Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Seyrafi, 32 P.3d 430.

34 citing documents.

  • State v. Valentin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. Valentin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    See Reed-Kaliher, 237 Ariz. at 122, ¶¶ 6–8; ¶ 16 (2001) (“[W]e interpret and apply statutory language in a way that will avoid an untenable or irrational result.”); ¶ 11 (App. 2001) (“We apply practical, common sense constructions rather than hypertechnical ones that would tend to frustrate legislative intent when we interpret criminal statutes.”).
  • Bekelian v. Jp Morgan 439 P.3d 811 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
  • Bekelian v. Jp Morgan 439 P.3d 811 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
    “When possible, we seek to harmonize statutory provisions and avoid interpretations that result in contradictory provisions.” Premiere Physicians Grp., ¶ 9 (2016); ¶ 14 (App. 2001) (statutory provisions must be “construed in context with related provisions and in light of their place in the statutory scheme”).
  • Brush & Nib v. Phoenix 418 P.3d 426 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • Brush & Nib v. Phoenix 418 P.3d 426 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    Generally, to succeed on a facial challenge a party “must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid.” ¶ 28 (App. 2001) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
  • State v. Kearns Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Kearns Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    We must “interpret and apply statutory language in a way that will avoid an untenable or irrational result,” ¶ 16 (2001), and we must also “apply practical, common sense constructions rather than hypertechnical ones that would tend to frustrate legislative intent when we interpret criminal statutes,” ¶ 11 (App. 2001).
  • State v. Anderson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Anderson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Vista Verde v. Maricopa County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • Vista Verde v. Maricopa County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    § 42-16255(B) prevents [a property owner] from filing an error correction claim to correct [a] classification error would undermine that legislative intent.” Levy, 1 CA- TX 14-0007 at 5, ¶ 20; ¶ 11 (App. 2001) (holding courts should “apply practical, common sense constructions rather than hypertechnical ones that would tend to frustrate legislative intent”).
  • Edw. C. Levy Co. v. Maricopa County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • Edw. C. Levy Co. v. Maricopa County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    ¶ 11, (holding that courts should “apply practical, common sense constructions rather than hypertechnical ones that would tend to frustrate legislative intent.”).
  • Winckler v. Bnsf Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • Winckler v. Bnsf Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Action Marine, Inc., ¶ 10, ¶ 13, (statutory provisions are construed in context with related provisions and in light of their place in the statutory scheme).
  • State of Arizona v. Cooperman 282 P.3d 446 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
  • State of Arizona v. Cooperman 282 P.3d 446 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
    Although the presumption contained in § 28-1381(G) is permissive and “nothing more than an inference,” the trial judge still has a duty to instruct the jury on this general principle of law pertaining to a prosecution under (A)(1) once evidence is introduced of the defendant’s alcohol concentration.
  • Lisa K. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 281 P.3d 1041 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
  • Lisa K. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 281 P.3d 1041 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
    “If we find that there is no set of circumstances under which the statute can be found constitutional, then it must be found unconstitutional.” n.4, n.4 (App. 2001).
  • State v. Boehler 262 P.3d 637 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
  • State v. Boehler 262 P.3d 637 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
  • CNL Hotels & Resorts, Inc. v. Maricopa County 244 P.3d 592 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
  • CNL Hotels & Resorts, Inc. v. Maricopa County 244 P.3d 592 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
    Courts “apply practical, common sense constructions rather than hypertechnical ones that would tend to frustrate legislative intent.” , *159 150, ¶ 11
  • State v. Lewis 233 P.3d 625 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
  • State v. Lewis 233 P.3d 625 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
  • Cicoria v. Cole 215 P.3d 402 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
  • Cicoria v. Cole 215 P.3d 402 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
    ¶ 13 , (courts construe statutory provisions in context with related provisions and in light of their placement in the statutory scheme); -61, ¶¶ 11-12 , -51 (App.1998) (reading statute as a unitary whole in order to determine the mea
  • State v. Hasson 177 P.3d 301 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
  • State v. Hasson 177 P.3d 301 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
    Power Corp., Inc., , 125, ¶ 134, , 604 (App.2004)(interpreting statute to give it a fair and sensible meaning, rather than a construction that frustrates legislative intent); ¶ 11 , (‘We apply practical, common sense constructions rather than hypertechnical ones that would tend to frustrate legislative intent when we interpret criminal statutes.”); , (in construing statutes, courts consider c
  • State v. Slayton 154 P.3d 1057 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
  • State v. Slayton 154 P.3d 1057 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
    (“Although statutorily created criminal offenses with no mental element ‘have a generally disfavored status,’ ...
  • Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington PlC 47 P.3d 1119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
  • Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington PlC 47 P.3d 1119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002