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Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Mitchell, 62 P.3d 616.

48 citing documents.

State v. Anderson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
State v. Anderson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
-20, 4 STATE v. ANDERSON Decision of the Court ¶ 19 (App. 2003) (explaining the act of “effecting arrest” is on-going, beginning with the officer’s first physical contact and continuing even after the arrest may be compl
State of Arizona v. Samkeita Jahveh Jurden 373 P.3d 543 Ariz. 2016
State of Arizona v. Samkeita Jahveh Jurden 373 P.3d 543 Ariz. 2016
P.3d 616 (App. 2003) (determining the meaning of “effecting an arrest”); ¶ 9, (finding that resisting arrest is not a victimless crime, but rather a crime against a person where a “[d]efendant must use or threaten to use physical force or any oth
City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Electronics, Inc. 375 P.3d 1189 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Electronics, Inc. 375 P.3d 1189 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
n law 6 PHOENIX v. GLENAYRE, et al. Opinion of the Court ¶10 When interpreting a statute, “we look first to the plain language of the statute as the most reliable indicator of its meaning.” Harris Corp. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, ¶ 13 (App. 2013) ( ¶ 12 (App. 2003)).
State v. Montoya Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Montoya Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State of Arizona v. Ronald Vassell 359 P.3d 1025 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
State of Arizona v. Ronald Vassell 359 P.3d 1025 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
State v. Emerson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Emerson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Jurden 352 P.3d 455 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Jurden 352 P.3d 455 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
§ 13-2508(A)(1) and (2) prohibit certain physical acts directed toward a peace officer, , (“As we read the [resisting arrest] statute, it prohibits assaultive behavior directed toward an arresting officer”); ¶ 16 , (“The purpose of the resisting arrest statute is to protect peace officers and citizens from substantial risk of physical injury.”), and a violation of A.R.S.
State v. Boutsisavanh Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Boutsisavanh Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Bos Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Bos Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Harris Corp. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 312 P.3d 1143 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
Harris Corp. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 312 P.3d 1143 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
“We look first to the plain language of the statute as the most reliable indicator of its meaning.” ¶ 12 , (citation omitted).
Alliance Trutrus, L.L.C. v. Carlson Real Estate Co. 270 P.3d 911 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Alliance Trutrus, L.L.C. v. Carlson Real Estate Co. 270 P.3d 911 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
When interpreting a statute, “[w]e look first to the plain language of the statute as the most reliable indicator of its meaning.” Nordstrom, ¶ 10 , ( ¶ 12 , ).
State v. Cagle 266 P.3d 1070 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
State v. Cagle 266 P.3d 1070 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
¶ 16 , (“The purpose of the resisting arrest statute is to protect peace officers and citizens from substantial risk of physical injury.”); see also Rudolph J. Gerber, Criminal Law of Arizona 2508-3 (2d ed. 1993) (“The statute’s purpose is to prohibit threats or any conduct that creat
State v. Flores 260 P.3d 309 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
State v. Flores 260 P.3d 309 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
-20, ¶ 19 , -20 (App.2003).
State v. Barker 253 P.3d 286 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
State v. Barker 253 P.3d 286 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
State v. Gomez 244 P.3d 1163 Ariz. 2010
State v. Gomez 244 P.3d 1163 Ariz. 2010
See State v. Mitchell, 204 Ariz. 14 216, 220 ¶ 22
State v. Lee 176 P.3d 712 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Lee 176 P.3d 712 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
-20, ¶¶ 12-19 , -20 (App.2003).
In re JESSI W. 152 P.3d 1217 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
In re JESSI W. 152 P.3d 1217 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
City of Phoenix v. Harnish 150 P.3d 245 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
City of Phoenix v. Harnish 150 P.3d 245 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
SFPP, L.P. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 108 P.3d 930 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
SFPP, L.P. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 108 P.3d 930 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
“When interpreting a statute, we attempt to fulfill the intent of the drafters, and we look to the plain language of the statute as the best indicator of that intent.” O’ ¶ 4 , ¶ 12
Nordstrom, Inc. v. Maricopa County 88 P.3d 1165 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Morgan v. Carillon Investments, Inc. 88 P.3d 1159 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Nordstrom, Inc. v. Maricopa County 88 P.3d 1165 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
When determining the meaning of a statute, “[w]e look first to the plain language of the statute as the most rehable indicator of its meaning.” ¶ 12 , (citation omitted).
Morgan v. Carillon Investments, Inc. 88 P.3d 1159 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
“We look first to the plain language of the statute as the most rehable indicator of its meaning.” ¶ 12
State v. Stroud 88 P.3d 190 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
Jangula v. Arizona Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund 88 P.3d 182 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
State v. Stroud 88 P.3d 190 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
(defendant improperly convicted of escape because he was never under actual restraint); , (in resisting-arrest context, effectuation of arrest is ongoing process); , (defendant properly charged with escape because evidence showed he had actually been restrained before he fled).
Jangula v. Arizona Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund 88 P.3d 182 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
‘We look first to the plain language of the statute as the most reliable indicator of its meaning.” ¶ 12
In re Ubaldo B. 81 P.3d 334 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
In re Ubaldo B. 81 P.3d 334 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
¶ 10 When determining the meaning of a statute, “[w]e look first to the plain language of the statute as the most reliable indicator of its meaning.” ¶ 12 , (citation omitted).

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