Cited by

Osborne’s abrogated by are unavailing.

¶ 32 (App. 2004) (holding sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment “[b]ecause the court’s consideration of the sentencing factors did not result in the imposition of a sentence above that which the judge was entitled to impose based on ‘the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant’”)

Further, even assuming the trial court’s mention of “the significant loss” could be construed as a consideration of an aggravating factor, such consideration was not a violation of Blakely because Appellant received a sentence that was “less than the sentence the judge could have imposed based solely on the facts found by the jury and admitted by [Appellant].” ¶ 35

A defendant need not know the age of the victim when committing the offense for it to qualify as a dangerous crime against children; the only requirement is that his conduct be “focused on, directed against, aimed at, or target a victim under the age of fifteen.” ¶ 14

-27, ¶¶ 27–30, -42 (App. 2004).

¶¶ 30-33, (“We need not remand for resentencing merely because [defendant’s] mitigated sentence might have been for a shorter period had the trial court not set off [judge-found] aggravating factors against the mitigating factors in imposing the mitigated sentence.”).5 ¶10 Ya

(internal citation omitted); ¶22

See, ¶¶ 13, 22-24, 40-41 (App. 2004) (applying Williams analysis to defendant charged with second-degree murder, alleged as dangerous crime against children); ¶¶ 16-18, -96 (App. 2000) (applying Williams to charge of sexual conduct with minor under age o

ble for aggravated sentence even though other Arizona statutory provisions require additional fact-finding and weighing before aggravated sentence properly imposed); , (judicial fact-finding does not violate Blakely if ultimate sentence does not exceed maximum authorized by jury verdict alone); , -43 (App.2004) (same).

Thus, because the trial court imposed a presumptive term, which does not exceed the statutory maximum, it did not violate Ramsey’s Sixth Amendment rights under Blakely.7 See Johnson, 111 P.3d at 1041; State v. Miranda-Cabrera, 209 Ariz. 220, ¶ 32

see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S. Ct. 708, 716, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 658 (1987) (new constitutional rules apply to cases that are not yet final).

be satisfied before defendant’s admissions of fact may be used for sentencing purposes); Aleman , ¶ 39 (Es-pinosa, J., specially concurring) (rejecting notion that “routine stipulation or admission by a defendant” used to establish element of offense or factual basis for plea would require independent Boykin waiver before it may be used for sentencing purposes); , -42 (App.2004) (finding, without further analysis, that defendant’s admissions at trial were admissions of fact under Blakely and tha

-43 (App.2004) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation when trial court weighs non-Bfatóy-compliant aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances and resulting sentence is below the presumptive); , (commenting that “t

akely , have also applied a harmless error analysis to Blakely violations”); Resendis-Felix, ¶¶ 8-10 , 100 P.3d at 460 ; , -32 (App.2004) (holding that “Blakely error is subject to harmless error or fundamental error analysis and may or may not require reversal based on the facts of a particular case”); , (even assuming defendant’s trial testimony did not qualify as admissions for sentencing purposes, trial court’s enhancement of sentencing range without “separate and specific [jury] finding” th

(once Blakely -compliant ceiling has been set, trial judge is free to engage in traditional discretionary sentencing); , (when Blakely is not implicated, trial court may impose any term within range authorized by verdict because "[j]

¶ 26 , (citing Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328 , 107 S.Ct.

Resendis-Felix, ___ Ariz. ___, ¶ 8, 100 P.3d at 460; see also State v. Henderson, ___ Ariz. ___, ¶¶ 22, 33, 921-22 (App. 2004); State v. Martinez, ___ Ariz. ___, ¶ 21, State 11 v. Miranda-Cabrera, ___ Ariz. ___, ¶ 30