Cited by

447 ¶¶ 13, 24 (App. 2002) (interpreting Article 2, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution as “imply[ing] that a person must show that his or her personal privacy rights were infringed before attacking the legality of a search or seizure” and holding that neither that provision nor Arizona case law confers “automa

ument that our state constitutional provisions are “specific in preserving the sanctity of homes.” (Arizona Constitution occasionally “found to afford a defendant greater privacy protections” than U.S. Constitution, but only in “exceedingly narrow” circumstances when “privacy of a person’s home has been invaded” by government); (except in home search context, protections of Arizona Constitution concomitant with those of federal constitution).

¶ 8 n.1 (2003); ¶ 14 (App. 2002) (“[E]xcept in cases involving ‘unlawful’ warrantless home entries, Arizona courts have not yet applied Article 2, Section 8 to grant broader protections against search and seizure than those available under the federal constitution.”); ¶ 8 (App. 200

and article 2, section 8 of the Arizona Constitution proscribe unreasonable search and seizure by the state.”); ¶ 16 (App. 2002) (“Arizona courts have consistently applied the Fourth Amendment’s ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ requirement when determining unlawful search or seizure claims made pursuant to Article 2, Section 8.”).

Evidence obtained in violation of this requirement may be subject to suppression, see Bolt , 142 Ariz. at 265 -69 , 689 P.2d at 524 -528 , but only the person whose rights were violated may claim the violation, see State v. Jeffers , , 413, ; State v. Juarez , , ¶ 12, (citing Rakas v. Illinois , 439 U.S. 128 , 143, 99 S.Ct.

See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 750 (1979) (constitution does not prohibit use of recordings of statements made by a party to the conversation); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971) (plurality opinion); (defendant may not challenge a search if he does not have an expectation of privacy in the location searched); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (“Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment .

4Snyder also argues the search violated article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution, but “except in cases involving ‘unlawful’ warrantless home entries, Arizona courts have not yet applied [article II, § 8] to grant broader protections against search and seizure than those available under the federal constitution.”

See, ¶ 21 n.7, n.7 (App. 2009); ¶ 16

-45, ¶ 14, -88 (App. 2002).

¶ 6 (App. 2008) (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140) (“In order to challenge a search, a person 3 STATE v. PULEO Decision of the Court must first show he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched”); ¶ 24 (App. 2002) (concluding that the Arizona Constitution and case law grant privacy rights only to defendants who can “establish a legitimate expectation of privacy”).

¶ 13, (“‘[E]xcept in cases involving “unlawful” warrantless home entries, the right of privacy afforded by Article 2, Section 8, has not been expanded beyond that provided by the Fourth Amendment.’”) (–45 ¶ 14, –88 (App. 2002)).

11 14, -88 (App.2002) ("[E]xcept in cases involving 'unlawful' warrantless home entries, Arizona courts have not yet applied Article 2, Section 8 to grant broader protections against search and seizure than those available under the federal constitution.”).

As this Court previously observed, “[E]xcept in cases involving ‘unlawful’ warrantless home entries, Arizona courts have not yet applied Article 2, Section 8, to grant broader protections against search and seizure than those available under the federal constitution.” -45, ¶ 14 , -88 (App.2002) (citations omitted).

See Bolt, 142 Ariz. at 264-65, 689 P.2d at 523-24 (Arizona‟s constitutional provisions “specific in preserving the sanctity of homes”); (except in home search context, protections of article II, § 8 concomitant with federal constitution).

7 ¶¶ 14-16, -88 (App. 2002) (citing cases).

“[A] person claiming a violation of the Fourth Amendment must have ‘a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.’ ” , quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 , 99 S.Ct.

-45, ¶ 14 , -88 (App.2002).