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She provided significant and detailed testimony regarding AHCCCS’s operations and procedures—matters well outside the “experience or knowledge of the average juror.” ¶ 14 (App. 2004).

Stated differently, in determining whether to give the instruction, the trial court must “be able to reasonably infer from the evidence that the defendant left the scene in a manner which obviously invites suspicion or announces guilt.” ().

¶ 27 (App. 2004) (“A trial court commits reversible error when it instructs on an issue or theory that is not supported by evidence because it invites the jury to speculate as to possible non-existent circumstances.”) (cleaned up).

Stated differently, a flight instruction is appropriate if the court is “able to reasonably infer from the evidence that the defendant left the scene in a manner which obviously invites suspicion or announces guilt.” ¶ 28 (App. 2004) (citation omitted).

9–300; Wilson, 185 Ariz. at 256–57, this court has more recently declined to strictly apply Smith, opting instead to apply modern harmless error review under 6 STATE v. NAJERA Decision of the Court similar circumstances, see Solis, 236 Ariz. at 287, ¶ 12 (citation omitted); –135, ¶¶ 26–38 (App. 2004) (applying harmless error review to an erroneous flight instruction).

Woodruff’s elusive behavior “obviously invites suspicion or announces guilt.” ¶ 30 (App. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) ().

Rather, a flight instruction is proper when the evidence of the defendant’s behavior “obviously invites suspicion or announces guilt.” ¶ 30 (App. 2004) ().

(); ¶ 28 (App. 2004) (noting that the test requires that flight evidence allows the jury to "be able to reasonably infer from the evidence that the defendant left the scene in a manner which obviously invites suspicion or announces guilt").

Rosas-Hernandez, 202 Ariz. at 220, ¶ 31; ¶ 27 (App. 2004) (it is error to instruct a jury on issues or theories not supported by evidence “because it invites the jury to speculate as to possible non-existent circumstances”) (citation omitted).

( P.2d 274 (1970)); ¶ 28, (noting test requires that flight evidence allows jury to “‘be able to reasonably infer from the evidence that the defendant left the scene in a manner which obviously invites suspicion or announces guilt’”) ( (198

A flight or concealment instruction is proper when “the defendant’s conduct manifests a consciousness of guilt.” ¶ 27, (holding that flight instruction not warranted based only on presence of a passport and a flight itinerary printout in the defendant’s backpack).

See Wilson v. City of Tucson, 8 Ariz. App. 398, 403, (after driver’s “sudden departure” from accident scene, investigating “officers could consider his flight as an additional factor tending to indicate guilt”); (trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting “‘flight’ evidence at trial,” “given the very minimal standard that evidence must satisfy in order to be ‘relevant’ and therefore admissible”); Yauch v. S. Pac.