Cited by

nold, ¶ 4 (App. 2011) (“[T]he plain language of § 13-3554(C) requires the victim to actually be a minor under 15 years of age for a court to sentence the defendant under [the DCAC statute].”); ¶ 13 (App. 2005) (“When the victim is older than fifteen, the statutes are silent and the general sentencing scheme would apply.”); ¶ 12 (App. 2003) (“This conclusion that the term ‘minor’ as employed in A.R.S.

See § 13-3553(A)(2) (criminalizing, inter alia, possession of visual depictions of minors engaged in exploitive 8 STATE v. DUNCAN Opinion of the Court exhibition); (acknowledging this caveat to constitutionality of § 13-3553).

§§ 13-3551, 13-3553, did not make 12 STATE v. MACHARDY Opinion of the Court the same constitutional misstep because “their scope is limited to visual depictions of ‘actual minors’ actually engaged in real or simulated exploitative exhibition or sexual conduct.” 4 ¶32 Drawing on Ashcroft and Hazlett, MacHardy argues the state failed to meet its burden to provide sufficient evidence under § 13-3553 because that evidence was based primarily on testimony that the offending images “appear[ed] to” dep

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764; ¶ 11 (App. 2003) (“[A] state can penalize conduct relating to [nude images of children] without meeting the more exacting standard for obscenity because the material involves actual children actually participating in the acts depicted.

§§ 13-3551 and -3553, we have previously rejected analogous claims, ¶ 29 (App. 2003), and decline to depart from Arizona precedent.

In support of this argument, ¶ 11, (violation of A.R.S.

for its holding that the term "minor” in the sexual exploitation statute referred to an "actual child.” Regenold, , 255 P.3d at 1030 .

his petition for post-conviction relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(h) because the State failed to identify any “actual” minor under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 13-3553(A)(2) (2010) (defining crime of sexual exploitation of a child as possessing “any depiction in which a minor is engaged in exploitative exhibition or other sexual conduct”),1 ¶ 11, (violation of A.R.S.

Thus, “[a] statute is to be read and applied in accordance with any special statutory definitions of the terms it uses.” see also A.R.S.

¶10 Finally, P.3d 1258 (App. 2003).

¶¶ 27-28, (noting courts “have emphasized that under these types of statutes, the material, at a minimum, must be lewd and lascivious”); -66, -52 (App. 1994) (rejecting argument in interpreting prior version of statute “that

-26, ¶ 5 , -61 (App.2003) (standing is not a jurisdictional doctrine under Arizona law; State’s failure to raise standing in trial court constituted waiver of the issue); cf. State v. B Bar Enters., , 101 n.2, , 980 n.2 (1982) (standing is not a constitutional jurisdicti

3348 ); , 527 ¶ 11, (“The crime is the abuse of the children.” (Footnote omitted.)).

at ¶ 10; ¶¶ 23-26 , ¶¶ 23-26 (App.2003); cf. McKillop, 857 P.2d at 364 (Alaska’s telephone harassment statute “must be interpreted to prohibit telephone calls only when the call has no legitimate communicative purpose — when the caller’s speech is devoid of any substantive information and the caller’s sole inten

at ¶10; ¶¶23-26, ¶¶23-26 (App. 2003); cf. McKillop, 857 P.2d at 364 (Alaska’s telephone harassment statute “must be interpreted to prohibit telephone calls only when the call has no legitimate communicative purpose—when the caller’s speech is devoid of any substantive information and the caller’s sole inten