Cited by

¶ 13 (App. 2004) ("A statute is not void for vagueness because it fails to explicitly define a term or because it can be interpreted in more than one way."); -40 (App. 1984) (finding waiver where one due process claim raised on appeal was not raised befo

But the requirement of fair and reasonable notice is not a requirement of “perfect notice or absolute precision of language.” quoting Kaiser, 65 P.3d at 466.

“Further, it must be supposed that public officers will act fairly and impartially and in accordance with their best judgment, and a statute will not be held unconstitutional because of a supposed possibility they will not do so.” ¶ 15, (quoting McLamb, 188 Ariz. at 6, 932 P.2d at 271).

“A statute is not void for vagueness if it gives a common person adequate notice of what conduct is proscribed.” ¶ 13

-50, ¶ 8, -25 (App. 2006)); -35, ¶ 5, -35 (App. 2004) (“[W]e .

See Thomas & King, ¶ 9, (interpreting municipal ordinances using the traditional rules of statutory construction); -35, ¶ 5, -35 (App. 2004) (“[W]e .

¶5 A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it does not “‘give persons of ordinary intelligence notice of what conduct is prohibited and contain explicit standards of application so as to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’”

¶ 5 , (holding that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give it effect).

(to afford due process, statute must give notice of prohibited conduct).

In construing a statute, “‘we consider the statutory scheme as a whole and presume that the legislature does not include statutory provisions which are redundant, void, inert, trivial, superfluous, or contradictory.’”

In interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to “fulfill the purpose of the legislature.” ¶ 5

Mail Boxes, etc. U.S.A., v. Industrial Comm’n of Ariz., , , 334 ¶ 5, see Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1147 (9th Cir.2002).