Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Connor, 161 P.3d 596.
- State v. Matthews 428 P.3d 198 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
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State v. Matthews
428 P.3d 198
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
See State v. Connor , , 557, ¶ 6, , 601 (App. 2007).
- Z.W. v. Foster 422 P.3d 582 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
- State v. Uptain Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
- State v. Uptain Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
- State v. Quiroz Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
- State v. Quiroz Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
- State v. Boozer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
- State v. Boozer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
- State v. Molinar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
- State v. Molinar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
- Stafford v. Burns 389 P.3d 76 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
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Stafford v. Burns
389 P.3d 76
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶ 17 (App. 2013) ( ¶ 39 (App. 2007)); (); see also Ariz. R. Evid.
- State v. Shreve Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
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State v. Shreve
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
“Because the trial court is in the best position to balance the probative value of challenged evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice, the trial court has broad discretion in this decision.” ¶ 39
- State v. Scott Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
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State v. Scott
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
“To the extent [Scott] sets forth a constitutional claim in which he asserts that the information is necessary to his defense, however, we will conduct a de novo review.” ¶ 6 (App. 2007).
- State v. Izquerdo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
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State v. Izquerdo
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
But “[e]vidence is unfairly prejudicial only when it has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis such as emotion, sympathy, or horror.” ¶ 39 (App. 2007) (citation omitted); see also Ariz. R. Evid.
- State v. Peterson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Peterson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Brown Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
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State v. Brown
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶ 6 (App. 2007) ( ¶ 4 (App. 1999)).
- State v. Aguilar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Aguilar
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
–46, –56 (1997) (reviewing independently whether the probative value of prior acts is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice after the trial court failed to perform the required balancing test); ¶ 32, (stating the trial court’s decision to admit other-act evidence will be affirmed as long as it is supported by the facts before the court, unless a clear abuse of discretion appears).
- State v. Meyer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Meyer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Woody Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Woody
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
“Because the trial court is in the best position to balance the probative value of challenged evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice, the trial court has broad discretion in this decision.” ¶ 39 (App. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
- State v. Key Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Key
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Additionally, a trial court has broad discretion in determining if evidence is admissible because the court “is in the best position to balance the probative value of challenged evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice.” ¶ 39, ( ¶ 21, ).
- State v. Gomez-Torres Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Gomez-Torres
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
“Because the trial court is in the best position to balance the probative value of challenged evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice, the trial court has broad discretion in this decision.” ¶ 39 (App. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
- State v. Bravo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Bravo
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
See Roper, 172 Ariz. at 238, 836 P.2d at 451 (citations omitted); -61, ¶ 21, -04 (App. 2007) (citations omitted).
- State v. Hon. stephens/wilson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Hon. stephens/wilson
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Romley v. Superior Court (Roper), P.2d 445 (App. 1992), P.3d 596 (App. 2007)—that “some limited infringement on the victim’s rights may be required” upon consideration of the defendant’s due process right of access to evidence favorable to the defense and material to either guilt or punishment.
- State v. Cornman 351 P.3d 357 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Cornman
351 P.3d 357
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Under Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence relevant for any purpose other than showing propensities to act in a certain way remains admissible.” ¶ 32 , (citation omitted).
- State v. Giron Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Giron
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
“Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only when it has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis such as emotion, sympathy or horror.” ¶ 39, (citation omitted).
- State v. Rozenman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Rozenman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Trotter Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Trotter
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶ 39, (citation omitted).
- State v. Young Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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State v. Young
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
403; ¶ 39, (“Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only when it has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis such as emotion, sympathy, or horror.”) (citation omitted).
- State v. Marquez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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State v. Marquez
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
“Evidence relevant for any purpose other than showing propensities to act in a certain way remains admissible.” ¶ 32
- State v. Dyer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014