Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Connor, 161 P.3d 596.

123 citing documents.

  • State v. Matthews 428 P.3d 198 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Matthews 428 P.3d 198 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    See State v. Connor , , 557, ¶ 6, , 601 (App. 2007).
  • Z.W. v. Foster 422 P.3d 582 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Uptain Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Uptain Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Quiroz Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Quiroz Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Boozer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Boozer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Molinar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Molinar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • Stafford v. Burns 389 P.3d 76 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • Stafford v. Burns 389 P.3d 76 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    ¶ 17 (App. 2013) ( ¶ 39 (App. 2007)); (); see also Ariz. R. Evid.
  • State v. Shreve Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Shreve Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    “Because the trial court is in the best position to balance the probative value of challenged evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice, the trial court has broad discretion in this decision.” ¶ 39
  • State v. Scott Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Scott Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    “To the extent [Scott] sets forth a constitutional claim in which he asserts that the information is necessary to his defense, however, we will conduct a de novo review.” ¶ 6 (App. 2007).
  • State v. Izquerdo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Izquerdo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    But “[e]vidence is unfairly prejudicial only when it has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis such as emotion, sympathy, or horror.” ¶ 39 (App. 2007) (citation omitted); see also Ariz. R. Evid.
  • State v. Peterson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Peterson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Brown Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Brown Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    ¶ 6 (App. 2007) ( ¶ 4 (App. 1999)).
  • State v. Aguilar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Aguilar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    –46, –56 (1997) (reviewing independently whether the probative value of prior acts is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice after the trial court failed to perform the required balancing test); ¶ 32, (stating the trial court’s decision to admit other-act evidence will be affirmed as long as it is supported by the facts before the court, unless a clear abuse of discretion appears).
  • State v. Meyer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Meyer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Woody Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Woody Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    “Because the trial court is in the best position to balance the probative value of challenged evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice, the trial court has broad discretion in this decision.” ¶ 39 (App. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
  • State v. Key Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Key Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    Additionally, a trial court has broad discretion in determining if evidence is admissible because the court “is in the best position to balance the probative value of challenged evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice.” ¶ 39, ( ¶ 21, ).
  • State v. Gomez-Torres Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Gomez-Torres Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    “Because the trial court is in the best position to balance the probative value of challenged evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice, the trial court has broad discretion in this decision.” ¶ 39 (App. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
  • State v. Bravo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Bravo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    See Roper, 172 Ariz. at 238, 836 P.2d at 451 (citations omitted); -61, ¶ 21, -04 (App. 2007) (citations omitted).
  • State v. Hon. stephens/wilson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Hon. stephens/wilson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    Romley v. Superior Court (Roper), P.2d 445 (App. 1992), P.3d 596 (App. 2007)—that “some limited infringement on the victim’s rights may be required” upon consideration of the defendant’s due process right of access to evidence favorable to the defense and material to either guilt or punishment.
  • State v. Cornman 351 P.3d 357 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Cornman 351 P.3d 357 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Under Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence relevant for any purpose other than showing propensities to act in a certain way remains admissible.” ¶ 32 , (citation omitted).
  • State v. Giron Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Giron Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only when it has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis such as emotion, sympathy or horror.” ¶ 39, (citation omitted).
  • State v. Rozenman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Rozenman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Trotter Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Trotter Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    ¶ 39, (citation omitted).
  • State v. Young Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Young Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
    403; ¶ 39, (“Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only when it has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis such as emotion, sympathy, or horror.”) (citation omitted).
  • State v. Marquez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Marquez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
    “Evidence relevant for any purpose other than showing propensities to act in a certain way remains admissible.” ¶ 32
  • State v. Dyer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014