Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Teagle, 170 P.3d 266.

203 citing documents.

State v. Morris 435 P.3d 1060 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2019
State v. Morris 435 P.3d 1060 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2019
State v. Teagle , , ¶ 19
State v. Moses Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Moses Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Evidence is not reweighed on appeal but, instead, this court defers to the superior court’s factual findings, “including findings on credibility and the reasonableness of the inferences drawn by the officer.” ¶ 19 (App. 2007) (citing cases).
State v. Rose Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. McCoy Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. McCoy Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
1609, 1614 (2015); ¶ 21 (App. 2007).
State v. Rose Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Ramos Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Ramos Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
substance.” ¶ 41 (App. 2007).
State v. Tucker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Tucker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)) (internal quotations omitted); ¶ 26 (App. 2007) (“In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we accord deference to a trained law enforcement officer’s ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.”); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2002) (reviewing reasonable- suspicion determinations in view of
State v. Turner 416 P.3d 872 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
State v. Turner 416 P.3d 872 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
State v. Teagle , , ¶ 25, , 272-73 (App. 2007).
State v. Sotelo-Nava Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Sotelo-Nava Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
¶ 44 (App. 2007) (“A jury may properly infer that a driver and sole occupant of a vehicle containing a large amount of drugs was aware that the drugs were in the vehicle.”).
State v. Cruz Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Cruz Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
¶ 41 (App. 2007); see also Gonsalves, 231 Ariz. at 523, ¶ 9 (two people may have simultaneous constructive possession of the same prohibited object).
State v. Mortemore Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Mortemore Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27); ¶ 26 (App. 2007) (“In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we accord deference to a trained law enforcement officer’s ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.”); see also U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2002) (reviewing reasonable-suspicion determinations in view of the totali
State v. Ribble Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Ribble Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶ 11 (2017); ¶ 21 (App. 2010); ¶ 25 (App. 2007).
State v. Battle Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Paul Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Paul Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
§ 28-1594; ¶ 20 (App. 2007).
State v. Battle Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶ 41 (App. 2007) (citation omitted) (“Constructive possession can be established by showing that the accused exercised 1 We cite to the current version of statutes unless changes material to this decision have occurred.
State v. Peltz 391 P.3d 1215 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
State v. Peltz 391 P.3d 1215 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
n.3 , , 271 n.3 (App. 2007).
State v. Gutierrez 381 P.3d 254 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Gutierrez 381 P.3d 254 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Evans, 235 Ariz. at 317, ¶ 8 (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); ¶ 26 (App. 2007) ("In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we accord deference to a trained law enforcement officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.").
State of Arizona v. Francisco Flores Huez, Jr. 380 P.3d 103 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
State of Arizona v. Francisco Flores Huez, Jr. 380 P.3d 103 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
(“[C]ircumstances that ‘describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers’ are insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion because travelers would then be subject to ‘virtually random seizures.’”), quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980).
State v. Strait Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Strait Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶ 41, (explaining the knowledge requirement may be proven either through “actual physical possession or constructive possession with actual knowledge of the presence of the narcotic substance” (citation omitted)).
State v. Meza-Contreras Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Meza-Contreras Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State of Arizona v. Kyle Andrew Stoll 370 P.3d 1130 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
State of Arizona v. Kyle Andrew Stoll 370 P.3d 1130 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
See, -73 (App. 2007) (defining reasonable 4 STATE v. STOLL Opinion of the Court suspicion).
State of Arizona v. Angel Pete Ruiz 372 P.3d 323 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
State of Arizona v. Angel Pete Ruiz 372 P.3d 323 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
¶8 “‘Reasonable suspicion is something short of probable cause,’” quoting State v. O’Meara, but more than a mere “inchoate ‘hunch,’” id.
State of Arizona v. Nicholas Olaf Kjolsrud, Loni Kay Kambitsch 371 P.3d 647 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
State of Arizona v. Nicholas Olaf Kjolsrud, Loni Kay Kambitsch 371 P.3d 647 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
Once the time needed to complete this mission has passed, an officer “must allow a driver to continue on his way unless (1) the encounter between the driver and the officer becomes consensual, or (2) during the encounter, the officer develops a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Sweeney, 227 P.3d at 873
State v. Cifuno Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Cifuno Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Walker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Walker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Holguin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Holguin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
n.3, ¶ 19, n.3 (App. 2007).
State v. Morlan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Morlan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
While officers must have more than an inchoate hunch, reasonable suspicion requires only a “minimal, objective justification for an investigatory detention.” ¶ 25