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¶11 Whether a superior court has jurisdiction over a restitution claim “presents a pure question of law.” ¶ 7 (App. 2008).

¶6 Whether a superior court has jurisdiction over a restitution claim “presents a pure question of law requiring this court to apply basic tenets of statutory construction.” ¶ 7 (App. 2008).

See, e.g., Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 608-09 (2010) (discussing, without noting any constitutional concerns, a plea agreement that left the amount of restitution open until appropriate restitution could be determined); ¶ 11 (App. 2008) (restitution, though part of the sentencing process, "is not a penalty or a disability").

¶ 7 (App. 2008) ( ¶ 5 (App. 2005)).

§ 13-907(C)’s plain language could support Parsons’s argument that ineligibility for receiving a caregiver registration card under the AMMA is a “disability,” , 428 ¶ 12, (defining “disability” as a legal incapacity or disqualification), the set aside statute specifically qualifies that a convicted felon is only released from the penalties and disabilities “resulting from the conviction.” Ineligibility for a license from a state agency is not a

P., limits the definition of “sentence” to “the penalty imposed upon the defendant after a judgment of guilty.” Although it has been recognized as “part of the sentencing process” in some contexts, “restitution is not a penalty or a disability.”

See Town of Gilbert Prosecutor’s (“Restitution is not meant to penalize the defendant; that function is served by incarceration, fines, or probation.”); (purpose of restitution not to punish); (“restitution is not a penalty or a disability”); (restitution to victim of crime is not criminal punishment exacted by the state).

Further, “a trial court may impose a reasonable deadline within which restitution claims must be filed.” ¶ 6 (2000); n. 2 (App. 2008) (observing that “both the trial court and the State have a concurrent obligation to see that restitution claims are not only preserved but adjudicated in a timely fashion”).

When interpreting a statute, our task “is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent.”

“[A] trial court may impose a reasonable deadline within which restitution claims must be filed.” Alton D., 994 P.2d at 403; n.2, n.2 (App. 2008) (observing “both the trial court and the State have a concurrent obligation to see that restitution claims are not only preserved but adjudicated in a timely fashion”).

at 479-80, ¶ 12 , 176 P.3d at 48 (quoting Pinto, 179 Ariz. at 596 , 880 P.2d at 1142 ); ¶ 17 , (trial court authorized to enter judgment for restitution under A.R.S.