Cited by

¶ 11 (App. 2009) (relying on Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009) and Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)).

Id.; ¶¶ 11–12 (App. 2009).

In construing these statutes, we have held that a driver must use a turn signal if the lane change “enters into the decision-making calculus of a nearby driver.” ¶¶ 24–25 (App. 2009).

Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009); ¶ 12 (App. 2009) (finding that reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop); A.R.S.

“Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Id.

“We review a denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion, but review constitutional issues de novo,” Gonzalez, 330 P.3d at 971, and “[i]nterpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo,”

The court reasoned that, under the statute, “a driver turning a vehicle from a direct course or moving right or left on a roadway must give an appropriate signal ‘in the event any other traffic may be affected by the movement,’ ” and “[t]his requirement applies equally to lane changes as to turns.” P.3d 214 (App. 2009), the court found the violation occurred when the driver “failed to signal while exiting the I-17 freeway.” The court rejected Appellant’s argument that other traffic was not affec

¶36 “‘[T]he Fourth Amendment requires only reasonable suspicion in the context of investigative traffic stops.’” , quoting United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir.2000).