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Prejudice occurs when: (1) evidence admitted against one defendant is facially incriminating to the other defendant, (2) evidence admitted against one defendant has a harmful rub-off effect on the 2 We previously examined a in which we arrived at a different conclusion.

¶ 11 (2017); ¶ 21 (App. 2010); ¶ 25 (App. 2007).

When an officer lacks probable cause, “duration is an essential element in determining whether the initially lawful intrusion takes on the characteristics of an unlawful detention.” ¶ 17 (App. 2010).

the encounter between the driver and the officer becomes consensual.’ ”)

¶ 12 (App. 2010); ¶ 2 (App. 2015).

¶12 Culver’s is misplaced.

(traffic stop “‘must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop’”), quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).

First, “an officer needs only reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred to initiate a stop.” ¶ 16 (App. 2010) (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009)).

¶ 17 (App. 2010) (Brown, J., specially concurring).

because they may cast too wide a net and subject all travelers to ‘virtually random seizures.’” , quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 , 100 S.Ct.

¶ 15 Evans observes that two Arizona cases — , 113 ¶ 22, , 24 ¶ 25, — have cited with approval Foreman’s “serve to eliminate” language, 369 F.3d at 781 .

¶15 Evans observes that two Arizona cases― ¶ 22, ¶ 25, ―have cited with approval Foreman’s “serve to eliminate” language, 369 F.3d at 781.

P.3d 868 (App. 2010), to support her argument that the investigatory detention was an unlawful second seizure, Sweeney is not applicable here.

An investigatory stop cannot last “‘longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’” quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).