Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Sweeney, 227 P.3d 868.
- State v. Ribble Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
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State v. Ribble
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶ 11 (2017); ¶ 21 (App. 2010); ¶ 25 (App. 2007).
- State v. Payan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
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State v. Payan
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
When an officer lacks probable cause, “duration is an essential element in determining whether the initially lawful intrusion takes on the characteristics of an unlawful detention.” ¶ 17 (App. 2010).
- State v. Urrea 398 P.3d 584 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
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State v. Urrea
398 P.3d 584
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
the encounter between the driver and the officer becomes consensual.’ ”)
- State v. Paul Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
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State v. Paul
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶ 12 (App. 2010); ¶ 2 (App. 2015).
- State v. Culver Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
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State v. Culver
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶12 Culver’s is misplaced.
- State of Arizona v. Nicholas Olaf Kjolsrud, Loni Kay Kambitsch 371 P.3d 647 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
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State of Arizona v. Nicholas Olaf Kjolsrud, Loni Kay Kambitsch
371 P.3d 647
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
(traffic stop “‘must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop’”), quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
- State v. Dwyer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
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State v. Dwyer
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
First, “an officer needs only reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred to initiate a stop.” ¶ 16 (App. 2010) (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009)).
- State v. Condiff Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Condiff
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶ 17 (App. 2010) (Brown, J., specially concurring).
- State of Arizona v. Ronald James Sisco II 359 P.3d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
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State of Arizona v. Ronald James Sisco II
359 P.3d 1
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
because they may cast too wide a net and subject all travelers to ‘virtually random seizures.’” , quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 , 100 S.Ct.
- State v. Evans 349 P.3d 205 Ariz. 2015
- State of Arizona v. Dale Lee Evans Ariz. 2015
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State of Arizona v. Dale Lee Evans
Ariz. 2015
¶15 Evans observes that two Arizona cases― ¶ 22, ¶ 25, ―have cited with approval Foreman’s “serve to eliminate” language, 369 F.3d at 781.
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State v. Evans
349 P.3d 205
Ariz. 2015
¶ 15 Evans observes that two Arizona cases — , 113 ¶ 22, , 24 ¶ 25, — have cited with approval Foreman’s “serve to eliminate” language, 369 F.3d at 781 .
- State of Arizona v. Jesus Ramiro Moreno 340 P.3d 426 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
- State of Arizona v. Jesus Ramiro Moreno 340 P.3d 426 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
- State v. Falkenburry Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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State v. Falkenburry
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
P.3d 868 (App. 2010), to support her argument that the investigatory detention was an unlawful second seizure, Sweeney is not applicable here.
- State of Arizona v. Dale Lee Evans 332 P.3d 61 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
- State of Arizona v. Dale Lee Evans 332 P.3d 61 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
- State of Arizona v. Esgardo Javier Nevarez 329 P.3d 233 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
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State of Arizona v. Esgardo Javier Nevarez
329 P.3d 233
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
An investigatory stop cannot last “‘longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’” quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).