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¶37 Recognizing that the appropriate remedy for the denial of such rights could include dismissal or suppression, ¶ 17 (App. 2012), the superior court rejected dismissal as a proper remedy because there was no evidence that any of the police officers interfered with Stempel’s ability to obtain exculpatory evidence.

¶16 Guided by the principle that “[c]ourts narrowly tailor remedies for a violation of the right to counsel to avoid unnecessarily infringing on society’s interest in the administration of criminal justice,” ¶ 17 (App. 2012) (internal quotation and citations omitted), we examine McNutt and Keyonnie to clarify the distinction in remedies.

2 STATE v. PARISEAU Decision of the Court DISCUSSION ¶5 We review a superior court decision “dismissing criminal charges for an abuse of discretion or application of an incorrect legal interpretation.” ¶ 8 (App. 2012).

mong them, where there is a “complete denial of criminal defense counsel” or “denial of access to criminal defense counsel during an overnight trial recess.” 3 ¶10 A defendant’s right to counsel is guaranteed by both “the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 24, of the Arizona Constitution.” see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807.

The superior court “abuses its discretion when the reasons given by the court for its actions are clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of justice.” ¶ 8 (App. 2012) (quotation omitted).

The remedy in the criminal proceeding is limited to denying the prosecution the fruits of its transgression.” (footnotes omitted)); ¶ 17, (recognizing in a DUI case that “suppression is the appropriate remedy when police interference with the right to counsel does not hamper the defendant’s ability to gather exculpatory evidence” (citation omitted)).

(remanding where no hearing held on probable cause); ¶¶ 8, 21, 536 (App. 2009) (remanding where record insufficiently clear to decide suppression on appeal); -64 (App. 2012) (remanding where trial court decided case on different issue); cf. Boteo-Flores, 288 P.3d at 114 (remand improper where appellate court may determine attenuation as a matter of law where not considered by trial court).

revented defendant from speaking to attorney during one-hour breathalyzer warm-up period); McNutt, 133 Ariz. at 9-10, 4 STATE v. PERAZA Opinion of the Court 648 P.2d at 124-25 (police prevented defendant from having attorney arrange independent blood test when attorney available by telephone); -63 (App. 2012) (police unreasonably deprived defendant of access to phone book); Rumsey, ¶¶ 9-10, 238 P.3d at 645-46 (police prevented defendant from consulting with attorney present at station); ¶¶ 3-4,

An abuse of discretion occurs when “the reasons given by the court for its actions are clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of justice.” ¶ 8, (citation omitted).

Compare Wills, 177 Ariz. at 595, 870 P.2d at 413 (vacating dismissal with prejudice and in light of lack of showing of harm to the defendant, remanding to dismiss without prejudice), -37, ¶¶ 13, 19, -64 (App. 2012) (affirming superior court finding that police interfered with defendant’s right to counsel but remanding for further proceedings to determine if sufficient harm existed to dismiss with prejudice).

The state argues the court’s finding was correct because the evidence that Nevarez withdrew his 5Although we need not reach the issue of whether Nevarez’s conduct unduly delayed the DUI investigation, we observe that the trial court’s finding that Nevarez was “engaging in activity in order to disrupt the collection of evidence,” does not appear to be determinative on this point, see id.