Cited by

(“Courts construe seemingly conflicting statutes in harmony when possible.”).

Korzep II, 172 Ariz. at 537, 838 P.2d at 1298

this court found it necessary to construe an earlier version of AR.S.

“Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony.” Goulder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., , 416, , 999 (App. 1993); , (“A statute should be explained in conjunction with other statutes which relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose.”) (citing State ex rel.

See Goulder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., , (“Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony.”); , (“A statute should be explained in conjunction with other statutes which relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose.”).

(relying on “strong policy statement enacted by the legislature” in construing A.R.S.

(holding statute should be explained in conjunction with other statutes which relate to same subject) (citing State ex rel.

(“A statute should be explained in conjunction with other statutes which relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose.”) (citing State ex rel.

(“Statutes should be read in the light of their purpose, and should not be construed without regard to their aim.”).

See, , Korzep, 165 Ariz. at 492 , 799 P.2d at 833 ; ¶ 5

Motors Acceptance Corp., , (stating Arizona courts will interpret a statute contrary to its plain meaning “only if necessary to effectuate the legislature’s clearly expressed contrary intent or to avoid an absurd result that the legislature could not in any event have intended”); , (noting statutes should be construed in conjunction with other statutes that relate to the same subject or purpose, giving effect to all statutes involved).

(“A statute should be explained in conjunction with other statutes which relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose.”).

(resident need not wait until assailant enters home to use force against assailant); , (resident entitled to § 13 — 411 instruction when force used to prevent crime by coresident); , (person staying in motel room is resident of room and entitled to § 13-411 instruction); , (statute “is applicable only to persons protecting the home, its contents, or the residents within,” and defendant could not invoke defense because murder occurred on business premises).

See McCandless, 191 Ariz. at 174 , 953 P.2d at 918 ; , (“A statute should be explained in conjunction with other statutes which relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose.”).

(“A statute should be explained in conjunction with other statutes which relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose.”) (citing State ex rel.

this court, relying on the legislative intent behind section 13-411, held that the justification defense embodied in the statute “is available only when a home, its contents, or the residents therein are being protected by the use of physical force or deadly physical force against

(“A statute should be explained in conjunction with other statutes which relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose.”); , , (App.

Lemons v. Superior *123 Court of Gila County

We recently stated “that the justification defense in § 13-411 applies only when a home, its contents, or its residents are being protected by the use of force against another.” , ( , ).