Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Flores, 772 P.2d 589.
- State v. Millis 391 P.3d 1225 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
- State v. Millis 391 P.3d 1225 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
- State v. Gulli 391 P.3d 1210 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
- State v. Gulli 391 P.3d 1210 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
- State of Arizona v. Manuel Fernando Florez 384 P.3d 335 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
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State of Arizona v. Manuel Fernando Florez
384 P.3d 335
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
or masturbatory contact with the penis or vulva” (emphasis added)); (masturbatory contact must involve at least two persons to constitute “sexual intercourse”).
- State v. Hon ainley/head Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Hon ainley/head
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
§ 1-211 (2002); ¶ 16, (“Courts will apply constructions that make practical sense rather than hypertechnical constructions that frustrate legislative intent.”); (“In construing a statute, courts should give the statute a sensible construction which will accomplish legislative interest and purpose, and which will avoid absurd results.”).
- State ex rel. Polk v. Campbell 357 P.3d 144 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State ex rel. Polk v. Campbell
357 P.3d 144
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
§ 1-211 (Supp.2014); ¶ 16
- E.R. v. Department of Child Safety 344 P.3d 842 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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E.R. v. Department of Child Safety
344 P.3d 842
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶ 13 (2014); ¶ 11 (2003)
- Ponderosa v. Coconino Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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Ponderosa v. Coconino
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Harris, 234 Ariz. at 345, ¶ 13, 322 P.3d at 162; Bilke, 206 Ariz. at 464, ¶ 11, 80 P.3d at 269
- State v. Young 224 P.3d 944 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
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State v. Young
224 P.3d 944
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
§ 13-2316(A)(7) in accordance with its plain language contravenes the rule that “courts should give the statute a sensible construction which will accomplish legislative interest and purpose, and which will avoid absurd results.” , ( , 557, , ).
- State v. CASTRONOVA 212 P.3d 887 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
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State v. CASTRONOVA
212 P.3d 887
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
(“In construing a statute, courts should give the statute a sensible construction which will accomplish legislative interest and purpose, and which will avoid absurd results.”).
- Patches v. Industrial Com'n of Ariz. 204 P.3d 437 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
- Patches v. Industrial Com'n of Ariz. 204 P.3d 437 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
- State v. Martinez 202 P.3d 521 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
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State v. Martinez
202 P.3d 521
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
(“In construing a statute, courts should give the statute a sensible construction which will accomplish legislative interest and ...
- Reed v. Burke 199 P.3d 702 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
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Reed v. Burke
199 P.3d 702
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
(“In construing a statute, courts should give the statute a sensible construction ...
- State v. Siddle 47 P.3d 1150 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
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State v. Siddle
47 P.3d 1150
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
at ¶38, (no reversible error when “question and answer did not necessarily suggest to the jury that the defendant was guilty because he had invoked his right to counsel during police questioning”); , (no error when reference to Miranda warnings did not call jury’s attention to defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent); , (officer’s testimony that defendant had stated “if he didn’t feel like answeri
- State v. Clary 2 P.3d 1255 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
- State v. Clary 2 P.3d 1255 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
- State v. Cid 892 P.2d 216 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
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State v. Cid
892 P.2d 216
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Corp., , ); , (words given usual and commonly-understood meaning unless legislature clearly intended different one); , (words of statute given ordinary meaning unless it appears from context different meaning should control).
- State v. Duzan 862 P.2d 223 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
- State v. Duzan 862 P.2d 223 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
- State v. Womack 847 P.2d 609 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
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State v. Womack
847 P.2d 609
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
“A statute adopted from another state is presumed to have been adopted with a construction previously placed upon it by the courts of that state.” -40 , -94 (App.1989).
- State v. Anaya 825 P.2d 961 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
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State v. Anaya
825 P.2d 961
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
Ariz.R.Evid., 804(b)(3), 17A A.R.S.; -238 , -592 (App.1989).
- State v. Jannamon 819 P.2d 1021 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
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State v. Jannamon
819 P.2d 1021
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
this court determined that A.R.S.
- State v. Barger 810 P.2d 191 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
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State v. Barger
810 P.2d 191
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
545 , (plaintiff’s statement to witness that he had denied stealing gasoline inadmissible under residual hearsay exception because statement highly suspect); , (where defendant claimed self-defense, his statement to another about how he had received black eye inadmissible hearsay); see also
- State v. Crane 799 P.2d 1380 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
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State v. Crane
799 P.2d 1380
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
While this statement may have been dictum in Hamilton, it was found to be a
- State v. Whitaker 793 P.2d 116 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
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State v. Whitaker
793 P.2d 116
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
Like Illinois, Arizona has declared that the purpose of the public sexual indecency statute is to “protect the public from shocking and embarrassing displays of sexual activities.”