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(“If overwhelming evidence of guilt exists in the record, we may conclude that a defendant has failed to meet his burden of establishing prejudice.”).

¶18 “It is well-established that both federal and state laws prohibit a prosecutor from making any comment, direct or indirect, about a defendant’s failure to testify.” ¶ 10 (App. 2014); see also U.S. Const. amend.

While statements that unfairly slander opposing counsel’s integrity are improper, critiques of defense theories and tactics are generally permissible, (no impropriety where prosecutor suggested in closing “that defense counsel was attempting to mislead the jury”).

Moreover, attorneys are generally “given wide latitude in closing arguments and may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.” ¶ 67 (App. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 87 ¶ 69; ¶ 22 (App. 2014).

Hoover asserts this statement improperly directed the jury’s attention to his decision not to testify because the only evidence the defense did not present was Hoover’s own testimony.

¶ 20 (App. 2014) (“Given the strength of the State’s evidence .

They may make comments “based on the evidence or reasonable inferences which may be drawn from it,” id., and may also criticize defense theories and tactics, ¶ 25 (App. 2014).

4 STATE v. GROVES Decision of the Court “Speculative prejudice is insufficient under fundamental error review.” ¶ 15 (App. 2010); ¶ 20 (App. 2014) (finding that defendant had not met his burden of establishing prejudice under fundamental error review in light of overwhelming evidence).

Rather, the State criticized the defense’s strategy, a “proper subject of closing argument.” ¶ 25 (App. 2014) (“Although some of the prosecutor’s comments suggested that defense counsel was attempting to mislead the jury, we cannot say that those statements did more than criticize defense tactics.”).

¶ 20 (App. 2014) (finding defendant failed to prove prejudice under fundamental-error review based on overwhelming evidence of guilt).

Further, “[t]o be constitutionally proscribed, a comment must be adverse; that is, it must support an unfavorable inference against the defendant and, therefore, operate as a penalty imposed for exercising a constitutional privilege.” ¶ 13 (App. 2014).

¶ 18 (App. 2014); Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 466, ¶ 199.

¶ 34 ( ¶ 20 (App. 2014)).

(“While there may have been some misstatements of fact they appear to be inadvertent and not of such magnitude as to be prejudicial.”); ¶ 25 (App. 2014) (“Although some of the prosecutor’s comments suggested that defense counsel was attempting to mislead the jury, we cannot say that those statements did more than criticize defense tactics.”).

¶ 25 (App. 2014) (stating that although jury argument that impugns the integrity of opposing counsel is improper, criticism of defense theories and tactics is a proper subject of closing argument).

-38 ¶¶ 24–25 (App. 2014) (finding no error from a prosecutor’s comments that defense counsel’s arguments were distractions or “red herrings” because prosecutors may criticize “defense theories and tactics”) (quotation omitted).

This freedom is not unbridled; “[j]ury 3 STATE v. CRAWFORD Decision of the Court argument that impugns the integrity or honesty of opposing counsel is improper.” ¶ 25 (App. 2014) (quoting Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 86, ¶ 59); (noting that a prosecutor’s unsubstantiated statement that defense counsel is a liar was “grossly inappropriate”).

“Prosecutorial misconduct is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial or reversal.” ¶ 22 (App. 2014) (quotation omitted).

See State v. Ramos , , ¶ 14, (finding statements improper irrespective of prosecutor's intent).

To meet this standard, Gorla must demonstrate the State acted in an intentionally improper or prejudicial manner, ¶ 22 (App. 2014), so “pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of the trial,”

–08 ¶ 16 (1999) (“By failing to give the [lesser 6 State v. Escalante Opinion of the Court included offense instruction], the trial court denied appellant ‘a right essential to his defense’ and affected the ‘very foundation of [his] theory of defense.’” (alteration in original)); ¶ 15 (App. 2014) (“In light of [the prosecutor commenting on defendant’s failure to testify], fundamental error occurred because Ramos was deprived of a right essential to his defense.”); ¶ 15 (App. 2011) (concluding th

¶14 Even if several of the comments Quiroz highlights, supra ¶ 5, could be interpreted as improperly “impugn[ing] the integrity or honesty of opposing counsel,” ¶ 25 (App. 2014) (stating “[j]ury argument that impugns the integrity or honesty of opposing counsel is [] improper”), Quiroz does not establish prejudice.