State v. Jenkins

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

DWIGHT JENKINS, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0823 PRPC
FILED 7-27-2017

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2008-007347-001
CR2008-031018-001
The Honorable Teresa A. Sanders, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Gerald R. Grant
Counsel for Respondent

Dwight Jenkins, Buckeye
Petitioner
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Dwight Jenkins petitions for review from the dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Arizona Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32. We have considered the petition for review and, for
the reasons stated, grant review but deny relief.

¶2 On September 1, 2009, Jenkins pled guilty to one count each
of burglary in the first degree, a Class 2 felony with one prior felony
conviction, and possession of narcotic drugs for sale, also a Class 2 felony
with one prior felony conviction. The superior court imposed concurrent
prison terms, the longest being 18.5 years for the burglary conviction.

¶3 On June 29, 2012, Jenkins filed a petition for post-conviction
relief. He raised a claim of newly discovered evidence. The new evidence
consisted of a recent post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) diagnosis. Per
Jenkins, he “was advised that the abuse he endured as a youth into his teen
years probably played a major rule in his poor decision making which led
him to want to dominate people as an adult as he was dominated by adults
as a youth.” The superior court summarily dismissed the Rule 32
proceeding without an evidentiary hearing. Ultimately, the Arizona
Supreme Court granted review and remanded to the superior court so
Jenkins could have the opportunity to show that his PTSD diagnosis might
have altered his sentence.

¶4 On remand, and in compliance with the supreme court’s
orders, the superior court appointed Jenkins counsel to file a petition for
post-conviction relief. Counsel did so, and repeated Jenkins’s argument that
his post-sentencing PTSD diagnosis constituted newly discovered evidence
entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. The superior court summarily
denied the petition, and Jenkins timely sought review.

¶5 For a Rule 32 petitioner to obtain post-conviction relief based
on newly discovered evidence:

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Decision of the Court

(1) The evidence must appear on its face to have existed at the
time of trial but be discovered after trial;

(2) The [petition] must allege facts from which the court could
conclude the defendant was diligent in discovering the facts
and bringing them to the court’s attention;

(3) The evidence must not simply be cumulative or
impeaching;

(4) The evidence must be relevant to the case;

(5) The evidence must be such that it would likely have
altered the verdict, finding, or sentence if known at the time
of trial.

State v. Bilke, 162 Ariz. 52, 52–53 (1989).

¶6 Contrary to Jenkins’s argument, all Bilke requirements must
be satisfied to establish a colorable claim of newly discovered evidence. See
State v. Andersen, 177 Ariz. 381, 387 (App. 1993) (petition failed to present
colorable claim because one requirement not established). The superior
court found Jenkins had established the first four Bilke factors. However,
addressing the fifth Bilke factor, the court found the following:

1. Although the defendant did present mitigating
circumstances, they were far outweighed by the aggravating
circumstances. The defendant had two prior felony
convictions, was on parole absconder status and one of the
offenses involved the defendant’s active participation with
accomplices in a very violent home invasion armed robbery.

2. The emotional, financial, and physical harm to the victims
in the Burglary in the First Degree matter, especially the
female victim, was immeasurable.

3. If the Court had been aware of the defendant’s
post-traumatic stress disorder diagnosis at the time of
sentencing, it would not have affected the outcome of the
defendant’s sentence in either case.

¶7 “A petition for post-conviction relief is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court,” and this Court reviews “a trial court’s

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Decision of the Court

factual findings for clear error.” State v. Herrera, 183 Ariz. 642, 647–48
(App. 1995) (citing State v. Schrock, 149 Ariz. 433, 441 (1986); State v. Cuffle, 171 Ariz. 49, 51 (1992)).

¶8 Jenkins fails to establish an abuse of discretion. He does not
point to any facts in the record that contradict the superior court’s findings
supporting its conclusion that the PTSD diagnosis would not have affected
the sentences imposed. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(iii) (petition for
review is required to contain “the facts material to a consideration of the
issues presented for review”). Further, the superior court judge who denied
Jenkins’s petition was the same judge who accepted the plea and sentenced
Jenkins. Thus, this judge was in the best position to determine whether
Jenkins’s PTSD would have affected the sentences imposed.

¶9 We grant review but deny relief.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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