State v. Escalante

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ALEX ROBERT ESCALANTE, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0389
FILED 6-22-2017

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR 2014-147018-001
The Honorable George H. Foster, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joseph T. Maziarz
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Carlos Daniel Carrion
Counsel for Appellant

Alex Robert Escalante, San Luis
Appellant
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

D O W N I E, Judge:

¶1 Alex Robert Escalante appeals his convictions for theft of
means of transportation and unlawful flight from a law enforcement
vehicle, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 13-1814
and 28-622.01. Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State
v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), defense counsel has searched the record, found
no arguable question of law, and asked that we review the record for
reversible error. See State v. Richardson, 175 Ariz. 336, 339 (App. 1993).
Escalante filed supplemental briefs in propria persona that we have
considered. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Two detectives were patrolling in an unmarked police vehicle
when they saw a black Kia roll through a stop sign. The driver was
described as a Hispanic male with short hair and “some facial hair.” The
detectives determined the Kia had not been reported stolen and stopped
following it. A few minutes later, the Kia — driven by the same male —
sped past the detectives on a residential street. The detectives asked a
patrol unit to initiate a traffic stop. When a responding officer attempted to
stop the Kia, it sped away.

¶3 An officer contacted the Kia’s owner, who was under the
misimpression that the vehicle was in her apartment parking lot. Officers
tracked the Kia to a different apartment complex, where it was parked
behind plywood boards partially concealing it. The detectives saw the
same male removing items from the Kia. Upon seeing the detectives, the
man fled in the Kia.

¶4 The Kia was later found abandoned. A witness stated that the
driver had run northbound toward a pedestrian bridge crossing the
freeway. An officer familiar with the area knew that the bridge led to an
apartment complex and learned that a 911 call had come in about a person
hiding in the laundry room of that complex. The officer drove to the

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Decision of the Court

complex and saw Escalante, who, with the exception of his clothing,
matched the description of the suspect. Escalante was detained, and the
detectives identified him as the Kia’s driver.

¶5 Escalante was charged with theft of means of transportation
and unlawful flight from a law enforcement vehicle. A jury trial ensued.
At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Escalante moved for a judgment of
acquittal pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20. His motion
was denied. The jury found Escalante guilty of the two charged offenses
and found two aggravating factors. The superior court determined
Escalante had two historical prior felonies and sentenced him to a slightly
aggravated sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment for the theft of means of
transportation offense, to run concurrently to a five-year presumptive term
of imprisonment for unlawful flight. Escalante received 498 days of
presentence incarceration credit.

¶6 This Court has jurisdiction over Escalante’s timely appeal
pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S.
§ 13-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 We have reviewed the entire record but found no reversible
error. All the proceedings were conducted in compliance with the Arizona
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the sentences imposed were within the
statutory range. Escalante was present at all critical phases of the
proceedings and was represented by counsel. The jury was properly
impaneled and instructed. The jury instructions were consistent with the
offenses charged. The record reflects no irregularity in the deliberation
process.

¶8 In his supplemental briefs, Escalante identifies two issues that
we review for fundamental error only.1 See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561,
567, ¶ 19 (2005) (fundamental error review applies when a defendant fails
to object to the alleged error in the trial court). “We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts and resolve all inferences
against appellant.” State v. Nihiser, 191 Ariz. 199, 201 (App. 1997).

¶9 Escalante challenges the detectives’ pretrial identification as
“unduly suggestive,” in violation of his due process rights. The

1 Although defense counsel filed a pretrial motion to preclude the
pretrial identification and an in-court identification by the detectives, that
motion was later withdrawn before the court ruled on it.

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constitutionality of a pretrial identification is a mixed question of law and
fact that we review de novo. State v. Garcia, 224 Ariz. 1, 7–8, ¶ 6 (2010). In
determining the reliability of a one-man show-up, the following factors are
relevant:

(1) the opportunity the witness had to view the criminal at
the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention;
(3) the accuracy of the witness’ prior description; (4) the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; and (5) the length of time between the crime
and the confrontation.

State v. Hicks, 133 Ariz. 64, 67–68 (1982).

¶10 The detectives saw the Kia driver three times and had “[n]o
doubt” that individual was Escalante. During their first encounter, one of
the detectives looked directly at the driver from a distance of roughly six
feet. The detectives’ initial description of the driver matched Escalante’s
appearance, with the exception of the clothing he was wearing when he was
discovered hiding in the apartment complex laundry room. Applying the
Hicks factors, the superior court did not fundamentally err by admitting
identification evidence at trial.

¶11 As we understand Escalante’s second argument, he contends
a class 6 felony conviction did not qualify as a historical prior felony
conviction and that he was thus improperly sentenced as a category three
repetitive offender. We disagree.

¶12 Under A.R.S. § 13-703(c), “a person shall be sentenced as a
category three repetitive offender if the person is at least eighteen years of
age or has been tried as an adult and stands convicted of a felony and has
two or more historical prior felony convictions.” Section 13-105(22) defines
a historical prior felony conviction as:

...

(b) Any class 2 or 3 felony, except the offenses listed in
subdivision (a) of this paragraph, that was committed within
the ten years immediately preceding the date of the present
offense. Any time spent on absconder status while on
probation, on escape status or incarcerated is excluded in
calculating if the offense was committed within the preceding
ten years. . . .

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...

(c) Any class 4, 5 or 6 felony, except the offenses listed in
subdivision (a) of this paragraph, that was committed within
the five years immediately preceding the date of the present
offense. Any time spent on absconder status while on probation,
on escape status or incarcerated is excluded in calculating if the
offense was committed within the preceding five years.

(Emphasis added.) Escalante committed two felonies in 2003 — a class 3
felony, and a class 6 felony. He was incarcerated until May 23, 2013, and
that time is excluded. See State v. Avila, 217 Ariz. 97, 99, ¶ 7 (App. 2007).
The subject offenses were committed on September 26, 2014 — well within
the statutory timeframe.

¶13 The superior court properly denied Escalante’s motion for
judgment of acquittal. A judgment of acquittal is appropriate only when
there is “no substantial evidence to warrant a conviction.” Ariz. R. Crim.
P. 20(a). Substantial evidence is such proof that “reasonable persons could
accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 67 (1990)
(citation omitted). “Reversible error based on insufficiency of the evidence
occurs only where there is a complete absence of probative facts to support
the conviction.” State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. 186, 200 (1996). The State
presented substantial evidence of guilt.

¶14 To prove the offense of theft of means of transportation, the
State was required to prove that Escalante, without lawful authority,
knowingly controlled another person’s means of transportation, knowing
or having reason to know that the property was stolen. A.R.S.
§ 13-1814(A)(5). Trial evidence established that Escalante drove the Kia on
multiple occasions. The vehicle’s owner did not give Escalante permission
to drive the vehicle.

¶15 To prove the offense of unlawful flight from a law
enforcement vehicle, the State was required to prove: (1) Escalante, who
was driving a motor vehicle, willfully or knowingly fled from or attempted
to elude a pursuing official law enforcement vehicle; (2) the law
enforcement vehicle was appropriately marked showing it to be an official
law enforcement vehicle; (3) the officer in the law enforcement vehicle,
while in pursuit used a red and blue light (4) and an audible siren. A.R.S.
§§ 28-622.01, -624(C). Testimony established that a marked police unit tried
to stop Escalante by getting behind the Kia and activating the lights and

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sirens. Escalante reacted by accelerating. Testimony established that the
police vehicle’s lights could be seen “a hundred yards away” and
characterized the siren as “loud.”

CONCLUSION

¶16 We affirm Escalante’s convictions and sentences. Counsel’s
obligations pertaining to Escalante’s representation in this appeal have
ended. Counsel need do nothing more than inform Escalante of the status
of the appeal and his future options, unless counsel’s review reveals an
issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition
for review. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984). On the court’s
own motion, Escalante shall have thirty days from the date of this decision
to proceed, if he desires, with an in propria persona motion for
reconsideration or petition for review.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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