State v. Viste

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

CORY DOUGLAS VISTE, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0739
FILED 3-31-2020

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR 2016-128726-001
The Honorable Douglas Gerlach, Judge
The Honorable George H. Foster, Jr., Judge Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joseph T. Maziarz
Counsel for Appellee

Matt G. Hayes Law PLC, Gilbert
By Matthew G. Hayes
Counsel for Appellant
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Cory Viste appeals his conviction for luring a minor for sexual
exploitation and the superior court’s imposition of probation. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In May 2016, Detective Snyder of the Pinal County Sherriff’s
Office participated in an internet teen chat room posing as a 13-year-old girl
named “Sandi.” He began chatting with Viste, who was 31 years old. Viste
asked “Sandi” how old she was and Detective Snyder responded that she
was 13. Viste asked “Sandi” whether she liked “older guys,” and Snyder
responded in the affirmative. Eventually, Viste and Snyder began chatting
on a social media messenger platform, as well as by email. Viste sent
Snyder a picture of himself, and Snyder sent Viste a picture of a teenage
girl.

¶3 Viste and Snyder’s conversations became sexual in nature.
On June 7, 2016, Viste told “Sandi” he wanted her to perform oral sex on
him. Snyder responded, “I’m down if u r,” and Viste said, “Of course I am
ha.” Viste also discussed other specific sexual activities with “Sandi”
during their online conversations.

¶4 Viste and “Sandi” agreed to meet at a park near her “home”
on June 16, 2016. The park was approximately 30 miles away from where
Viste lived. Prior to the scheduled meet-up, Snyder briefed the Phoenix
police officers who would be involved in Viste’s arrest (the “net team”). He
gave them an overview of the investigation, explained the probable cause
for Viste’s arrest, gave them a description of Viste’s vehicle, and provided
them with his physical description. The net team conducted surveillance of
the area around the park, by ground and by air. They observed Viste
driving around the park for 20 to 30 minutes, “kind of just perusing.”
Viste’s last email to Snyder said, “I’m here,” but Viste did not stop at the
park. Concerned that Viste would attempt to make contact with an actual

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minor, police decided to pull him over and arrest him. Snyder, who had
not obtained an arrest warrant, arrived as Viste was being arrested by the
net team. Officers searched Viste’s vehicle but found no evidence
pertaining to the charges.

¶5 The State charged Viste with luring a minor for sexual
exploitation and attempting to commit sexual conduct with a minor. Before
trial, Viste filed a motion to suppress “the stop” and “all evidence gathered
from the stop,” arguing he had not committed a traffic violation and police
did not have probable cause to arrest. Following an evidentiary hearing,
the superior court denied the motion, finding that even if Viste “had not
appeared at the park and had earlier that day stopped communicating all
together with law enforcement, there was still enough to support an arrest.“

¶6 A jury convicted Viste of luring a minor under the age of 15
for sexual exploitation, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3554, but acquitted him of
attempt to commit sexual conduct with a minor. The superior court
suspended the imposition of sentencing and placed Viste on supervised
probation for a term of 15 years. Viste timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶7 Viste argues the superior court erred by denying his motion
to suppress because the officers who arrested him lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop his vehicle and lacked probable cause to make a
warrantless arrest. We will not set aside a court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Guillory, 199 Ariz. 462,
465, ¶ 9 (App. 2001). We only consider the evidence presented at the
suppression hearing1, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to sustaining the court’s ruling. State v. Weekley, 200 Ariz. 421, 422, ¶ 3 (App.
2001). We defer to the court’s credibility assessments of police officers and
the reasonableness of the inferences they made but consider the court’s
legal decisions de novo. State v. Baggett, 232 Ariz. 424, 426, ¶ 7 (App. 2013).

¶8 An investigatory stop of a motor vehicle constitutes a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment but does not require probable cause. State v.
Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 187 Ariz. 116, 118 (1996). Instead, “the ‘totality of the
circumstances’ must provide ‘a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” Id. (citation

1 In their appellate briefs, Viste and the State both include evidence
from the trial transcripts, but we have confined the facts in this decision to
those presented to the superior court at the suppression hearing.

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omitted). Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is required. State v.
Richcreek, 187 Ariz. 501, 505 (1997). Although Viste argues there was no
reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle because he did not commit a traffic
violation, we do not address whether there was reasonable suspicion for
the stop because we conclude the police had probable cause for the arrest.

¶9 A police officer may arrest an individual without a warrant if
the officer has probable cause to believe the individual has committed a
felony. A.R.S. § 13-3883(A)(1). An officer has probable cause when there is
reasonably trustworthy information that a suspect has committed an
offense. State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 137–38, ¶ 30 (2000). Probable cause
may be based upon the collective knowledge of all of the police officers
involved in an investigation. State v. Keener, 206 Ariz. 29, 32, ¶ 14 (App.
2003). The State has the burden of showing probable cause to make a
warrantless arrest. State v. Edwards, 111 Ariz. 357, 360 (1974).

¶10 We reject Viste’s assertion that when the officers stopped and
arrested him “there was no specific criminal activity involving or connected
to [him].” “A person commits luring a minor for sexual exploitation by
offering or soliciting sexual conduct with another person knowing or
having reason to know that the other person is a minor.” A.R.S. § 13-
3554(A). Detective Snyder had probable cause to believe that Viste had
committed the offense of luring a minor for sexual exploitation when Viste
emailed “Sandi,” who he believed to be 13 years old, told her he wanted
her to perform oral sex, and asked her whether she was interested in
participating in other sexual activities. The probable cause that Viste
committed the offense of luring a minor justified both the stop and Viste’s
arrest. The fact that Viste did not commit a traffic offense before he was
pulled over is immaterial.

¶11 Viste also argues that when Detective Snyder requested the
net team to arrest him he did not know for certain who was driving Viste’s
vehicle. However, Detective Snyder provided the net team with Viste’s
physical description and a description of his vehicle, and the team
identified Viste’s vehicle driving around the park. That information
provided officers with sufficient probable cause to arrest Viste and thus the
superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to
suppress.

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CONCLUSION

¶12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Viste’s conviction for
luring a minor under the age of 15 and the superior court’s imposition of
probation.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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