State v. Wright

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

RONALD REED WRIGHT, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0142
FILED 4-9-2020

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015CR201800455
The Honorable Derek C. Carlisle, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Nathan Curtisi
Counsel for Appellee

Mohave County Legal Advocate, Kingman
By Jill L. Evans
Counsel for Appellant
 STATE v. WRIGHT
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Ronald Wright appeals his conviction and sentence for
misconduct involving weapons. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In March 2018, a Mohave County Sheriff’s Office deputy was
dispatched to a residence in Kingman.1 The deputy observed Wright
standing outside the home, facing a woman in the doorway. When the
deputy told Wright he was under arrest, Wright removed a backpack he
was wearing and attempted to toss it to the woman. The deputy “grabbed
the backpack,” arrested Wright, and searched them both. In the backpack,
the deputy found a loaded firearm, which Wright, who knew he was a
prohibited possessor, was not permitted to have.

¶3 The jury convicted Wright of one count of misconduct
involving weapons. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 13-3102(A)(4)2 (“A person
commits misconduct involving weapons by knowingly . . . [p]ossessing a
deadly weapon or prohibited weapon if such person is a prohibited
possessor.”). The trial court found the State had proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that Wright had two historical prior felony convictions,
sentenced him as a non-dangerous, repetitive offender to the minimum
sentence of eight years’ imprisonment, and credited him with 254 days of
presentence incarceration. Wright timely appealed, and we have
jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

1 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury
verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against the [defendant].” State
v. Nelson, 214 Ariz. 196, 196, ¶ 2 (App. 2007) (citing State v. Tamplin, 195 Ariz.
246, 246, ¶ 2 (App. 1999)).

2 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite the current
version of rules and statutes.

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 STATE v. WRIGHT
Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

I. Jury Instructions

¶4 After the close of evidence, the trial court discussed jury
instructions with the parties. Although the State was required to prove
Wright “knowingly” possessed a deadly weapon or prohibited weapon as
a prohibited possessor, see A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4), defense counsel asked the
court to include “all mental states” in the jury instructions “for comparison
sake,” so the jury would understand “there are different culpability levels
in crime and that this crime involves the culpable state of knowingly.” The
court denied the request.

¶5 Wright argues on appeal that by refusing to instruct jurors on
other mental states, the trial court deprived him of a “meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S.
479, 485 (1984). In particular, Wright asserts that jurors could have found
he possessed the firearm recklessly, but not knowingly, so as to warrant an
instruction on recklessness. “We review a court’s refusal to give a
requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion,” State v. Lewis, 236
Ariz. 336, 346, ¶ 44 (App. 2014) (citing State v. Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, 363-64,
¶ 51 (2009)), and find no error here.

¶6 Although a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction “on all
theories reasonably supported by the evidence, ‘when a jury is properly
instructed on the applicable law, the trial court is not required to provide
additional instructions that do nothing more than reiterate or enlarge the
instructions in defendant’s language.’” State v. Forde, 233 Ariz. 543, 566,
¶ 91 (2014) (quoting State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 309 (1995)). Here, the only
mental state applicable to the charge against Wright was “knowingly,”3 see
A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4), which the court correctly defined for jurors as
“act[ing] with awareness of the existence of conduct or circumstances
constituting an offense.” See A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(b); see also Rev. Ariz. Jury
Instr. (Criminal) 1.0510(b) (5th ed. 2019). The definition of “knowingly”
inherently excludes other mental states — such as recklessness or criminal
negligence — that do not satisfy the elements of that definition. The court

3 Although the trial court acknowledged Wright could have also been
convicted of misconduct involving weapons if the jury found he
“intentionally” possessed a firearm, the court concluded there was no
reason to instruct jurors on “intentional” possession under the facts of the
case, and Wright does not challenge that decision.

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 STATE v. WRIGHT
Decision of the Court

was not required to provide additional instructions, or put a gloss on the
existing instruction, that would explain what “knowingly” does not mean.

¶7 Nor did the trial court’s refusal to instruct jurors on mental
states inapplicable to the charged offense offend principles of due process
by impeding Wright’s ability to present a complete defense. Because the
parties stipulated that Wright was a prohibited possessor on the date of the
offense, the only question at trial was whether he knowingly possessed the
firearm that was found in the backpack. And, although the defense chose
not to present any direct testimony or evidence, Wright received a fair
opportunity to defend against the element of knowing possession through
cross-examination and argument.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Prove Prior Convictions

¶8 After the jury found Wright guilty of misconduct involving
weapons, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s allegations that Wright
had two prior felony convictions. At the hearing, the State offered certified
copies of: the judgment and sentencing order for one prior conviction; the
sentencing order for another prior conviction; a “pen pack” from the
Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) consisting of a summary
inmate report, photograph, and fingerprints; and a booking photograph
and fingerprints taken from Wright in the instant case. After considering
the evidence and argument, the court found the State proved the prior
convictions beyond a reasonable doubt “[b]ased on the identifying
information” provided.

¶9 Wright argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence
proving he was the person who committed the alleged priors. Because he
did not make this objection at trial, he bears the burden of proving
fundamental, prejudicial error to merit relief on appeal. See State v. Fiihr, 221 Ariz. 135, 136, ¶ 1 (App. 2008) (citing State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561,
567-68, ¶¶ 19-20 (2005), and State v. Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 154 (1991)).

¶10 The certified records of the prior convictions describe a
person named “Ronald Reed Wright” with a birthdate of January 29, 1961;
the same information is contained in the ADOC pen pack, as well as the
booking documents associated with the instant case. Moreover, Wright’s
booking photograph from the instant case resembles the photograph from
the ADOC, both include a similar chin scar, and the ADOC summary
inmate report list descriptions for two offenses committed by Wright on
September 10, 2014 and August 29, 2006 — the same offense dates listed in
the certified sentencing orders provided by the State.

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 STATE v. WRIGHT
Decision of the Court

¶11 This evidence is sufficient to identify Wright as the person
convicted of the prior felonies. See State v. McAlvain, 104 Ariz. 445, 446-47
(1969) (concluding a photograph and judgment of conviction were
sufficient to prove a prior conviction despite lack of expert fingerprint
comparison); State v. Baca, 102 Ariz. 83, 87 (1967) (concluding photographs
and a “detailed description” of the offender in record of conviction were
sufficient to prove the defendant was the same person convicted of a prior
felony). Accordingly, Wright fails to prove error, fundamental or
otherwise.

CONCLUSION

¶12 Wright’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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