State v. Ralston-Gon Zales

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ERIC BRADLEY RALSTON-GONZALES, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0371
1 CA-CR 19-0370
(Consolidated)
FILED 5-19-2020

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. V1300CR201680152
V1300CR201680479
The Honorable Michael R. Bluff, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Casey Ball
Counsel for Appellee

Prescott Law Group PLC, Prescott
By Taylor R. Nelson, J. Andrew Jolley
Counsel for Appellant
 STATE v. RALSTON-GONZALES
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Maria Elena Cruz
joined.

G A S S, Judge:

¶1 Eric Ralston-Gonzales appeals his convictions and sentences
for (1) two counts of aggravated driving under the influence (DUI) and
one count of failure to appear in Cause No. V1300CR201680479 and (2) the
revocation of probation in Cause No. V1300CR201680152 as a result of the
convictions. Because Ralston has shown no error in the superior court’s
denials of his motions to suppress evidence and to continue the trial, and
because his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may not be raised on
direct appeal, this court affirms Ralston’s convictions and sentences.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This court considers the facts and all reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions. State v. Tucker, 205
Ariz. 157, 160 n.1 (2003). In March 2016, Ralston pled guilty in Cause No.
V1300CR201680152 to possessing drug paraphernalia and driving with a
suspended license. The superior court suspended imposition of sentence
and placed him on probation.

¶3 Four days later, a trooper with the Arizona Department of
Public Safety (DPS) pulled Ralston over for following another vehicle too
closely. Ralston exhibited signs of impairment, and the trooper arrested
him for DUI. When Ralston refused to provide a blood sample, the trooper
obtained a warrant to draw his blood. The sample tested positive for the
presence of methamphetamine. One month later, Ralston did not appear
at a mandatory court proceeding regarding the DUI arrest. The State
indicted Ralston on two counts of aggravated DUI and one count of
failure to appear in the first degree. See A.R.S. §§ 13-2507, 28-1381.A.1, 28-
1381.A.3, 28-1383.A.1.

¶4 Before trial, Ralston moved to suppress the blood evidence
arguing the trooper furnished false and misleading information in the
affidavit he submitted to secure the warrant. Ralston also sought to

2
 STATE v. RALSTON-GONZALES
Decision of the Court

continue the trial to secure the presence of a witness. The superior court
denied both motions. At trial, the jury found him guilty as charged. The
superior court sentenced him as a repetitive offender to concurrent
minimum terms of eight years’ imprisonment for each DUI conviction and
to a consecutive mitigated term of three years’ imprisonment on the
failure to appear count. Because Ralston’s convictions resulted in an
automatic revocation of his probation in Cause No. V1300CR201680152,
the superior court sentenced him to a consecutive presumptive one-year
prison term for the drug paraphernalia count and to a time-served jail
term for driving with a suspended license.

¶5 This court has jurisdiction to consider Ralston’s timely
appeals in both causes, which were consolidated, under Article 6, Section
9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21.A.1, 13-4031, and
13-4033.A.1.

ANALYSIS

I. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Ralston’s motion to suppress.

¶6 At an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress, Ralston
submitted evidence showing (1) the trooper resigned from DPS after being
investigated for misconduct related to his DUI arrests and (2) the trooper’s
affidavit (and resulting warrant) contained the wrong date and time of the
alleged offense.

¶7 Approximately six months after Ralston’s arrest, DPS began
investigating the trooper’s DUI cases for a period including the trooper’s
contact with Ralston. DPS sustained allegations of misconduct against the
trooper based on evidence he had arrested suspects without probable
cause and filed reports containing false information, among other
misconduct. Though DPS’s investigation did not identify any concerns
with Ralston’s arrest, Ralston argued DPS’s findings called into question
whether the trooper genuinely observed objective signs of impairment.

¶8 At the evidentiary hearing, the trooper said Ralston “seemed
very restless, very erratic,” “had bloodshot and watery eyes,” and
exhibited additional signs of impairment while performing field sobriety
tests. The trooper testified he unintentionally included the wrong date and
time in the affidavit by re-using a form he had completed in the past. The
superior court denied Ralston’s suppression motion, as well as his motion
for reconsideration.

3
 STATE v. RALSTON-GONZALES
Decision of the Court

¶9 On appeal, Ralston argues the superior court should have
granted his motion because the State did not overcome the prima facie
case he made for suppression. This court reviews the denial of a motion to
suppress for an abuse of discretion, “considering only the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing and viewing it in the light most
favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.” State v. Havatone, 241 Ariz.
506, 509, ¶ 11 (2017). This court considers legal issues and mixed questions
of law and fact de novo. State v. Spencer, 235 Ariz. 496, 498, ¶ 8 (App. 2014).

¶10 In general, the State carries “the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence the lawfulness in all respects of the
acquisition of all evidence that the State will use at trial.” Ariz. R. Crim. P.
16.2(b)(1). If the challenged evidence was obtained pursuant to a warrant,
the State’s burden does not arise until the defendant first “alleges specific
circumstances and establishes a prima facie case supporting the
suppression of the evidence at issue.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.2(b)(2)(C); see
also State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 265–68 (1996).

¶11 A blood draw by law enforcement is a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment and, absent consent, ordinarily requires a warrant
supported by probable cause. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Birchfield v. North
Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016); Spencer, 235 Ariz. at 498, ¶ 9. Because
Ralston’s blood was drawn pursuant to a warrant, he was required to
“present sufficient evidence to dispel the warrant’s presumption of
regularity” to go forward with his motion to suppress. See Hyde, 186 Ariz.
at 269.

¶12 Evidence is not lawfully obtained under a warrant if “the
affiant’s statement to the judge [issuing the warrant] was knowingly or
intentionally false or was made in reckless disregard for the truth, and . . .
the false statement was necessary to a finding of probable cause.” State v.
Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 145 (1997). An affiant’s statement is made in reckless
disregard for the truth if “obvious circumstances . . . impeach the
credibility of the information in the affidavit.” State v. Carter, 145 Ariz. 101,
109 (1985).

¶13 In making his prima facie case, Ralston presented sufficient
evidence which, if true, would show (1) the trooper obtained the warrant
by either knowingly or intentionally submitting false information or
recklessly disregarding the truth and (2) such information was necessary
to establish probable cause. The State then offered the trooper’s testimony
showing Ralston’s prima facie case was not true. See Powell v. Gleason, 50
Ariz. 542, 549 (1937) (“The words ‘prima facie,’ as used in statutes and

4
 STATE v. RALSTON-GONZALES
Decision of the Court

legal phraseology . . . always implies that the proper party shall have the
opportunity of offering proof in rebuttal of the prima facie fact.”).

¶14 Contrary to Ralston’s argument, his prima facie case did not
establish irrebuttable evidence the trooper’s stated basis for arresting him
lacked credibility. See Hyde, 186 Ariz. at 266. Though DPS’s investigation
cast suspicion on the reliability of the trooper’s affidavit, the superior
court acted within its discretion when it accepted the trooper’s
observations of Ralston’s impairment. See State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 22,
¶ 19 (App. 2007) (appellate courts defer to a superior court’s factual
determinations, including credibility findings). The evidence before the
superior court showed DPS’s investigation revealed issues with a small
number of the trooper’s DUI arrests but Ralston’s case was not one of
them.

¶15 With the trooper’s affidavit otherwise found to be reliable,
his inaccurate identification of the date and time of Ralston’s traffic stop
was explainable, and the error was not, by itself, fatal to the lawfulness of
the warrant. See State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 129 Ariz. 156, 158
(1981) (typographical error in stating date of criminal activity did not
render warrant defective absent evidence the error was misleading or
confusing). The superior court reasonably found the errors to be
unintentional considering the affidavit correctly stated the date it was
prepared, the trooper spoke with the judge who issued the warrant on the
same day, and the trooper had nothing to gain by misstating the date and
time of the offense. See State v. Buccini, 167 Ariz. 550, 554 (1991) (“A trial
court’s finding on whether the affiant deliberately included misstatements
of law or excluded material facts is a factual determination, upheld unless
clearly erroneous.”).

¶16 Ralston also argues the superior court denied him an
opportunity to present evidence in support of his motion to suppress.
Ralston’s claim is belied by the record, which shows the superior court
considered his multiple submissions of evidence and argument, and his
cross-examination of the trooper, without condition. The argument,
therefore, lacks merit.

II. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Ralston’s motion to continue trial.

¶17 The trooper stopped Ralston in a residential driveway.
About thirty minutes into the stop, after the trooper administered the DUI
tests to Ralston and placed him in the patrol car, a woman who knew

5
 STATE v. RALSTON-GONZALES
Decision of the Court

Ralston emerged from the residence. With the trooper’s permission, she
spoke to Ralston for several minutes. The woman then explained to the
trooper how she knew Ralston and said Ralston’s manner at the time was
typical of his behavior when he was “really nervous.”

¶18 Ralston’s appointed attorney never contacted the woman as
a potential witness, possibly because she was a victim in another case on
which the attorney served as defense counsel. The woman moved out of
state before Ralston’s trial.

¶19 Approximately six weeks before trial started, Ralston
retained Knapp counsel to assist his appointed attorney.1 Knapp counsel
did not learn of the potential witness until one month before trial, and he
did not obtain her full identity and contact information until a few days
before trial. After speaking with the woman, who was willing to testify,
Knapp counsel moved to continue the trial to obtain funds to fly her to
Arizona as a witness. The superior court denied the motion, reasoning
Ralston could have secured the witness’s presence earlier, the court’s
calendar would require the trial to be delayed for months, and the
witness’s testimony—based on counsel’s offer of proof—would not
contradict the trooper’s observations of impairment.

¶20 Ralston argues it was improper for the superior court to
deny his motion to continue based on scheduling considerations. The
superior court “may continue trial only on a showing that extraordinary
circumstances exist and that delay is indispensable to the interests of
justice.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.5(b). This court reviews the denial of a motion
to continue for abuse of discretion and requires the defendant to show
prejudice. State v. Forde, 233 Ariz. 543, 555, ¶ 18 (2014). Here, the superior
court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to continue Ralston’s trial.

¶21 Contrary to Ralston’s contention, the superior court did not
deny a continuance solely based on its calendar. Its other reasons for
doing so—that Ralston could have secured the witness’s presence earlier
and her testimony was unlikely to impact the case—were sound. Though
“the unavailability of a key witness” may qualify as an “extraordinary
circumstance” under Rule 8.5(b), a court has discretion to deny a
continuance if the witness’s absence could have been “foreseen and

1 See Knapp v. Hardy, 111 Ariz. 107 (1974) (permitting indigent defendant to

receive services from privately retained attorney who associates with
appointed counsel).

6
 STATE v. RALSTON-GONZALES
Decision of the Court

avoided.” State v. Vasko, 193 Ariz. 142, 144–45, ¶ 11 (App. 1998). Here,
Ralston bears the blame for failing to timely identify and contact the
potential witness. Ralston personally knew the witness, and the State
disclosed the video showing her interaction with Ralston and the trooper
almost two years before trial.

¶22 Ralston also fails to demonstrate the witness’s absence
caused him prejudice. In seeking the continuance, Knapp counsel told the
court the witness would testify consistent with her statements heard on
the trooper’s dashcam video, but counsel could not anticipate what
testimony she might provide beyond those statements. Because jurors
were able to hear the witness’s expected testimony when they watched the
video and Ralston can only speculate whether, and how, the witness
would have testified beyond those statements, he fails to establish her in-
court testimony would have altered the verdicts. See State v. Cook, 172
Ariz. 122, 125 (App. 1992).

III. Ralston’s ineffective assistance claim is not reviewable on
direct appeal.

¶23 Ralston argues his appointed counsel provided
constitutionally deficient representation. Such contentions may only be
raised in a petition for post-conviction relief. See Spreitz, 202 Ariz. at 3, ¶ 9.

CONCLUSION

¶24 For the reasons set forth above, this court affirms Ralston’s
convictions and sentences.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

7