State v. Shaw

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

JOHN BRADLEY SHAW, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0447 PRPC
FILED 7-9-2020

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2017-120845-001
The Honorable Mark H. Brain, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Lisa Marie Martin
Counsel for Respondent

John Bradley Shaw, Florence
Petitioner

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.
 STATE v. SHAW
Decision of the Court

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Petitioner John Bradley Shaw seeks review of the superior
court’s order summarily denying his post-conviction relief (PCR) petition.
See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33. Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, this
court will not disturb a superior court’s ruling on a PCR petition. State v.
Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577 ¶ 19 (2012). Because Shaw has shown no such
error, this court grants review but denies relief.

¶2 The State charged Shaw with unlawful flight from a law
enforcement vehicle, a Class 5 felony, and misconduct involving weapons,
a Class 4 felony. For sentencing enhancement purposes, the State alleged
that Shaw had 17 prior felony convictions.

¶3 At a settlement conference in September 2017, the State
offered to dismiss prior felony conviction allegations and stipulate to a
three-year prison term followed by probation if Shaw pled guilty to both
offenses. Explaining the offer expired at the end of the day, the State also
verbally agreed not to file anticipated drug-related charges against Shaw
after laboratory testing was completed on suspected methamphetamine
and heroin found in Shaw’s possession when he was arrested. Shaw
rejected the offer.

¶4 Almost eight months later, Shaw signed the proffered plea
agreement and pled guilty to the charged offenses. The court accepted the
guilty plea and, abiding by the parties’ stipulation, imposed a three-year
slightly aggravated prison term for the weapons charge. For the unlawful
flight charge, the court suspended sentence and placed Shaw on probation
for 18 months after his release from prison.

¶5 Shaw timely commenced PCR proceedings. His appointed
counsel found no colorable claims, and Shaw proceeded to represent
himself.

¶6 In his PCR petition as amended, Shaw claimed police
unlawfully seized the firearm that was the basis of the weapons charge.
Shaw also challenged the voluntariness of his plea. Finally, Shaw asserted
he was “not bound to” the plea agreement because it was “expired and . . .
void” when he signed it and, therefore, his “case [should be] dismiss[ed].”
The superior court summarily dismissed the petition and Shaw now timely
seeks review by this court.

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 STATE v. SHAW
Decision of the Court

¶7 Shaw suggests that his counsel and the superior court coerced
him at the settlement conference to plead guilty. Whatever Rule 33.1
provision Shaw implicates as a basis for relief on this claim, his argument
fails. The settlement conference transcript clearly indicates Shaw was
steadfast in his rejection of the plea offer and in his desire to go to trial at
that time. His guilty plea eight months later after an apparent change of
mind does not indicate coercion, and his avowals at the change of plea
hearing confirm his plea was voluntary.

¶8 Shaw next appears to argue that, when he pled guilty, he was
entitled to rely on the prosecutor’s earlier verbal promise at the settlement
conference not to file drug-related charges. Not so. At the settlement
conference, the prosecutor addressed Shaw as follows: “[J]ust so you know,
it is the policy of our office that if you reject a plea offer, any subsequent
plea offer has to be substantially harsher. . . . So this offer expires today and
it won’t be coming back.” Shaw immediately responded, “I understand
that.” The court verbally confirmed with Shaw that he wanted to reject the
plea offer and proceed to trial. Nothing in the record indicates an
enforceable agreement between the State and Shaw to resuscitate the
prosecutor’s verbal promise after Shaw rejected it. In any event, Shaw does
not claim the State has charged him with any drug charges related to this
case after he pled guilty.

¶9 Shaw also takes issue with the plea agreement’s reference to
his 17 prior felony convictions. But a trial court may consider prior felony
convictions as aggravating factors even where the State has agreed not to
allege those prior convictions for sentencing enhancement purposes. State
v. Jackson, 130 Ariz. 195, 196 (App. 1981). Shaw’s concerns about the State’s
referring to the prior convictions “outside of the plea agreement” lack
merit.

¶10 Shaw next asserts both plea and post-conviction counsel
provided ineffective assistance. Shaw, however, merely makes
unsubstantiated generalizations regarding counsel’s purported deficient
performance; he does not provide substantive argument supported by
authority and a factual record. See State v. Febles, 210 Ariz. 589, ¶ 18 (App.
2005) (to raise colorable claim and avoid summary dismissal of petition,
defendant must establish counsel’s performance was objectively
unreasonable based on applicable professional standards, and counsel’s
performance prejudiced defendant); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.7(e) (“The
defendant must attach to the petition any affidavits, records, or other
evidence currently available to the defendant supporting the allegations in
the petition.”).

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 STATE v. SHAW
Decision of the Court

¶11 Finally, to the extent Shaw challenges any of the superior
court’s specific rulings, he has shown no error. The court dismissed the
petition in an order that clearly identified and correctly ruled upon the
issues raised. Further, the court did so in a thorough, well-reasoned manner
that will allow any future court to understand the court’s rulings. Under
these circumstances, “No useful purpose would be served by this court
rehashing the trial court’s correct ruling in a written decision.” State v.
Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274 (App. 1993).

CONCLUSION

¶12 Because Shaw has not shown the superior court abused its
discretion by summarily dismissing his post-conviction relief petition, this
court grants review but denies relief.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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