State v. Joyce

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

RYAN CHRISTOPHER JOYCE, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0552
FILED 6-11-2020

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. P1300CR201801015
The Honorable Thomas K. Kelly, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Michael O’Toole
Counsel for Appellee

The Zickerman Law Office, PLLC, Flagstaff
By Adam Zickerman
Counsel for Appellant
 STATE v. JOYCE
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the
Court, in which Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge David B. Gass joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Ryan Christopher Joyce (“Appellant”) appeals his
convictions and placement on probation for unlawful flight from a
pursuing law enforcement vehicle and harassment. Appellant’s counsel
has filed a brief in accordance with Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000);
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297
(1969), stating that he has searched the record on appeal and found no
arguable question of law on any issue. Appellant’s counsel therefore
requests that we review the record for fundamental error. See State v.
Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999) (stating this court reviews the
entire record for reversible error). Appellant was provided the
opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona, but has not
done so.

¶2 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the Arizona
Constitution, art. 6, § 9, and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections
12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A). Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶3 On July 11, 2018, the State charged Appellant by indictment
with unlawful flight from a pursuing official law enforcement vehicle, a
class five felony, in violation of A.R.S. § 28-622.01, and harassment, a class
one misdemeanor, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2921(A)(1).

¶4 At trial, the State presented the following evidence: On May
9, 2018, Appellant’s wife had an order of protection served against
Appellant by Officer Eller of the Prescott Valley Police Department. Later

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against Appellant. See State
v. Kiper, 181 Ariz. 62, 64 (App. 1994).

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 STATE v. JOYCE
Decision of the Court

that same day, Appellant in violation of the order sent his wife rude text
messages indicating he planned to return to their shared residence. After
learning Appellant planned to return that afternoon, Officers Eller and
Cozens went to the residence, but they did not receive a response to their
knock at the door. As the officers began walking away, they heard a
vehicle’s engine running inside the garage, but the engine shortly
thereafter turned off. The officers confirmed by phone that Appellant’s
wife was not at home, and therefore assumed Appellant was in the
residence. The officers again knocked on the door, but received no
response. They decided to park their vehicles down the street—and out of
sight from Appellant’s residence—and wait for Appellant to drive away
from the residence. They were joined by Sergeant Grant in another police
vehicle.

¶5 Almost immediately thereafter, Appellant left the residence
and drove onto the road toward where the officers were waiting. As
Appellant approached the three fully marked law enforcement vehicles,
Officer Eller turned on his overhead lights and siren, and attempted to
pull over Appellant. Instead of pulling over or stopping at the upcoming
stop sign, however, Appellant rolled through the stop sign and began to
accelerate. Officer Cozens and Sergeant Grant activated their overhead
lights and sirens and followed Officer Eller in a line of three vehicles
following Appellant. Appellant accelerated up to forty-eight miles-per-
hour on a road with a twenty-five miles-per-hour posted speed limit.

¶6 After a short pursuit, Appellant decelerated and turned right
into a private club parking lot where he began to open his car door as his
car slowed down. Thinking Appellant was preparing to flee on foot, the
officers ordered Appellant out of his vehicle; however, he appeared to
have difficulty complying with the order. Officers Cozens and Eller
approached and pulled Appellant out of his vehicle. Appellant informed
the officers he had previously suffered a stroke and was unable to
properly use the left side of his body.

¶7 After handcuffing Appellant, the officers informed
Appellant of his Miranda2 rights. Appellant stated he wanted a lawyer but
continued to speak and claimed he did not see the lights or hear the sirens.
Officer Eller told Appellant to stop talking. However, Appellant
continued to speak, stating, “[M]an I knew it when that was happening
that I should not be doing it. And that’s why I pulled over at the gym.”

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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 STATE v. JOYCE
Decision of the Court

¶8 Appellant did not testify at trial, but his counsel argued his
stroke caused him to become very slow in visual processing, which caused
his delay in pulling over. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial judge
found Appellant guilty of misdemeanor harassment and the jury returned
a guilty verdict for felony flight from a law enforcement vehicle. The trial
court placed Appellant on supervised probation for three years, which
included domestic violence counseling and mental health terms, plus
incarceration in the Yavapai County Jail for four days, with credit for four
days’ time already served. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

¶9 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and
find none. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300; Clark, 196 Ariz. at 537, ¶ 30. The
evidence presented at trial was substantial and supports the verdict, and
the period of probation imposed was within the statutory limits. See
A.R.S. § 13-902(A)(4). Appellant was represented by counsel at all stages
of the proceedings and allowed to speak at sentencing. The proceedings
were conducted in compliance with his constitutional and statutory rights
and the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

¶10 After filing of this decision, defense counsel’s obligations
pertaining to Appellant’s representation in this appeal have ended.
Counsel need do no more than inform Appellant of the status of the
appeal and of his future options, unless counsel’s review reveals an issue
appropriate for petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. See
State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85 (1984). Appellant has thirty days
from the date of this decision to proceed, if he desires, with a pro per
motion for reconsideration or petition for review.

CONCLUSION

¶11 Appellant’s convictions and placement on probation are
affirmed.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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