State v. Bridewell

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA,
Appellee,

v.

LEONARD DWIGHT BRIDEWELL,
Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 21-0585
FILED 5-24-2022

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. LC2021-000270-001
The Honorable Julie A. LaFave, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Peoria City Attorney's Office, Peoria
By Vanessa Hickman, Rebecca Strickland
Counsel for Appellee

Leonard Dwight Bridewell, Peoria
Appellant

STATE v. BRIDEWELL
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Leonard Dwight Bridewell appeals from the superior court's
judgment affirming his justice court misdemeanor conviction for disorderly
conduct. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Bridewell and his wife had a domestic dispute at their
apartment. Police responded to the scene and charged Bridewell with
disorderly conduct and assault, both domestic-violence offenses. A bench
trial before the Peoria Municipal Court followed, and the court found
Bridewell guilty of disorderly conduct.

¶3 Bridewell appealed the conviction to the Maricopa County
Superior Court. The superior court affirmed. Bridewell then appealed to
this Court. The State moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
but we denied the motion based on Bridewell's contention that his appeal
challenged the facial validity of the disorderly conduct statute. We have
jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 22-375.

DISCUSSION

¶4 The scope of our review is limited to Bridewell's assertion that
the disorderly conduct statute is void for vagueness. See A.R.S. § 22-375
("An appeal may be taken by the defendant . . . from a final judgment of the
superior court in an action appealed from a justice of the peace or municipal
court, if the action involves the validity of a . . . statute."). Because the other
issues Bridewell raises fall outside our jurisdiction, we decline to consider
them. Id.

¶5 We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. State v.
Kaiser, 204 Ariz. 514, 517, ¶ 8 (App. 2003). We presume the statute's
constitutionality, Fann v. State, 251 Ariz. 425, 433, ¶ 23 (2021), and the
complaining party must demonstrate its invalidity, Hall v. Elected Officials'
Ret. Plan, 241 Ariz. 33, 38, ¶ 14 (2016).

2

STATE v. BRIDEWELL
Decision of the Court

¶6 "A statute is void for vagueness if it fails to give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,
so that he [or she] may act accordingly." State v. Burbey, 243 Ariz. 145, 149,
¶ 15 (2017) (alteration in original) (cleaned up). "Such laws violate due
process because they fail to provide fair warning of criminal conduct and
do not provide clear standards to law enforcement to avoid arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement." Id.

¶7 The disorderly conduct statute provides that a person
commits disorderly conduct "if, with intent to disturb the peace or quiet of
a neighborhood, family or person, or with knowledge of doing so, such
person: [e]ngages in fighting, violent or seriously disruptive behavior."
A.R.S. § 13-2904(A)(1). And our supreme court rejected a vagueness
challenge to a prior version of Arizona's disorderly conduct offense. See
State v. Starsky, 106 Ariz. 329, 330-32 (1970) (upholding disorderly conduct
statute that included prohibitions on disturbing the peace by "[t]hreatening,
traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting"). For purposes of a
vagueness challenge, we discern no material difference between the current
and prior versions of the statute.

¶8 Bridewell claims the statute is unconstitutionally vague
because it did not allow him "to delineate between conduct that was
deemed lawful or unlawful." But Bridewell must show something more
than his own confusion—he must demonstrate that the statute is
unintelligible to the person of "ordinary intelligence." Burbey, 243 Ariz. at
149, ¶ 15. Due process does not require "perfect notice" and a statute is not
"void for vagueness simply because it may be difficult for the public to
determine how far they can go before they are in actual violation." Fuenning
v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 590, 598 (1983). Because due process "requires
only that the language of a statute convey a definite warning of the
proscribed conduct," id., Bridewell fails to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality, see Hall, 241 Ariz. at 38, ¶ 14.

CONCLUSION

¶9 Bridewell's conviction is affirmed.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA
3