State v. Bachler

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JOHN ADAM BACHLER, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 22-0597
FILED 5-14-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2018-155975-001
The Honorable Justin Beresky, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Brian Coffman
Counsel for Appellee

Law Office of Stephen M. Johnson Inc., Phoenix
By Stephen M. Johnson
Counsel for Appellant
 STATE v. BACHLER
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 A jury convicted John Bachler (“Bachler”) of first-degree,
premeditated murder. Bachler appeals his conviction and natural life
sentence, arguing the superior court should have suppressed statements he
made to law enforcement during a post-arrest interview. Bachler also
argues the superior court should have declared a mistrial because a
detective testified about Bachler’s mental state. We reject both arguments
and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On July 4, 2017, Phoenix police and fire departments
responded to a report of a deceased individual in a culvert a short distance
from Bachler’s neighborhood. The victim, who was homeless, was lying on
a makeshift bed, wearing only underwear, and had suffered five gunshot
wounds. The medical examiner determined the manner of death was
homicide. Police recovered a single shell casing at the scene.

¶3 Bachler visited the area where the homicide took place a few
nights before the incident. Then, on July 3 around 8 p.m., surveillance
footage from a gas station showed Bachler with a handgun holstered and
holding a plastic bag containing purchased items.

¶4 That same night, Bachler sent a string of text messages to his
wife and mother complaining about the nearby homeless population.
Those messages included the following statements: “I don’t want my [kids]
living in this area;” “I wanted to live further North;” and “I admitted to
drinking, but this junky neighborhood has a sobering effect.” Bachler also
asked, “What else should I show you? A deceased carcass with a needle in
its arm? How about some young kid being raped by some heroin and meth
addicts!” Around 7:30 p.m., Bachler stopped texting, which his wife found
unusual because he was “constantly on his phone.”

¶5 After hearing about the homicide on the news, Bachler’s wife
called the police because she suspected her husband was involved.

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Bachler’s wife knew he was out in the neighborhood when the homicide
occurred, and that he had stayed at a nearby hotel that night. Bachler kept
abreast of neighborhood activity, so his disinterest in the crime shocked her,
particularly because Bachler often complained about the homeless
population living nearby. She once heard him comment, “if I could get
away with killing one of those lowlifes, I would.” She also recalled that he
previously “said something about [how] fireworks would be good to cover
up gunshots.”

¶6 Bachler’s wife grew more suspicious after asking Bachler
what he did with the clothes he was wearing the night of the murder and
he responded that he had thrown them away because they were “messed
up with oil or grease.” When she did not find the clothes in the trash, she
confronted him, and he responded that he donated the clothes. He later
said he donated his shoes because they were “too big.”

¶7 Roughly a week later, the police searched Bachler’s home and
interviewed him. During the search, they could not locate Bachler’s
clothing from the night of July 3 or a 9mm handgun (a type of firearm
Bachler owned, and the type used in the homicide).

¶8 On November 16, 2018, the Fugitive Apprehension
Investigative Detail (“FAID”) Unit arrested Bachler. Bachler asserts that
transporting officers told him he had to confess and then threatened him,
including by mentioning the death penalty, stating they “had him ‘dead-to-
rights,’” and telling him that he was “going to go down for 1st [d]egree
[m]urder.”

¶9 Upon arriving at the station, the transporting officer escorted
Bachler to a room where a detective interviewed him. The interview started
before 9 a.m. and lasted about six-and-a-half hours. Before beginning the
interview, the detective read Bachler his Miranda1 rights. During the
interview, the police provided Bachler with access to a bathroom and gave
him food and drink.

¶10 The detective showed Bachler a presentation, describing what
the police had learned during the murder investigation and explaining why
they had probable cause to believe he was responsible. Almost five hours
into the interview, Bachler admitted to shooting the victim. He claimed it
was “a freak, accidental, wrong-place-wrong-time” situation and there was

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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not “an altercation by any means.” Bachler mentioned that he used a plastic
shopping bag to catch the shell casings.

¶11 The State charged Bachler with first-degree murder. Bachler
moved to suppress his confession. The superior court held a suppression
hearing, during which a transporting officer, the investigating detective,
and Bachler testified.

¶12 Bachler argued that his will was “completely overcome”
during the interview, making his confession involuntary and inadmissible.
He relied on the detective’s comment that “I have a certain degree of control
over my cases, and my most powerful tool is my discretion, I can make
choices of what I, how I want to charge somebody versus the county
attorney saying, no, you’re doing this.” According to the detective, he
meant to convey only that the county attorney, and not the detective, would
make the ultimate charging decision. Bachler testified that he interpreted
the comment to mean the detective had the “ultimate” and “final say” on
charging. Bachler also testified that when the detective mentioned that the
county attorney had decided to charge him with premeditated murder, it
scared him. Bachler thought that charge “meant death penalty,” so the
detective was his “savior” because if he said what the detective wanted to
hear, the “death penalty [was] off the table.”

¶13 Bachler also challenged the length of the interview. The
detective testified that the interview took longer because Bachler discussed
other topics—for example, his family, firearms, and politics. Bachler
admitted during the interview, “I’m slowing things down. I’m talking too
much. I’m sorry about that.” At one point, the detective suggested,
“Alright, let’s jump back into this so we can get through this.” At no point
did the detective believe that Bachler wanted to end the interview; instead,
the detective described it as a free-flowing, back-and-forth conversation.

¶14 The superior court denied Bachler’s motion. The court found
that the officers did not threaten Bachler during transport, the detective’s
comments about his discretion did not persuade Bachler to confess, and
none of the factors in A.R.S. § 13-3988 supported suppression.

¶15 At trial, Bachler changed his story about the shooting. He
testified that, after leaving the gas station, he went to the culvert where the
victim was staying. Bachler said he exchanged words with the victim, who
then brandished a knife and lunged at him, causing Bachler to shoot and
kill the man in self-defense. He claimed he fled the scene without calling
911 and hid his gun and remaining ammunition. He checked into a nearby

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hotel for the night; the next morning, he messaged his wife, who picked him
up.

¶16 During trial, the interviewing detective testified about the
investigation. When asked what stood out to him, the detective responded
as follows:

The firearm in the plastic bag really stood out to me . . . . So I
have had, as you guys can probably imagine, I have had lots
of training and experience being in homicide for almost ten
years. I’ve seen hundreds of cases. I have been to training that
talks about hundreds of cases. The firearm in the plastic bag
shows to me or through my training and experience that there
was forethought (emphasis added).

¶17 Bachler made an objection, which the court sustained. The
detective then re-answered that “through my training and experience,
again, I have had cases where we learned that the subject placed the firearm
into a plastic bag in order to catch the shell casings, so they would not be
discovered by law enforcement.” Bachler did not object to that testimony.

¶18 Bachler moved for a mistrial, arguing that the State violated
Arizona Rule of Evidence 704(b) by “ask[ing] the detective to . . . make a
legal conclusion as associated with the bag,” thereby testifying that Bachler
had acted with premeditation. The State responded that the testimony was
proper because it explained to the jury that the detective’s “conclusions
were based on the facts that he was finding” and “why that fact is important
to him.” The court declined to declare a mistrial, reasoning that, although
the statements “started to cross the line,” “[t]he jury will ultimately decide
whether it means premeditation or could be a point toward premeditation.”
The court later instructed the jury that if the court “sustained an objection
to a lawyer’s question, you must disregard it and any answer given.”

¶19 The jury convicted Bachler of first-degree, premeditated
murder. The superior court sentenced Bachler to natural life in prison.

¶20 Bachler timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S.
§§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031.

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DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Suppress

¶21 Bachler argues the superior court abused its discretion by not
suppressing the incriminatory statements he made during the second
interview, contending those statements were involuntary. We review the
superior court’s ruling on a suppression motion for an abuse of discretion,
considering only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. State
v. Wilson, 237 Ariz. 296, 298 ¶ 7 (2015). We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to sustaining the superior court’s ruling and defer to the
court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous. State v. Rosengren, 199
Ariz. 112, 116 ¶ 9 (App. 2000). We review legal conclusions de novo. Id.

¶22 The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
applicable here through the Fourteenth Amendment, “is available outside
of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings
in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from
being compelled to incriminate themselves.” Miranda, 384 U.S.at 467. A
confession voluntarily given “shall be admissible in evidence[.]” A.R.S. §
13-3988(A). “To find a confession involuntary, we must find both coercive
police behavior and a causal relation between the coercive behavior and the
defendant’s overborne will.” State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, 336 ¶ 44 (2008).
We review the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the
defendant’s will was overborne. State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 399 ¶ 39
(2006). In asserting that his confession was involuntary, Bachler relies on
the manner of his arrest, statements officers allegedly made to him during
transport, the length of the interview, and promises the interviewing
detective allegedly made.

¶23 Bachler first argues the “violent collision” with his vehicle, the
presence of rifles and canines, and the “violent manner” in which he was
apprehended contributed to the involuntariness of his later statements. A
restriction on a suspect’s “freedom of movement” is a prerequisite to
invoking the Fifth Amendment’s protections. See State v. Maciel, 240 Ariz.
46, 50 ¶¶ 12-13 (2016). Recognizing that pre-condition, § 13-3988 focuses on
the point at which an individual has been arrested. See A.R.S. § 13-3988(C)
(“Nothing contained in this section shall bar the admission in evidence of
any confession made . . . at any time at which the person who made or gave
such confession was not under arrest or other detention.”). There is,
therefore, a distinction between the apprehension process, when a suspect
is not yet in custody, and arrest, at which point a suspect is in custody and
the Fifth Amendment applies. See Maciel, 240 Ariz. at 50 ¶¶ 12-13.

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¶24 Here, even assuming a “violent collision” occurred, and the
police used rifles and canines to arrest Bachler, he was not yet in custody
when those actions took place, so they do not render his later confession
involuntary. The actions taken to apprehend Bachler occurred before—even
if only shortly before—he was detained and thus before his right against
self-incrimination attached. See A.R.S. § 13-3988(C).

¶25 Next, Bachler argues that the police made “threatening
statements” enroute to the station, causing him to involuntarily confess
hours later. Bachler claimed transporting officers mentioned the death
penalty and told him that he had to confess, they “had him ‘dead-to-
rights,’” and “he was going to go down for 1st Degree Murder.” A
transporting officer denied making any of the alleged comments or hearing
any other officer make threats. The superior court found that Bachler “was
not threatened by the officers during the transport[.]” Because there was
conflicting testimony, we defer to that factual finding. See State v. Tapia, 159
Ariz. 284, 288 (1988); State v. Olquin, 216 Ariz. 250, 252 ¶ 10 (App. 2007)
(“[W]e do not impose our own determination as to the credibility of
witnesses” and defer to the superior court since it “is in the best position to
make that determination.”).

¶26 Moreover, as the superior court observed, the video recording
of the confession does not support Bachler’s argument. At the beginning of
the interview, Bachler said that “it is true I don’t normally carry that [many]
Second Amendment items.” Soon after, he told the detective that “I think
this all has something to do with” “crimes against my own children” by
“not only my ex-wife but her brother-in-law.” If transporting officers had
threatened Bachler with first-degree murder charges only minutes earlier,
it is unlikely he could have thought he was detained regarding crimes
against his children. Bachler’s comments discredit his version of events and
support the superior court’s factual finding.

¶27 Bachler next contends that his statements were involuntary
because the interviewing detective suggested that “an admission would
result in leniency in charging” and “in the ultimate punishment, which was
reasonably perceived to be death.” “Promises of benefits or leniency,
whether direct or implied, even if only slight in value, are impermissibly
coercive.” State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 127 ¶ 30 (2006). On the other hand,
when an alleged promise is no more than a statement that a defendant’s
answers might make a difference in the charges, it does not render resulting
statements involuntary. See State v. Williams, 27 Ariz. App. 279, 285 (App.
1976); State v. McVay, 127 Ariz. 18, 20 (1980) (“[W]here the alleged promise

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is couched in terms of a mere possibility or an opinion, this is not deemed
to be a sufficient promise so as to render a confession involuntary.”).

¶28 Here, Bachler relies on the interviewing detective’s statement
that, “I have a certain degree of control over my cases, and my most
powerful tool is my discretion, I can make choices of what I, how I want to
charge somebody versus the county attorney saying, no, you’re doing this.”
Bachler says this comment “led [him] to believe that only an admission
would literally save his life from the death sentence penalty associated with
1st Degree Murder.” Our supreme court has held that similar statements
did not cross the line into direct or implied promises. See, e.g., McVay, 127
Ariz. at 20 (determining an officer’s statement that defendant’s
“cooperation would be made known to the warden and it was possible this
would have an effect on his request to be released from isolation” was a
“possibility rather than a promise”); State v. Hall, 120 Ariz. 454, 456 (1978)
(authorities’ statement that if appellant cooperated “it would possibly have
an effect on the sentencing” was not a direct or implied promise); see also
State v. Greenberg, 236 Ariz. 592, 597–98 ¶ 22–23 (App. 2015) (detective’s
statement that it was possible for appellant to be charged only with a
misdemeanor and see a judge in the morning was not a direct or implied
promise). At best for Bachler, the detective explained that he has some
discretion in how suspects are charged. The detective did not promise
benefits or leniency, and so his statements did not render Bachler’s
confession involuntary.

¶29 Finally, Bachler argues that the length of his interview
rendered his statements involuntary. The length of an interview alone is
insufficient to find a confession involuntary. Newell, 212 Ariz. at 399 ¶ 41.
In Newell, our supreme court noted that, during a fourteen-hour interview,
the defendant was given multiple breaks to use the restroom, spent time
alone, and had not been questioned the entire time—all factors
undercutting the claim that statements were made involuntarily. Id. ¶ 42.
Here, the police read Bachler his Miranda rights, gave him breaks, and
provided him with food and drink. Moreover, the superior court found
that Bachler prolonged the interview: “[H]e went on for five or close to six
hours, denying, first of all, that he was there; interrupting at every stage of
investigation –- interview. Talking about things that had nothing to do with
this case, the women he was out looking for, the baseball game. He was
talking about everything but.” Based on our independent review of the
video recording of the interview, the superior court’s conclusions were
correct, not clearly erroneous. State v. Sandoval Beltran, 1 CA-CR 23-0142,
2024 WL 1930995, at *2 (Ariz. App. May 2, 2024) (mem. decision) (“[W]e
conduct an independent review of the video evidence, but we review that

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evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.”
(cleaned up)). The superior court did not err in denying Bachler’s motion
to suppress his confession.

II. Motion for Mistrial

¶30 Bachler also argues the superior court erred when it refused
to declare a mistrial because of testimony from the interviewing detective.
“The decision to grant or deny a motion for mistrial rests within the sound
discretion of the [superior] court and the failure to grant a motion for
mistrial is error only if such failure was a clear abuse of discretion.” State
v. Koch, 138 Ariz. 99, 101 (1983). The superior court “is always in the best
position to determine whether a particular incident calls for a mistrial.” Id.
Declaring a mistrial is the “most dramatic remedy for trial error” and is only
resorted to when “justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and
a new trial granted.” State v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. 250, 262 (1983). When the
superior court sustains an objection to witness testimony, two factors guide
whether a mistrial is required: “whether the testimony called to the jurors’
attention matters that they would not be justified in reaching their verdict”
and “the probability under the circumstances of the case that the testimony
influenced the jurors.” State v. Lamar, 205 Ariz. 431, 439 ¶ 40 (2003).

¶31 Arizona Rule of Evidence 702(a) says an expert may testify if
“the expert’s scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue.” Rule 704(b) then provides that “[i]n a criminal case, an expert
witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant . . . ha[d] a
mental state . . . that constitutes an element of the crime charged. Those
matters are for the trier of fact alone.” Ariz. R. Evid. 704(b).

¶32 Here, the interviewing detective testified as a lay and expert
witness. He provided lay testimony, based on personal knowledge, about
the homicide investigation and what police learned throughout. He
provided expert testimony about his broader investigative experience.
During direct examination, the State asked, “was there something that
particularly jumped out at you” or “[w]as there one particular point that
you thought wow, this is different?” The detective answered:

[T]he firearm in the plastic bag really stood out to me . . . . So
I have had, as you guys can probably imagine, I have had lots
of training and experience being in homicide for almost ten
years. I’ve seen hundreds of cases. I have been to training that
talks about hundreds of cases. The firearm in the plastic bag

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shows to me or through my training and experience that there
was forethought (emphasis added).

¶33 Bachler argues that the term “forethought” is synonymous
with “premeditation,” so the detective violated Rule 704(b) by testifying as
an expert that Bachler acted with premeditation, an element of first-degree
murder. See A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1). But even if the detective’s testimony
violated Rule 704(b), we conclude that it is highly improbable that the
testimony influenced the jury.

¶34 The testimony was fleeting—the objectionable portion of the
detective’s answer consisted of a single word, “forethought.” Bachler
immediately objected and the court sustained the objection. The detective
then re-stated his answer in a manner that was not objectionable. See infra
¶ 37. The court later instructed the jury to disregard any questions or
answers if it had sustained an objection. We presume jurors follow
instructions, including by disregarding information subject to a sustained
objection. Newell, 212 Ariz. at 403 ¶ 68.

¶35 This is not an instance where “the risk that the jury will not,
or cannot, follow instructions is so great” that a mistrial must result. Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968). Contrary to Bachler’s assertion
otherwise, there was ample additional evidence supporting premeditation.
Examples include, but are not limited to, the following: Bachler’s comments
to his wife that “if [he] could get away with killing one of those lowlifes,
[he] would” and that “fireworks would be good to cover up gunshots”;
Bachler’s visit to the area of the eventual crime scene just days prior; and
Bachler’s admission that he used the plastic bag to catch the shell casings.
The superior court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in denying a
mistrial.

¶36 Bachler also challenges the detective’s re-stated testimony
that he has investigated cases where the suspect placed “the firearm into a
plastic bag in order to catch the shell casings, so they would not be
discovered by law enforcement.” Because Bachler did not object to that
testimony, we review for fundamental error. See State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz.
135, 140 ¶ 12 (2018). To establish fundamental error, a defendant has the
burden to show “(1) the error went to the foundation of the case, (2) the
error took from the defendant a right essential to his defense, or (3) the error
was so egregious that he could not possibly have received a fair trial.” Id.
at 142 ¶ 21. To prevail under either of the first two prongs, but not to prevail
under the third, the defendant must separately show prejudice. Id.

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¶37 Bachler has not shown that the detective’s re-stated testimony
was objectionable. The detective explained only that, in prior cases,
suspects have used plastic bags to avoid detection. That testimony still
required the jury to decide whether Bachler used a plastic bag for that
purpose. But, even if the detective’s testimony suggested that Bachler did
so, the detective did not comment directly on a mental state that is an
element of the crime. See Ariz. R. Evid. 704(b). First-degree murder does
not require an intent to avoid detection. While one could argue, first, that
obtaining a plastic bag and then using it during a crime shows planning
and, second, that planning shows premeditation, neither of those two
conclusions must follow from the detective’s statement. Even if the jury
credited that statement, it still had to conclude (i) that Bachler obtained a
plastic bag prior to the crime, (ii) that he used it during the crime, (iii) that
he did so to avoid detection, (iv) that doing so to avoid detection required
planning, and (v) that planning established premeditation. Thus, the
detective’s re-stated answer did not violate Rule 704(b).

¶38 Even if the superior court erred in allowing the detective’s re-
stated testimony, Bachler has not shown fundamental error. The detective’s
testimony did not go to the foundation of the case, take from Bachler a right
essential to his defense, or deprive him of a fair trial. See Escalante, 245 Ariz.
at 142 ¶ 21. Bachler took the stand in his own defense and testified that he
had not placed his gun in a plastic bag, and thus Bachler had an opportunity
to refute the detective’s statement. At that point, it was up to the jury to
determine the “credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony.” Grijalva v. State, 32 Ariz. 470, 475 (1927). And, as explained (see
supra ¶ 35), there was ample other evidence in the record supporting
premeditation. See State v. Granados, 235 Ariz. 321, 329 ¶ 35 (App. 2014)
(holding defendant could not show prejudice when the objected-to
evidence was cumulative).

CONCLUSION

¶39 We affirm the court’s denial of Bachler’s motion to suppress
and the resulting convictions and sentences.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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