State v. Dennis Hyde

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JASON CLIFFORD DENNIS HYDE, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 22-0600
FILED 1-23-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015CR202100541
The Honorable Richard D. Lambert, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Brian Coffman
Counsel for Appellee

DwaneCates.com PLLC, Phoenix
By Aaron Reed
Counsel for Appellant
 STATE v. DENNIS HYDE
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the court, in
which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Jason Clifford Dennis Hyde appeals his convictions and
sentences for criminal damage and for failure to stop at the scene of an
accident involving serious physical injury or death. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 One night in May 2021, a person requested a ride from a
shuttle company. One of the company’s drivers picked the passenger up in
a Kia Soul. As they were traveling south on McCulloch Boulevard in Lake
Havasu City, Arizona, a Dodge Dakota pickup truck hit them. The impact
caused the Kia to lift onto two wheels, cross over from the southbound lanes
across the northbound lanes, and then collide with a curb and a wall. The
passenger crawled out of the Kia and walked towards the Dodge. He
noticed two people in the Dodge, and they ran away as he approached their
vehicle. The passenger called out, “Now you guys, you’re running away
from us leaving us for dead?” Both the passenger and the driver sustained
severe physical injuries from the collision.

¶3 The responding police officers searched the abandoned
Dodge, finding several cold beers, open containers, and warm food in paper
bags. They also found a driver’s license with the name Jason Hyde and an
address. At 2:46 a.m., two officers went to the address on the driver’s
license. They knocked on the door and Hyde’s mother answered. They
asked if they could go in, but she said nothing.

¶4 Hyde then came to the door with “his hand out in front of him
with his fists clenched.” Upon seeing this, one of the officers put him in a
hold usually performed when handcuffing someone. The officers did not
place Hyde in handcuffs but told him that he was being detained. They did
not read him his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Hyde
then questioned why he was being detained and argued with one of the
officers. The other officer de-escalated the situation, and Hyde agreed to
talk to him. They walked to the front of the porch and started talking, but

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Hyde stated he wanted to return to the front door because he wanted the
conversation recorded by a camera in the door. The officer did not stop him
from walking in the camera’s view.

¶5 The officers asked Hyde if he knew why they had contacted
him. He responded that he had been involved in a collision and that he was
the driver. He added that the Kia had hit his vehicle, that the passenger had
yelled profanities at him, and that he got scared and “ran.” The officers then
asked him why he had not called the police after the collision, to which he
responded that he did not have a phone. Finally, they asked him where the
case of beer in the vehicle’s front seat had come from, and Hyde said he had
“no clue.” The officers did not ask him whether he had been drinking before
driving, but he “volunteer[ed]” that he did not drink before the collision
and drank only after he came back home. Less than five minutes after the
encounter began, he chose to cease talking. The officers then arrested him.
After the arrest, the officers asked Hyde his date of birth and whether he
had anything on him that might harm them. He confirmed his date of birth
and said he was not carrying any weapons but continued “spontaneously”
making incriminating statements such as “There was no one in the car with
me” and “I really wish I would have stayed [at the scene].” The officers’
body cameras had recorded Hyde’s encounter with the officers and his
arrest.

¶6 The State charged Hyde with one count of failure to stop at
the scene of an accident involving serious physical injury or death, a class 2
felony; three counts of aggravated assault, class 3 and 4 felonies; and two
counts of criminal damage, one a class 4 felony, and the other a class one
misdemeanor. The State later moved to dismiss the aggravated assault and
criminal damage charges. For the charge of failure to stop at the scene of an
accident involving serious physical injury or death, the State alleged
physical, emotional, or financial harm to the victim or the victim’s
immediate family as an aggravating factor. The State also alleged the taking
of or damage to property as an aggravating factor for the misdemeanor
criminal damage charge.

¶7 Before trial, Hyde moved to preclude all the statements that
he made before he spoke to his attorney, arguing that the statements were
obtained in violation of his Miranda rights because he was in custody but
was not given warnings. The State responded that his statements before his
arrest should not be suppressed because he was not in custody when he
was questioned and that his post-arrest statements should not be
suppressed because they were not made in response to questioning. The
court held an evidentiary hearing, observing the body camera recording

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and hearing testimony from the arresting officer about the encounter. The
court denied Hyde’s motion, finding that Hyde was not in custody because
the environment in which he was questioned did not present inherently
coercive pressures. It also found that he was not interrogated after he was
arrested and that he “blurt[ed] out” his post-arrest statements “despite not
being asked a question.”

¶8 At trial, the State referred to the passenger as one of the
victims during its opening statement. After the opening statement, Hyde
moved to preclude the State from referring to the passenger as a victim. The
State argued that the passenger was a victim because “two victims out of
the same or one nucleus of events” could exist and that Hyde’s conduct
victimized the passenger and the driver. The trial court denied the motion,
reasoning that failure to stop at the scene of an accident involving serious
physical injury or death required a victim and that the State could refer to
the passenger as a victim. However, before the State’s closing argument, the
trial court instructed the jury that counsel’s comments were “not evidence.”
During closing arguments, the State again referred to the passenger as a
victim.

¶9 The jury found Hyde guilty of criminal damage and failure to
stop at the scene of an accident involving serious physical injury or death.
The jury also found that the State had proved the alleged aggravating factor
for each count. The court sentenced Hyde to a term of 7 years’
imprisonment for the count of failure to stop at the scene of an accident
involving serious physical injury or death, and to a consecutive term of 2
years’ imprisonment for the count of criminal damage. Hyde timely
appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Suppress

¶10 Hyde argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to suppress his statements. This court reviews the trial court’s denial of a
motion to suppress for abuse of discretion. State v. Maciel, 240 Ariz. 46, 49
¶ 9 (2016). In this review, this court considers “only the evidence presented
at the suppression hearing, and reviews the evidence in a light most
favorable to upholding the ruling.” State v. Aldana, 252 Ariz. 69, 72 ¶ 10
(App. 2021).

¶11 Miranda requires the police to warn suspects who are in
custody of their rights before initiating questioning. State v. Spears, 184 Ariz.
277, 286 (1996). A person is considered in custody for Miranda purposes if

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the person’s “freedom of action was significantly curtailed and, if so, when
the environment in which [the person] was questioned presented
inherently coercive pressures similar to a station house interrogation.”
Maciel, 240 Ariz. at 50 ¶ 13.

¶12 A person’s freedom of movement “has been significantly
curtailed if a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty
to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Id. at 50 ¶ 14 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Here, Hyde argues—and the State
concedes—that his freedom of action was curtailed. As a result, the only
remaining issue is whether the environment presented “inherently coercive
pressures.”

¶13 A person is questioned in an environment that presents
“inherently coercive pressures” if the environment “threaten[s] to
subjugate the [person] to the examiner’s will.” Id. at 50 ¶ 16 (citation
omitted). To determine whether the environment presented “inherently
coercive pressures,” we must consider “all of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation,” including the site of the questioning, the
presence of objective indicia of arrest, and the length and form of the
interrogation. Id. at 49–50 ¶¶ 11, 14 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). When “a person is arrested in his home or on the street and
whisked to a police station for questioning[,] detention represents a sharp
and ominous change, and the shock may give rise to coercive pressures.”
Id. at 50 ¶ 17 (citation omitted). “In contrast, coercion is often lacking when
a person is questioned in familiar surroundings.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶14 Here, before he was arrested, Hyde was questioned in
familiar surroundings. He was questioned in front of his mother’s house’s
porch. Id. His mother and daughter were present during the questioning,
the entire encounter occurred in public, and he was in full view of
passersby. Id. at 50–51 ¶ 18 (explaining that “exposure to public view
during questioning can dispel the danger of coercion”). He was not
transported elsewhere nor was he handcuffed. He was able to move back
and forth in front of the house. Only two officers were present during
questioning and they did not threaten him with force. Finally, Hyde’s
encounter with the officers before he was arrested lasted less than five
minutes. Id. at 51 ¶ 23 (finding that detention of less than one hour did not,
on its own, amount to custody for Miranda purposes). The evidence
presented at the suppression hearing supports the trial court’s finding that
Hyde was not questioned in an environment that presented inherently
coercive pressures and he was thus not in custody.

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¶15 The record also supports the trial court’s finding that Hyde’s
statements after he was arrested were not the result of interrogation. The
officers asked him only (1) whether he had anything on him that might
harm them and (2) to confirm his date of birth. Those questions concerned
officers’ safety and Hyde’s identity. They were attendant to his arrest and
not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from Hyde. See
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (holding that “the term
‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but
also to any words or actions on the part of the police[—]other than those
normally attendant to arrest and custody[—]that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect”
(emphasis added)); see also State v. Landrum, 112 Ariz. 555, 559 (1976)
(holding that questions about the suspect’s identify were “clearly neutral,
nonaccusatory in nature, and in furtherance of proper preliminary
investigation” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The rest of
Hyde’s statements after his arrest were spontaneous. He was not made any
promises nor did the officers threaten him with force. Hyde has shown no
error.

II. Victim Reference

¶16 Hyde also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the
State, over his objection, to refer to the passenger as a victim in its opening
statement and closing argument. He contends that because the passenger
was not listed as a victim in the indictment, the passenger’s status as a
victim was not relevant under Arizona Rule of Evidence 401.

¶17 Hyde frames the issue as an error in admitting irrelevant
evidence. But the State referred to the passenger as a victim only during its
opening statement and closing argument. Statements of counsel are not
evidence. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384 (1990). We thus reject this
framing. The issue is not whether irrelevant evidence was erroneously
admitted, but whether the court erred in allowing the State to refer to the
passenger as a victim. In reviewing prosecutorial error claims, this court
first determines whether an error exists. State v. Shortman, 254 Ariz. 338, 343
¶ 21 (App. 2022). If so, “[w]e will find an error harmless if we can say
beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not affect the verdict.” State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 511 ¶ 106 (2013).

¶18 A “victim” is “a person against whom a criminal offense has
been committed.” A.R.S. § 13–4401(19). One may be considered a “victim”
even if not identified as such in the indictment or charging document. See
State v. Guilliams, 208 Ariz. 48, 52–53 ¶¶ 13–15 (App. 2004) (holding that

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Department of Corrections was a “victim” of defendant’s attempted escape
for purposes of restitution award because “the restitution statutes do not
require that a specific victim be named in . . . [an] indictment . . . or verdict
form”). Further, the offense of failure to stop at the scene of an accident
involving serious physical injury or death may have more than one victim.
See State v. Powers, 200 Ariz. 123, 127 ¶ 13 (App. 2001) (stating that the
objective behind the law prohibiting drivers from leaving the scene of a
collision “is satisfied by allowing only a single charge for each accident
scene regardless of the number of victims”).

¶19 Here, Hyde was driving the Dodge that hit the Kia in which
the driver and the passenger were traveling, and severely injured them.
Thus, both the driver and the passenger were victims of Hyde’s offense. See
State ex rel. Smith v. Reeves, 226 Ariz. 419, 422–23 ¶¶ 13–17 (App. 2011)
(explaining that “[a]lthough defendant was not charged with committing a
crime for hitting [a child], the charge that he left the scene without
complying with A.R.S. § 28–663 is not simply a claim that defendant
violated a safety statute or an offense against public order; rather, it is a
claim that he violated the specific duty he owed to [the child] that arose the
moment that defendant struck him”). As a result, the trial court did not err
in allowing the State to refer to the passenger as one of the victims.

¶20 Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that counsel’s
statements during their opening statements and closing arguments were
“not evidence,” and “[w]e presume that the jurors follow[] the court’s
instructions.” State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 403 ¶ 68 (2006). Thus, even if the
trial court erred in allowing the State to refer to the passenger as a victim in
closing argument, the reference did not affect the jury’s unanimous verdict.
See State v. Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. 197, 216 ¶ 69 (2018) (finding that even
if the State’s statements during its opening statement were improper, “they
were harmless in light of the trial court’s initial instructions noting that
opening statements are not evidence”).

CONCLUSION

¶21 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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