State v. Ariaga

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ANNA MARIE ARIAGA, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 23-0268
FILED 2-29-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
No. S0300CR97000514
The Honorable Cathleen Brown Nichols, Judge

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Coconino County Attorney’s Office, Flagstaff
By Ammon David Barker
Counsel for Appellee

John Trebon, PC, Flagstaff
By John J. Trebon
Counsel for Appellant
 STATE v. ARIAGA
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Anna Ariaga appeals the superior court’s denial of her
application for the restoration of her civil rights and to set aside several of
her convictions. The State agrees that the court erred by denying Ariaga’s
application to have her civil rights restored. The State also agrees that the
court erred by relying on an incorrect factual predicate for determining
whether Ariaga’s endangerment convictions should be set aside, but argues
that the case should be remanded for an assessment of whether other factors
establish a basis for denying Ariaga’s request that the convictions be set
aside. Accordingly, and for reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In 1997, Ariaga pleaded guilty to one count of attempted
aggravated assault (a class 3 felony) and three counts of endangerment
(class 6 undesignated felonies), and she was placed on probation for three
years. After she successfully completed probation, the endangerment
offenses were designated as class 1 misdemeanors.

¶3 In 2017, Ariaga applied to have her civil rights restored and
all of her convictions set aside. The court denied both aspects of her
application. In 2023, Ariaga filed a motion to restore her civil rights and to
set aside her three misdemeanor convictions. The court restored Ariaga’s
right to vote but declined to restore her other civil rights or to set aside the
misdemeanor convictions.

¶4 Ariaga timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(3).

DISCUSSION

¶5 Both parties agree that Ariaga’s civil rights, including her
firearm rights, should be restored. Under A.R.S. § 13-907(A), first-time
felony offenders are entitled to have their civil rights automatically restored
upon the completion of probation. Firearm rights are also restored unless

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 STATE v. ARIAGA
Decision of the Court

the defendant was convicted of a dangerous or serious offense as defined
in § 13-704 and § 13-706. A.R.S. § 13-907(C).

¶6 Here, Ariaga was a first-time felony offender. Because her
conviction was designated as non-dangerous, it was not a dangerous
offense under § 13-704. A.R.S. § 13-907(C)(1). And because her felony
conviction was an “attempt,” it was not a serious offense under § 13-706.
See A.R.S. §§ 13-907(C)(2), -706(F)(1). Thus, the superior court erred by
denying Ariaga’s request to have her civil rights restored.

¶7 Next, Ariaga contends her misdemeanor convictions of
endangerment should be set aside. We review the superior court’s decision
whether to set aside a conviction for abuse of discretion. State v. Hall, 234
Ariz. 374, 375, ¶ 3 (App. 2014). “An error of law committed in reaching a
discretionary conclusion may . . . constitute an abuse of discretion.” Id.
(citation omitted).

¶8 Section 13-905(A) allows convicted persons to apply to have
their judgment of guilt set aside once they have completed probation.
When determining whether to set aside a conviction, the court must
consider seven enumerated factors under A.R.S. § 13-905(C), including a
“catch-all” provision relating to “any other factor that is relevant to the
application.” A.R.S. § 13-905(C)(7). A conviction may not be set aside,
however, if the person was convicted of a “felony offense in which the
victim is a minor under fifteen years of age.” A.R.S. § 13-905(P)(4).

¶9 Here, although the superior court could have considered any
relevant factor under § 13-905(C)(7), the court denied Ariaga’s motion to set
aside the endangerment convictions solely because “the Defendant was
convicted of undesignated felony offenses that involved victims under the
age of 15.” But that rationale was incorrect because Ariaga’s convictions
involving victims under the age of 15 were ultimately designated as
misdemeanors.

¶10 Because the superior court did not indicate whether it had
analyzed other factors that may be relevant to the application, we remand
for the court to reconsider Ariaga’s request.

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 STATE v. ARIAGA
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶11 We reverse the superior court’s denial of the restoration of
Ariaga’s civil rights and the court’s denial of her request to set aside her
convictions, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this
decision.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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