State v. Rodriguez

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JUAN MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 23-0385
FILED 09-17-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015CR202200410
The Honorable Douglas Camacho, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Casey Ball
Counsel for Appellee

Harris & Winger PC, Flagstaff
By Chad Joshua Winger
Counsel for Appellant
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe
joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 Juan Manuel Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) appeals his
convictions for attempted first-degree murder, three counts of aggravated
assault, drive-by shooting, discharging a firearm at a nonresidential
structure, unlawful flight from a pursuing law enforcement vehicle,
possession of a narcotic drug for sale, possession of a dangerous drug for
sale, money laundering, and misconduct involving weapons. Rodriguez
challenges the superior court’s denial of his motions to sever charges, strike
four jurors for cause, and give an adverse-inference instruction under State
v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184 (1964). He also contends the court erred by admitting
drug profile evidence, precluding evidence favorable to the defense, and
overruling his objections to alleged prosecutorial error. Finally, Rodriguez
argues there was insufficient evidence to support most of his convictions.
The State concedes one conviction lacks adequate support. Based on that
concession, we vacate Rodriguez’s conviction and sentence for discharging
a firearm at a nonresidential structure. We otherwise affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Because Rodriguez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to support his convictions, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to
sustaining those convictions. See State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989).

¶3 Detective S. and his partner saw two vehicles leave a
residence they were surveilling, and each followed one vehicle. Detective
S. tailed a BMW driven by Rodriguez. After the BMW driver ran a stop sign
and accelerated beyond the speed limit, Detective S. activated the lights and
sirens on his unmarked Dodge Charger. As Detective S. pursued the BMW
at high speed, Rodriguez spun the BMW around and drove head-on at
Detective S., who swerved onto the shoulder to avoid a collision. Detective
S. turned to follow the BMW and noticed it had spun out and stopped
partially off the road. Detective S. stepped out of his car to command the
BMW’s occupants to show their hands. Detective S. saw the driver

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“digging around on the floorboard“ and making “frantic movements”
while slowly backing up the BMW.

¶4 Concerned that Rodriguez planned to hit him, the detective
got back into his car and then heard automatic gunfire coming from the
BMW. Detective S. returned fire as the BMW rammed the Charger’s left
rear tire area, impairing its maneuverability. Detective S. struggled to
control the vehicle while driving away and Rodriguez pursued and shot at
the detective. While driving, Detective S. returned fire through the
Charger’s back window when a bullet struck him in the upper back. Bullets
from Rodriguez’s gun also struck a residence and the tire of a parked truck.
Detective S. located other responding officers and got a ride to the hospital.
The Charger was riddled with bullet holes, including two in the driver’s
seat headrest. At the hospital, Detective S. removed his shirt and the bullet
that wounded him fell out.

¶5 A short time later, a law enforcement helicopter and a sheriff’s
deputy observed Rodriguez and the BMW in a desert area near Mohave
Community College. Rodriguez, now alone, exited the driver’s seat,
opened the left rear door, and retrieved a bag he slung around his neck. He
walked away from the car, stepped down into a wash, and attempted to
hide the bag in some brush. When Rodriguez emerged, he held a gun in
each hand. As he walked toward the college, he fired a shot at Deputy G.,
who was tracking him.

¶6 Just before reaching campus, Rodriguez collapsed—he had a
gunshot wound to his torso. He was unresponsive as officers handcuffed
and searched him. In addition to the two guns he was carrying, he had a
third gun, $3,870 in cash, and a ledger containing names and dollar
amounts paid or owed.

¶7 The crime scenes near the college and the shootings with
Detective S. were secured and searched. The BMW contained a
semiautomatic weapon on the driver’s side floorboard, another drug ledger
hidden in the driver’s side door panel, and an Uzi-style firearm, jewelry,
coin collections, and a small scale, all in the trunk. Rodriguez’s blood was
found on an airbag deployed in the driver’s seat and on the left rear
passenger doorframe. Along the desert path Rodriguez took from the
BMW to the college, law enforcement found a bag containing $34,504 in
cash, a “gram scale” designed to measure lightweight items, and baggies
containing fentanyl and methamphetamine. Officers found 17 shell casings
on the streets where Rodriguez shot at Detective S—all 17 were fired from
a weapon Rodriguez possessed when he collapsed.

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¶8 The State charged Rodriguez with attempted first-degree
murder, three counts of aggravated assault, discharging a firearm at a
residence, discharging a firearm at a nonresidential structure, drive-by
shooting, possession of a narcotic drug for sale (fentanyl), possession of a
dangerous drug for sale (methamphetamine), money laundering, unlawful
flight from a pursuing law enforcement vehicle, and misconduct involving
weapons. At trial, Detective S. identified Rodriguez as the BMW’s driver,
and eyewitnesses to the incident identified the BMW’s driver as the shooter.
The jury acquitted Rodriguez of discharging a firearm at a residence and
found him guilty of the remaining charges. The superior court sentenced
him to concurrent and consecutive prison terms totaling 169 years.

¶9 Rodriguez timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S.
§§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4033(A).

DISCUSSION

I. Severance

¶10 Rodriguez argues the superior court erred by denying his
pretrial motion to sever the drug-related counts from the shooting-related
counts. We review a denial of severance for an abuse of discretion,
considering the evidence before the court when it denied the motion. State
v. LeBrun, 222 Ariz. 183, 185 ¶ 5 (App. 2009); State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421,
444–45 ¶ 60 (2016). Because Rodriguez did not renew his motion to sever
during trial, he must establish fundamental error. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.
13.4(c); Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 443 ¶ 54.

¶11 Offenses may be tried together if they “(1) are of the same or
similar character; (2) are based on the same conduct or are otherwise
connected in their commission; or (3) are alleged to have been a part of a
common scheme or plan.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.3(a). Joint trials are favored
in the interest of judicial economy, see State v. Allen, 253 Ariz. 306, 309 ¶ 56
(2022), but the superior court must sever “if necessary to promote a fair
determination of [the] defendant’s guilt or innocence,” Ariz. R. Crim. P.
13.4(a). Charges are “connected together in their commission” when
evidence of the charges “[is] so intertwined and related that much the same
evidence was relevant to and would prove [all the charges sought to be
joined], and the crimes themselves arose out of a series of connected acts.”
State v. Prion, 203 Ariz. 157, 162 ¶ 32 (2002).

¶12 In analyzing Rodriguez’s motion to sever, the court
considered the following evidence: within a short period of time,
Rodriguez tried to elude and shot at police; drove into the desert where he

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tried to hide drugs, a scale, and money; and fired a shot at police before
collapsing from a gunshot wound while carrying three firearms, more cash,
and a drug ledger. In opposing severance, the State argued the charges
arose from “the same nucleus of events,” were contemporaneous, and
would be cross-admissible to establish Rodriguez’s motive, identity, and
absence of mistake. The superior court concluded the counts were properly
joined under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.3(a)(2) and (a)(3) and
that any risk of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the
probative value of cross-admission.

¶13 The superior court correctly concluded the charges were
connected in their commission, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.3(a)(2), and not
required to be severed based on a risk of unfair prejudice, see Ariz. R. Evid.
403. The crimes took place over a brief, unbroken period; the crimes were
interrelated; and it would have been difficult for jurors to understand one
set of crimes without evidence of the others. See State v. Martinez-Villareal,
145 Ariz. 441, 445–46 (1985); State v. Comer, 165 Ariz. 413, 418–19 (1990).

¶14 Rodriguez also fails to show prejudice. Evidence of the joined
counts would have been cross-admissible at separate trials under Arizona
Rule of Evidence 404(b). See State v. Johnson, 212 Ariz. 425, 430 ¶ 11 (2006);
State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 612 (1992). The drug evidence tended to show
Rodriguez’s motive, and absence of mistake, in shooting at and fleeing from
police. See State v. Williams, 183 Ariz. 368, 376 (1995). The shooting evidence
tended to show Rodriguez’s consciousness of guilt in committing the drug
offenses. See id. at 375–76. The superior court properly instructed the jury
to separately consider each charge and that each charge needed to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Johnson, 212 Ariz. at 430 ¶ 13.

II. Profile Evidence

¶15 Rodriguez argues testimony from the State’s expert
associating drug dealers with guns was inadmissible drug-profile evidence.
The superior court largely denied his pretrial motion to preclude
generalized drug evidence, and it overruled his similar objections during
trial. We review those evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. See
State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 585 ¶ 11 (2017).

¶16 “Profile evidence” typically refers to an “informal
compilation of characteristics” commonly displayed by persons engaged in
a particular type of criminal activity. State v. Lee, 191 Ariz. 542, 544 ¶ 10
(1998) (cleaned up). Profile evidence is inadmissible when offered only to
show that because the defendant “shares characteristics—many of them

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innocent and commonplace—with a certain type of offender, [the
defendant] must also possess the same criminal culpability.” Id. at 545 ¶ 14;
see also Haskie, 242 Ariz. at 585 ¶ 14.

¶17 But evidence about typical offender behaviors is not always
inadmissible. Such evidence may be admitted when it “has significance
beyond the mere suggestion that because an accused’s conduct is similar to
that of other proven violators, he too must be guilty.” Id. at 546 ¶ 19. Thus,
behavioral evidence may be admitted “to assist a jury in understanding the
modus operandi of a drug-trafficking organization,” State v. Escalante, 245
Ariz. 135, 142 ¶ 22 (2018), or “to explain how a person’s actions may
indicate their active participation in a crime,” State v. Garcia-Quintana, 234
Ariz. 267, 271 ¶ 13 (App. 2014). The fact that modus operandi evidence “may
indicate [the defendant’s] active participation in a crime” does not
transform it into inadmissible profile evidence. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 15; see also
Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 143 ¶ 25.

¶18 Here, an expert testified that firearms are commonly found
when investigating drug crimes because drug sellers carry guns to protect
themselves, their money, and their product. The expert also testified that
drug buyers may make purchases with money, but they also barter other
things of value, like jewelry and electronic equipment.

¶19 The superior court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
that testimony. The expert’s description of why drug sellers commonly
carry guns was modus operandi evidence explaining a general practice. The
testimony did not suggest Rodriguez must be guilty of drug crimes simply
because he was carrying a gun, and the expert did not compare the modus
operandi evidence “with the conduct of [Rodriguez] in [this] particular
case.” Garcia-Quintana, 234 Ariz. at 271 ¶ 14. Similarly, the expert’s
testimony about people bartering items of value for drugs was modus
operandi evidence. The testimony did not suggest that Rodriguez must be a
drug dealer because he possessed items of value like jewelry and guns. The
testimony was offered, rather, to explain why drug sellers might have such
items in their possession. See id. at 271 ¶¶ 13, 15.

III. Willits Instruction

¶20 Rodriguez argued at trial that he was innocent of the charges
premised on Detective S. being shot because evidence showed the detective
was hit by a ricocheting bullet from his own gun. After the shooting,
Detective S. gave his weapon to the lead investigating detective, who
returned it about three weeks later. The State did not test the weapon, and

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Rodriguez suggested that such testing could have linked it to the bullet that
wounded Detective S. Rodriguez also argued that Detective S.’s weapon
was unsuitable to be tested after being returned because it could have been
altered at that point.

¶21 Rodriguez asked the superior court to give an adverse-
inference instruction under Willits, 96 Ariz. at 186. “To be entitled to a
Willits instruction, a defendant must prove that (1) the state failed to
preserve material and reasonably accessible evidence that could have had
a tendency to exonerate the accused, and (2) there was resulting prejudice.”
State v. Glissendorf, 235 Ariz. 147, 150 ¶ 8 (2014) (cleaned up). The superior
court declined to give the requested instruction, reasoning the State did not
fail to preserve Detective S.’s firearm and the results of testing it would not
have tended to exonerate Rodriguez. We review the court’s refusal to give
a Willits instruction for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 7.

¶22 The superior court did not abuse its discretion. Rodriguez
does not establish that the State failed to preserve Detective S.’s firearm.
His speculation that the weapon could have been altered does not establish
a failure to preserve it. Cf. State v. Geotis, 187 Ariz. 521, 525 (App. 1996);
Glissendorf, 235 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 9. Rodriguez also fails to show that testing
the firearm would have produced evidence having any tendency to
exonerate him. Because the projectile recovered from Detective S.’s back
was merely the internal core of a bullet that no longer had a jacket, the
projectile lacked characteristics that could be matched to a particular
weapon, including Detective S.’s firearm. Cf. State v. Hernandez, 250 Ariz.
28, 34 ¶ 21 (2020).

IV. Preclusion of Evidence

¶23 The superior court precluded testimony that law enforcement
found no drug evidence when they searched Rodriguez’s home, reasoning
that the testimony was irrelevant. Rodriguez challenges that ruling,
arguing it deprived him of his constitutional right to present a complete
defense. We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, but we
consider constitutional claims de novo. State v. Nordstrom, 230 Ariz. 110, 114
¶ 8 (2012).

¶24 The superior court correctly precluded the testimony. The
drug charges against Rodriguez were premised on drugs, money, scales,
and ledgers he possessed on the day of the incident. The absence of drug
evidence at Rodriguez’s home had no bearing on whether he was guilty of
the charged offenses. See Ariz. R. Evid. 401. Rodriguez’s constitutional

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right to present a defense was “subject to reasonable restrictions,” including
the application of evidentiary rules that “are not ‘arbitrary’ or
‘disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’” United
States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (citation omitted). Rodriguez fails
to establish that Arizona Rule of Evidence 401’s relevance requirement is
arbitrary or that its application deprived him of a meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense.

V. Prosecutorial Error

¶25 Rodriquez argues he was deprived of a fair trial by
inadmissible, prejudicial comments the prosecutor made during closing
arguments in both the guilt and aggravation phases of trial. Rodriguez
objected to the prosecutor’s statement, in the guilt phase, that “[t]his entire
case is nothing more than somebody who wants to be a cop killer.” The
court overruled the objection. During the aggravation phase, Rodriguez
objected to the prosecutor’s statement that when Rodriguez committed the
drive-by shooting and discharged a firearm at a structure, “[w]e are lucky”
that two non-victim witnesses “w[ere]n’t killed.” In response to
Rodriguez’s objection, the superior court instructed the jury to “only
consider [the aggravating] circumstance for the charge that the defendant
was found guilty of,” and to “rely on [their] collective memory as to who
the victim of each offense was.”

¶26 We review the challenged statements for harmless error. See
State v. Johnson, 247 Ariz. 166, 200 ¶ 133 (2019). We assess each allegation
individually and consider whether they cumulatively caused an unfair trial.
Id. To establish prosecutorial error, Rodriguez must show “the prosecutor’s
misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process.” Murray, 250 Ariz. at 548 ¶ 13 (cleaned
up). He can do so by showing the existence of misconduct and a reasonable
likelihood such misconduct could have affected the verdict. Id.

¶27 Rodriguez argues the prosecutor’s statement about him
“want[ing] to be a cop killer” was not supported by evidence and
encouraged jurors to determine his guilt “based on raw emotion and
prejudice.” We discern no error in the statement’s admission. In exercising
their “wide latitude” during closing arguments, prosecutors may argue “all
reasonable inferences from the evidence” provided they do not “make
insinuations that are not supported by the evidence” or “make arguments
that appeal to the fears or passions of the jury.” State v. Morris, 215 Ariz.
324, 336–37 ¶¶ 51, 58 (2007) (cleaned up). The prosecutor’s “cop killer”
statement was not unduly inflammatory and was supported by the

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evidence—namely, that Rodriguez fired multiple shots knowing the
intended target was a police officer.

¶28 Rodriguez also contends the prosecutor’s comment that two
non-victim witnesses could have been killed improperly suggested those
witnesses were victims, asked jurors to view themselves in the witnesses’
shoes, and appealed to juror sympathy. We again find no impropriety. The
prosecutor referred to the non-victim witnesses while arguing that
Rodriguez risked inflicting bodily harm when he discharged a firearm at a
nonresidential structure while committing a drive-by shooting. The
witnesses were present during those incidents, they heard the bullets whiz
by, and the relevant aggravator does not apply only to threats of harm to a
named victim of the offense. See A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(1). Thus, the
prosecutor’s reference did not improperly treat the witnesses as victims or
appeal to the jurors’ sympathy in lieu of the evidence presented at trial. Nor
did the statement place jurors in the witnesses’ shoes—that a juror might
have been in the vicinity did not transform the prosecutor’s statement into
an improper appeal to personal fears. Cf. Morris, 215 Ariz. at 337 ¶ 58
(observing that the prosecutor improperly “singled out particular jurors
and addressed them personally”).

VI. Motions to Strike Jurors for Cause

¶29 Rodriguez moved to strike four jurors for cause during voir
dire. Rodriguez argues the superior court’s refusal to strike those jurors,
who then joined the jury panel, deprived him of a fair trial.

¶30 Criminal defendants have a right to an impartial jury. U.S.
Const. amend. VI; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24. A person cannot be seated as a
juror if the person is a “witness[ ] in the action,” is “interested directly or
indirectly in the matter under investigation,” is related to a party, or is
“biased or prejudiced in favor of or against” a party. A.R.S. § 21-211. Even
if a person is not prohibited from serving under § 21-211, the superior court
must excuse a juror “if there is a reasonable ground to believe that the juror
. . . cannot render a fair and impartial verdict.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b).

¶31 “In assessing a potential juror’s fairness and impartiality, the
trial court has the best opportunity to observe prospective jurors and
thereby judge the credibility of each.” State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 139
¶ 37 (2000). The court’s discretion over jury selection is accordingly broad,
see State v. Jimenez, 255 Ariz. 550, 553 ¶¶ 5, 8 (App. 2023), and we will not
upset its decision absent an abuse of discretion, State v. Colorado, 256 Ariz.
97 (App. 2023). As the proponent of error, Rodriguez must establish that

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the challenged jurors were “incapable of rendering a fair and impartial
verdict.” State v. Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. 197, 209 ¶ 21 (2018) (cleaned
up); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.5(h).

¶32 Rodriguez contends Juror M. should have been struck
because he was a witness in the action. A.R.S. § 21-211(1). We are
unpersuaded. A witness in the action is “limited to persons with personal
knowledge of a material, disputed aspect of the case.” State v. Thornton, 187
Ariz. 325, 330 (1996). Because Juror M.’s knowledge was confined to
information about the response of fire and medical services personnel,
which did not bear on any material, disputed issues at trial, Juror M. was
not a witness in the action. See id. (holding that a person who had listened
to the underlying events over a police scanner was not a witness because
the information she heard “did not involve disputed facts”).

¶33 Rodriguez also contends Juror M., Juror S., and Juror T.
should have been struck because they were “interested directly or
indirectly in the matter under investigation.” A.R.S. § 21-211(2); see also
State v. Eddington, 228 Ariz. 361, 363 ¶ 11 (2011). A juror’s familiarity with
some of the underlying events or law enforcement personnel involved in
the case, does not automatically prevent the juror from serving. See Acuna
Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 210 ¶ 32; State v. Blackman, 201 Ariz. 527, 533 ¶ 12
(App. 2002). Here, each challenged juror assured the court he or she could
fairly and impartially decide the case based on the evidence presented. The
trial judge was “in the best position to observe the potential jurors,” Johnson,
247 Ariz. at 196 ¶ 106, and the record supports the judge’s exercise of
discretion in retaining each juror. Notably, of the two potential witnesses
that Juror M. personally knew, only one testified—and only about a minor,
undisputed issue with no cross-examination by Rodriguez. Although Juror
S. and Juror T. each spoke of being fearful because of their loved ones’
proximity to the shootings, their experience did not presumptively bias
them against Rodriguez—his defense was that he was not the person who
committed the shootings, not that they never occurred. Cf. Thornton, 187
Ariz. at 330. Moreover, the emotional impact of the crimes on the jurors did
not bar them from serving on the jury. See Johnson, 247 Ariz. at 199 ¶ 126
(observing that a juror’s experience as a victim “alone is not disqualifying”).

¶34 Finally, Rodriguez contends Juror L. should have been struck
because he was, at first, not certain he could be fair and impartial. “[A]
juror’s assurances of impartiality need not be couched in absolute terms.”
Hoskins, 199 Ariz. at 139 ¶ 37. Juror L. eventually assured the superior court
he could be fair and impartial and would render a verdict based solely on
the evidence presented. Considering the totality of Juror L.’s answers, see

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Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.5(h), his reference to the uncertainty of human nature
when initially describing his ability to be fair and impartial did not require
the superior court to strike him. See Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 210–11
¶¶ 31–32; cf. Jimenez, 255 Ariz. at 550 ¶ 15. The superior court did not abuse
its discretion in not striking Juror L.

VII. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶35 Finally, Rodriguez contends the evidence at trial was
insufficient to support 9 of his 11 convictions. We review the sufficiency of
evidence de novo, viewing all facts and resolving all evidentiary conflicts in
favor of the verdict. State v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 279 ¶ 5 (2014). We
determine only whether substantial evidence supports the verdict. Id.
“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such proof that
reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 134 ¶ 65 (2006) (cleaned up). “The substantial evidence
required to support a conviction may be direct or circumstantial,” State v.
Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 27 ¶ 40 (App. 2007), and we do not “reweigh the
evidence to decide if [we] would reach the same conclusions as the trier of
fact,” State v. Barger, 167 Ariz. 563, 568 (App. 1990).

A. Attempted First-Degree Murder

¶36 A person commits attempted first-degree murder by
intentionally committing an act that “is any step in a course of conduct
planned to culminate in” the offense of first-degree murder. A.R.S. § 13-
1001(A)(2). A person commits first-degree murder if “[i]ntending or
knowing that the person’s conduct will cause death, the person causes the
death of another person . . . with premeditation.” A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1).

¶37 There was sufficient evidence that Rodriguez was the person
who fired his weapon at Detective S. Multiple eyewitnesses testified that
the BMW’s driver was the shooter, and ample evidence—including
eyewitness testimony, video evidence, and forensic evidence—established
that Rodriguez was the driver. The fact that Detective S. initially described
the BMW’s occupants as a white driver and a Hispanic male passenger did
not prevent jurors from finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Rodriguez
was the driver, and therefore the shooter. See State v. Felix, 234 Ariz. 118,
120–21 ¶ 10 (App. 2014).

¶38 There was also sufficient evidence of premeditation. The
evidence showed that Rodriguez began firing at Detective S. after (1) he was
aware the officer was attempting to stop him, (2) he intentionally drove at

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Detective S.’s vehicle head on, and (3) Detective S. stepped out of his vehicle
and commanded him to show his hands while he dug around the BMW’s
floorboard. The evidence further showed that Rodriguez shot at Detective
S. a second time while he pursued the detective’s vehicle after intentionally
impairing it. In sum, jurors had ample evidence from which to conclude
that Rodriguez “considered his act [before shooting at Detective S.] and did
not merely react to an instant quarrel or in the heat of passion.” State v.
Ovante, 231 Ariz. 180, 184 ¶ 14 (2013).

B. Aggravated Assault

¶39 Rodriguez was convicted of committing three aggravated
assaults with a deadly weapon—one causing physical injury to Detective S.
and two causing reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury to
Detective S. and Deputy G. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(1), (2), -1204(A)(2).

¶40 Substantial evidence supports all three convictions. For the
reasons given above, there was sufficient evidence Rodriguez shot at
Detective S. Based on such evidence, along with the bullet holes found in
the driver’s side headrest of the Charger, jurors could further conclude that
Detective S. was hit and injured by a bullet Rodriguez fired. And there was
sufficient evidence that Deputy G. felt a reasonable apprehension of
imminent physical harm. Deputy G. testified that after hearing the bullet
from Rodriguez whiz past his head, he “was in fear that [Rodriguez] might
fire another round and hit [him],” so he exited his vehicle, went behind it
to “use [the] car as cover[,] and brought [his] rifle up on [Rodriguez] at that
point.” The jury could find, based on that testimony, that the deputy
reasonably feared imminent injury.

C. Drive-By Shooting

¶41 Rodriguez was convicted of drive-by shooting, which
required proof that he “intentionally discharg[ed] a weapon from a motor
vehicle at a person, another occupied motor vehicle or an occupied
structure.” A.R.S. § 13-1209(A). Substantial evidence—which showed that
Rodriguez intentionally fired a weapon from the BMW at Detective S. in the
Charger—supports his conviction.

D. Possessing Drugs for Sale

¶42 Rodriguez was convicted of possessing a dangerous drug
(methamphetamine) for sale and possessing a narcotic drug (fentanyl) for
sale. See A.R.S. § 13-3407(A)(2); A.R.S. § 13-3408(A)(2). He argues there was
insufficient evidence to satisfy the “for sale” element of each offense.

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¶43 The State presented evidence that Rodriguez possessed 3.25
grams of fentanyl pieces, about 100 fentanyl tablets—which would provide
up to 20 days of fentanyl for a typical user—and 10 grams of a crystalline
substance containing methamphetamine—about 100 usable amounts.
Based on that evidence, combined with Rodriguez’s possession of scales,
drug ledgers, and large amounts of cash, jurors could reasonably conclude
that he possessed methamphetamine and fentanyl for sale. See State v.
Martinez, 226 Ariz. 221, 224 ¶¶ 14–15 (App. 2011).

E. Money Laundering

¶44 A person commits money laundering in the second degree
under A.R.S. § 13-2317(B)(1) by “transfer[ring], transport[ing], . . . or
conceal[ing] the existence or nature of racketeering proceeds knowing or
having reason to know that they are the proceeds of an offense.” Rodriguez
contends there was insufficient evidence that the money he possessed came
from drug sales. The record shows otherwise. Evidence that Rodriguez
was carrying a large amount of cash—which he tried to hide—along with
drugs, scales, and drug ledgers provided substantial circumstantial
evidence that he was transferring, transporting, or concealing known
proceeds from drug sales. Cf. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 521 (2008).

F. Discharging a Firearm at a Nonresidential Structure

¶45 Rodriguez also challenges his conviction of “knowingly
discharg[ing] a firearm at a nonresidential structure” under A.R.S. § 13-
1211(B). This court recently concluded “that a conviction for discharging a
firearm at a nonresidential structure requires evidence that a defendant
‘knowingly’ shot ‘at’ a nonresidential structure, as opposed to firing at a
person and inadvertently striking a structure.” State v. Aguirre, 255 Ariz.
89, 91 ¶ 1 (App. 2023).

¶46 The State concedes Rodriguez’s conviction under § 13-1211(B)
is incompatible with Aguirre and should be vacated. We accept that
concession. Because there was no evidence Rodriguez knowingly shot at
the truck, we vacate his conviction for violating § 13-1211(B).

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 STATE v. RODRIGUEZ
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶47 Because insufficient evidence supports Rodriguez’s
conviction for discharge of a firearm at a nonresidential structure, we vacate
that conviction and sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this decision. We otherwise affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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