State v. Garland

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

RUFUS LEE GARLAND, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0021 PRPC

FILED 12-03-2024

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2020-128043-001
The Honorable Michael W. Kemp, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Robert A. Walsh
Counsel for Respondent

Rufus Lee Garland, San Luis
Petitioner
 STATE v. GARLAND
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell, and Judges Kent E. Cattani and Paul
J. McMurdie delivered the decision of the Court.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Rufus Lee Garland seeks review of the dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32. For the reasons stated, we grant review but deny relief.

BACKGROUND

¶2 A jury found Garland guilty of kidnapping, aggravated
assault, and misdemeanor assault based on evidence he entered the victim’s
car, forced her at gunpoint to drive to his apartment, and then hit, choked,
and bit her while stating he was going to kill her. On direct appeal, in a pro
per brief, Garland argued the victim lied about what happened and her
relationship with him. He also argued the superior court erroneously
excluded evidence that would have discredited the victim’s testimony.
Finding no reversible error, we affirmed. State v. Garland, 1 CA-CR 22-0085,
2023 WL 408937 (Ariz. App. Jan. 26, 2023) (mem. decision).

¶3 Garland timely requested post-conviction relief and waived
his right to appointed counsel. In his petition for relief, he developed claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel, other constitutional violations, and
actual innocence. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a), (e), (h).

¶4 The superior court denied relief. Garland then filed this
petition for review.

DISCUSSION

¶5 We grant review. See A.R.S. § 13-4239; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.16.
We review for an abuse of discretion, “which occurs if the court makes an
error of law or fails to adequately investigate the facts necessary to support
its decision.” State v. Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, 407, ¶ 6 (2021). We will uphold
the court’s decision “if it is legally correct for any reason.” State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, 508, ¶ 7 (2015).

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Decision of the Court

¶6 Garland challenges the denial of relief regarding his
kidnapping conviction. First, he challenges his kidnapping conviction,
arguing that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
Garland points to counsel’s failure to (1) subpoena a “phone specialist” who
would have shown that the victim’s call logs belied her account of where
the kidnapping occurred, (2) object during the prosecutor’s direct
examination of the victim, and (3) adequately cross-examine the victim. To
state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
“must demonstrate that counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced thereby.” Bigger, 251 Ariz. at
407, ¶ 8 (citation omitted).

¶7 Garland failed to make this showing. His allegations are too
speculative to establish deficient conduct or prejudice. Garland offers no
specific information, supported by evidence, about how a phone specialist
would have testified, or about what questions or objections defense counsel
should have raised during the victim’s testimony and how that would have
affected the outcome. The superior court therefore did not abuse its
discretion by denying relief. See State v. Borbon, 146 Ariz. 392, 399 (1985)
(“Rule 32 does not require the trial court to conduct evidentiary hearings
based on mere generalizations and unsubstantiated claims that people exist
who would give favorable testimony.”); State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 413,
¶ 17 (App. 2000) (explaining that a colorable claim requires the defendant
to “provide specific factual allegations that, if true, would entitle him to
relief” supported by “sworn statements” or “a satisfactory explanation of
their absence”).

¶8 Garland also argues the trial evidence was insufficient to
show he kidnapped the victim, the court refused to admit evidence that
would have impeached the victim’s account of the kidnapping, and he is
actually innocent of that charge. The first two claims are precluded because
they were resolved on direct appeal, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2), and the
third is not colorable. Garland has failed to demonstrate, by clear and
convincing evidence, that no reasonable juror would find him guilty of
kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(h).

¶9 In the superior court, Garland also argued that his attorney
provided ineffective assistance by not calling other witnesses who could
impeach the victim’s testimony. He also argued that the superior court
violated his constitutional rights by preventing him from presenting a
complete defense, by making biased decisions, by referring to “cruel and
unusual” conduct, and by mismanaging deliberations. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.
32.1(a). Garland largely fails to provide references for these claims on

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Decision of the Court

review, but he proposes that the claims regarding the court’s conduct are
not precluded because he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and personally
waive them. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). Because Garland does not
meaningfully develop any of these issues on review, we do not consider
them. See State v. Stefanovich, 232 Ariz. 154, 158, ¶ 16 (App. 2013) (holding
the defendant waived a claim on review when he “cite[d] no relevant
authority and [did] not develop the argument in any meaningful way”);
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.16(c)(4) (“A party’s failure to raise any issue that could
be raised in the petition for review . . . constitutes a waiver of appellate
review of that issue.”). We also conclude, in any event, that Garland did
waive his claims of constitutional errors committed by the superior court
by omitting them from the appellate brief that he filed personally.

CONCLUSION

¶10 We grant review but deny relief.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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