State v. Baca

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ALEXANDER ERMENES BACA, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0067
FILED 01-30-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
No. S0300CR202100463
The Honorable Stacy Lynn Krueger, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Madeline Shupe
Counsel for Appellee

Coconino County Legal Defender, Flagstaff
By Joseph A. Carver
Counsel for Appellant
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Alexander Baca appeals his convictions and
sentences for first-degree murder and aggravated harassment. He claims
the court erred by failing to dismiss a seated juror, Juror 14, for cause. For
the following reasons, this Court affirms.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The State charged Baca with first-degree murder and
aggravated harassment against his former girlfriend. The case proceeded to
a jury trial.

¶3 While returning from the lunch break on the eighth day of
trial, as Juror 14 was parallel parking, the passenger in the truck ahead of
Juror 14 jumped out and claimed Juror 14 hit the truck. Neither Juror 14 nor
a fellow juror who was with him believed they hit the truck, and they
relayed that belief to the truck’s passenger. As they discussed the matter,
the truck’s driver approached, and all four people examined the bumper
and found no damage. The passenger remained convinced Juror 14 hit the
truck, so Juror 14 said, “I’m sorry if I did.” After that, the jurors and the
truck’s occupants went their separate ways. The jurors noted that the truck
had a sticker on it that read “Baca Soul” or “Baca Strong,” and Juror 14 later
identified the truck’s occupant as someone who attended the trial and sat
on the defense’s side.

¶4 Juror 14 reported the incident to the bailiff, who informed the
trial judge. At the request of Baca’s counsel, the court questioned Juror 14
and the other juror to determine if the interaction would impact their
deliberations. The judge asked Juror 14 if he “ha[d] any concerns about this
interaction in terms of [his] jury service,” to which Juror 14 replied, “Not at
all.” The judge followed up by asking, “And anything about that that causes
you any concern with your ability to be fair and impartial in this matter?”
Juror 14 responded, “Not really.” Baca’s counsel asked about the tone of the
conversation, and Juror 14 recounted the story. When Baca’s counsel

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rephrased the question, emphasizing whether “anyone was upset or angry
or anything like that,” Juror 14 answered: “No. I mean, I wish—I mean, I
don’t know what to say. I don’t know. Just coming back from lunch.”
Counsel again asked the question: “I’m just trying to get a sense of what the
conversation was like between the two of you. And if you got the sense that
this other person was upset or if you or [the other juror] was upset at all.”
Juror 14 responded: “Not upset. Just something that happened, you know.”

¶5 The juror who accompanied Juror 14 similarly reported the
interaction. Although this juror described the truck’s passenger as “acting
tough” and “upset,” he clarified that the passenger was not “yelling” or
being “animated.” The judge asked this juror: “[A]nything about that
interaction at all, would it affect your ability to be fair and impartial in this
case?” This juror responded: “No. I don’t think it has any bearing on what’s
going on in here.”

¶6 Baca’s counsel moved to dismiss Juror 141, claiming “his body
language appeared to be defensive” and a concern about “inherent
prejudice against Mr. Baca.” The court denied the motion, concluding there
was no indication the incident would affect Juror 14’s ability to remain fair
and impartial. Later that day, after the trial progressed, Baca’s counsel re-
urged the motion to strike Juror 14 after observing Juror 14 “staring at Mr.
Baca’s family for extended periods of time.” The court again denied the
motion, determining a juror “looking in the direction of . . . defense counsel
table, defendant, and also anyone behind [the defendant] is not enough” to
change the court’s perception of whether the juror could remain fair and
impartial.

¶7 The trial continued, and the jury convicted Baca on both
counts. Baca moved for a new trial on several grounds, including the court’s
failure to strike Juror 14, but the court denied the motion. Baca was
sentenced to imprisonment for natural life for the first-degree murder
conviction and to one year for the aggravated harassment conviction, with
966 days of presentence incarceration credit.

¶8 Baca timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction under
Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-
120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and -4033(A).

1 Baca’s counsel also moved to dismiss the other juror, but that ruling was

not challenged on appeal. See State v. Larson, 222 Ariz. 341, 346, ¶ 23 (App.
2009) (argument not advanced in opening brief is waived).

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DISCUSSION

¶9 Baca’s single issue on appeal is whether the court erred by
failing to excuse Juror 14. This Court reviews the superior court’s refusal to
strike a juror for an abuse of discretion, State v. Montoya, ___ Ariz. ___, ___,
¶ 72, 554 P.3d 473, 500 (2024), which requires this Court to “determine
whether substantial evidence supports” the court’s decision, State v. Miller, 234 Ariz. 31, 44, ¶ 51 (2013) (quotation omitted). And, because Baca’s
counsel objected to the court retaining Juror 14, this Court “review[s] any
error for harmless error.” Montoya, ___ Ariz. at ___, ¶ 72, 554 P.3d at 500.
Under harmless error review, “the [S]tate must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict.” State v. Perez-
Gutierrez, 257 Ariz. 307, 312, ¶ 18 (2024) (cleaned up).

¶10 “The right to a jury trial requires unbiased, impartial jurors.”
State v. Eddington, 228 Ariz. 361, 363, ¶ 6 (2011) (citations omitted). “Even a
single partial juror violates a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.”
State v. Macias, 249 Ariz. 335, 339, ¶ 10 (App. 2020) (quotation omitted).
“Persons biased or prejudiced” for “or against” any party in an action “shall
be disqualified to serve as jurors.” A.R.S. § 21-211(4); accord Ariz. R. Crim.
P. 18.4(b) (“The court . . . must excuse a prospective juror . . . from service in
the case if there is a reasonable ground to believe that the juror . . . cannot
render a fair and impartial verdict.” (emphasis added)). But because the
trial court is in the best position to determine an impaneled juror’s fairness
and impartiality, State v. Reinhold, 123 Ariz. 50, 55 (1979), a defendant
“challenging the juror bears the burden of establishing” the juror’s bias or
discrimination, State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 139, ¶ 37 (2000).

¶11 Baca contends “the totality of the circumstances showed a risk
that the jury’s edifice of impartiality had been compromised.” He re-urges
the arguments that Juror 14 appeared “defensive” against Baca’s counsel
when answering questions, “stared at [Baca’s] family for a noticeably long
time” during the trial and that the parking interaction did not involve
merely a minor fender-bender but a “confrontation.” Essentially, Baca
requests this Court to reweigh the evidence of Juror 14’s fairness and
impartiality, which this Court will not do. See State v. Acuna Valenzuela, 245
Ariz. 197, 210, ¶ 30 (2018) (“Although the juror here did not respond in the
same affirmative manner as the juror in [an earlier case], [this Court]
defer[s] to the decision of the trial court who actually heard the testimony
and observed the juror’s demeanor.”).

¶12 Baca also cites several cases stressing that courts must dismiss
a juror whenever “reasonable grounds” exist to believe the juror cannot be

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fair or impartial. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b). Yet the facts of the cases he cites
supporting reasonable grounds are much different than those in this case.
See Eddington, 228 Ariz. at 365, ¶ 18 (juror working for the investigating
agency); State v. Cota, 229 Ariz. 136, 146–47, ¶¶ 39–40 (2012) (juror who
became “upset” at a comment made by the prosecutor, reported she felt
“humiliated” and “wasn’t sure she could ever side with the State
thereafter” and “missed several minutes of testimony because she was
upset”). Other cases discussing reasonable grounds for dismissing jurors
are similarly distinguishable. State v. Johnson, 247 Ariz. 166, 198, ¶ 113 (2019)
(juror whose “opinion is unqualified or fixed” (cleaned up)); State v.
Thornton, 187 Ariz. 325, 330 (1996) (jurors possessing “personal knowledge
of a material, disputed aspect of the case” or “knowledge that is unique to
the case”). The record before this Court does not establish “reasonable
grounds” that would require Juror 14’s dismissal.

¶13 Substantial evidence supported the court’s determination that
“there[ wa]s no indication that . . . [Juror 14’s] ability to be fair and impartial
w[as ] affected by th[e] interaction.” When questioned about whether the
incident would impact his ability to remain fair and impartial, Juror 14
repeatedly answered it would not. The court found Juror 14 “was very clear
and precise with his answers, that it would not affect him, would not affect
his ability to be fair and impartial.” The court perceived Juror 14 to be
“almost confused by why the [c]ourt was asking whether he could still be
fair and impartial.” After hearing Juror 14’s and the other juror’s accounts,
the court summarized the incident: “[M]inor fender-benders, it happens.
Interaction did not seem to be much of an interaction at all. It was short. It
was a couple comments, they looked for damage, there was no damage, and
then the other individuals walked away.” The court concluded by saying:
“I don’t see any concerns with this—with this juror remaining. And there’s
no indication that—to indicate that his ability to be fair and impartial would
be affected by this interaction.” The court did not abuse its discretion by
keeping Juror 14 impaneled. See Johnson, 247 Ariz. at 199, ¶ 126 (“The court
found [the impaneled juror’s] answers appropriate, candid, and credible,
leaving the court confident that [the juror] could serve. The law requires
nothing more.”).

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CONCLUSION

¶14 For the reasons above, Baca’s convictions and sentences are
affirmed.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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