State v. Rhyner

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

SAMUEL RHYNER, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0312
FILED 05-13-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2021-001352-001
The Honorable Sunita Cairo, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Joseph Newberg
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Mikel Steinfeld
Counsel for Appellant
 STATE v. RHYNER
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Samuel D. Rhyner appeals his convictions and sentences for
six counts of sexual conduct with a minor, two counts of kidnapping, two
counts of molestation of a child and one count of sexual abuse. Finding no
error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view and recount the facts in the light most favorable to
sustaining the jury verdicts, see State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93 (2013),
using pseudonyms to protect the victims’ identities, see Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.
111(i).

¶3 Jane is Rhyner’s youngest daughter from his first marriage.
Rhyner sexually abused Jane beginning when she was four or five, and it
continued for over a decade. At first, he fondled her breasts and penetrated
her vagina with his finger. Later, he covered Jane’s eyes with a belt, tied
her hands together and forced her to perform oral sex on him. He did this
“pretty often.” Rhyner eventually had sexual intercourse with Jane and
told her to “shut up” when she asked him to stop. He also threatened to
beat Jane if she told anyone about the abuse.

¶4 Rhyner divorced his first wife and married his second
(“Second Wife”) about four years later. Second Wife had a daughter,
Sophie, who shared a bedroom with Jane. When Sophie was eight, Rhyner
sexually abused her for the first time, penetrating her vagina and anus with
his finger. He repeated this behavior multiple times for about a year.
Sophie delayed reporting the abuse, fearing Rhyner would hurt her mother
in retaliation.

¶5 The State charged Rhyner with seven counts of sexual
conduct with a minor, two counts of kidnapping, two counts of molestation
of a child, and two counts of sexual abuse, all dangerous crimes against
children.

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Decision of the Court

¶6 A jury trial was held. During trial, the State asked Second
Wife whether Rhyner ever exhibited “red flag[s],” to which she replied:

I know that after [Rhyner’s] mom died he became very
aggressive. He just was never happy. There was just a lot of
instances that happened. Every house that we lived in had a
hole in the wall from him just being upset, so it was a really,
really hard time for everybody.

Rhyner did not object to this question or answer.

¶7 The State voluntarily dismissed one count of sexual conduct
with a minor and one count of sexual abuse. The jury found Rhyner guilty
on all remaining counts, and the superior court sentenced him to six
consecutive life terms for his sexual-conduct-with-a-minor convictions and
another seventy-three consecutive years for his other convictions. Rhyner
timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031,
-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Rhyner argues the superior court should have excluded
Second Wife’s testimony as improper character evidence under Arizona
Rule of Evidence 404(b). Rhyner did not object at trial, so we review for
fundamental error. See State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140, ¶ 12 (2018).
Rhyner must show the alleged error is both fundamental and prejudicial.
Id.

¶9 Under Rule 404(b), evidence of a prior bad act “is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith.” Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Such evidence is
admissible, however, “for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.” Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). This list is not exhaustive;
prior bad act evidence is admissible “for any purpose other than that of
showing the defendant’s criminal propensities.” State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz.
404, 417 (1983). Still, evidence of an act otherwise admissible under Rule
404(b) may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice. Ariz. R. Evid. 403; State v. Anthony, 218
Ariz. 439, 444, ¶ 33 (2008).

¶10 We discern no error. Second Wife’s testimony clarifies why
Jane and Sophie waited years to report the abuse: They had witnessed
Rhyner’s violence firsthand and feared he would retaliate. The testimony

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Decision of the Court

was offered to support the children’s fear of retaliation and to explain the
delay in reporting, not to show Rhyner was predisposed to violence. See
Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b) (excluding only bad act evidence introduced to show
propensity). And any prejudice does not substantially outweigh this
probative value. See Ariz. R. Evid. 403; State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 382
(1986) (testimony is not unfairly prejudicial just because it may “harm
defendant’s interests”).

CONCLUSION

¶11 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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